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This thesis examines Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, and 
revisits his concept of alienation, a key to understanding his controversial rhetoric. I argue 
that his terminology - in which words have many meanings - may be understood in light 
of his dualistic view of humanity and his historical view of human progress. In his view of 
dualism and dialectic progress, Schiller sees either a fragmented or united human 
condition, and changes the meaning of his words depending on which era or state he is 
discussing. He holds that the aesthetic (holistic) education of man is vital in overcoming 
alienation, and contends we should use what he calls the play drive, a mental state 
equidistant from sense and reason, in all aspects of life, just as artists do when realizing 
the combination of mind and matter. For Schiller, ultimate social reform must start from 
the foundation of such a synthesized psyche, since this is the only way to build the bridge 
between the ideal and real, to realize humanity's dreams of freedom. 
11 
Acknowledgments 
I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. James Bradley, for his intellectual and practical 
assistance during the research and writing of this thesis. His patient guidance inspired me 
to conduct a close reading ofthe works of Schiller, and contributed greatly to the product 
of my research. A special thanks to my examiners, Dr. Suma Raj iva and Dr. Antoinette 
Stafford, for their kind comments and helpful suggestions. I also wish to thank Dr. Peter 
Harris for his kindness in proofreading the manuscript and offering helpful suggestions. 
Any remaining errors and omissions are entirely my own responsibility. 
111 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ ii 
Acknowledg:rnents ..... L.... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... vi 
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Chapter 1 The Definition of The Fragmented World 
1.1 Holism . .. . ... . .. . . ........ .. .. .. ..... ... .... .. ... . . .. . ... .. . . . . . . . . .. . ... ... . . . .. ... . . .. . . . . ..... ... . .. . .. .. . . . . . 11 
1.2 Frag:rnentation ................................................................................................. 13 
1.3 The Division of Labour ... .... ... .... ...... ... .. . . . .. . ... . . .. . ... . .. . .. . . . . . ....... ........ .. . .. . . . . .. .. 17 
1.4 Micro Levels of Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
1.5 Macro Levels of Frag:rnentation ..................................................................... 22 
1. 6 Reason and Sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
1.7 The Sensuous and Formal Drives .................................................................. 27 
1.8 State of Reason . ................. .......... ................... .. . . . ............ ..................... ..... ... . 31 
Chapter 2 Human Stages of Development 
2.1 The Meaning of History ................................................................................. 3 5 
2.2 Reflections: Resistance in the Frag:rnented Era .............................................. 41 
2.3 Stage 1: A State of Nature - Before Civilization ........................................... 45 
2.4 Stage 2: An Age of Trru;tsition - Ancient Greece ........................................... 48 
2.5 Stage 3: A Natural State- Provides Only Physical Necessities ..................... 54 
2.6 Stage 4: The Aesthetic State .......................................................................... 56 
Chapter 3 Terminology- Fragmentation and Wholeness 
3.1 Fragmentation in Language ........................................................................... 59 
3 .2 Reason ........................................................................................................... 64 
3.3 Nature ............................................................................................................ 69 
3.4 Civilization .................................................................................................... 80 
3.5 Freedom ......................................................................................................... 83 
1V 
Chapter 4 Schiller's World of Dualism 
4.1 Dual and Dialectic Attitude ........................................................................... 88 
4.2 Two Kinds of Ideality .................................................................................... 98 
4.3 Two Kinds of Truth..................................................................................... 100 
4.4 Realist and Idealist ....................................................................................... 103 
4.5 Two Kinds .ofRevolution ............................................................................ 105 
4.6 Two Kinds of Aesthetic Semblance ............................................................ 108 
4.7 Two Kinds of Art ......................................................................................... 112 
4.8 Two Kinds ofWorks of Art ......................................................................... 115 
4. 9 Tragedy and Comedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7 
4.10 Two Kinds of Form ................................................................................... 120 
4.11 The Metaphor of War ................................................................................ 123 
4.12 Two Kinds of Ideal Beauty ........................................................................ 132 
4.13 Objectivity of Beauty ................................................................................. 13 8 
4.14 Freedom and Regulation ............................................................................ 143 
4.15 Nature and Duty I Principle and Practice . . ... .... .. ......... .. . . . .... .. . . . .. .. . . . . ... .. . . . 151 
4.16 Love as Beauty ........................................................................................... 154 
Chapter 5 Play as the Perfection of Humanity 
5.1 True Play ..................................................................................................... 158 
5.2 Contemplation ............................................................................................. 164 
5.3 Shaftesbury .................................................................................................. 168 
5.4 Moritz .......................................................................................................... 171 
5.5 Kant ............................................................................................................. 173 
5.6 Conclusion- Is Play Realistic? ..................................................................... 175 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 182 
v 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1 Three States ..................................................................................................... 32 
Table 4.1 Wilkinson and Willoughby's Three Kinds of Synthesis ........................... 88 - 89 
Table 4.2. Regarding Historical Distinctions ................................................................. 91 
Table 4.3. Regarding Synthesis ........................................................................................ 91 
Table 4.4. Dialectic Terminology ..................................................................................... 95 
Table 4.5 Schiller's Categorization of Revolutions ....................................................... 106 
Table 4.6 Nature in Artfulness ...................................................................................... 113 
Table 4.7 Schiller's Ideality and the Ideal Work of Art ................................................ 115 
Table 4.8 Wilkinson and Willoughby's Three Term Relationship ............................... 128 
Table 4.9 Revision of Wilkinson and Willoughby's Living Organism Schema ........... 129 
Table 4.10 The Schema of Table 4.8 Applied to the Matter and Form Relation .......... 129 
Table 4.11 Ideal Beauty ................................................................................................. 134 
Table 4.12 Schiller's Categories ofBeauty ................................................................. 136 
Table 4.13 Under the Three Kinds ofBeauty ................................................................ 142 
Table 4.14 Freedom and Regulation .............................................................................. 144 
Table 4.15 Under the Three Drives ................................................................................ 152 
Table 5.1 Three Kinds of Play ....................................................................................... 161 
Table 5.2 Two Kinds of Reality .................................................................................... 176 
Vl 
The nature of the language (precisely its tendency to the universal) must be fully 
submerged in the form given to it, the body must lose itself in the idea, the sign in the 
indicated, the reality in the appearance. Free and victorious must that to be presented 
stride forth from the presenting, and, despite all fetters of language, stand there in its 
entire truth, liveliness and personality before the imaginative power. With one word: 
The beauty of poetical presentation is ''free self-action of nature in the fetters of 
language." (Kallias 526) 
Vll 
Introduction 
Researchers have often considered Schiller's terminology in his aesthetical essays, 
such as the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, to be confusing and incomplete. 
Criticism concerning Schiller's terminology started early and continues to the present day. 
For example, Lesley Sharpe observes that in 1795, just after the Lette.rs was published, 
"Johann Kaspar Friedrich Manso, a rationalist critic, and Friedrich August Mackensen, a 
Kantian, ... criticize Schiller's allegedly obscure language and resent his adaption of 
Kantian terminology to suit his argument. They were the first of a series of critics who 
dismissed Schiller's philosophizing as vitiated by poetic language and as making incorrect 
use of Kantinian categories" (Sharpe 8). Sharp goes on to note that reviewers rarely 
address the arguments of the Letters. This kind of critique became widespread, she adds, 
and in 1819, "Friedrich Bouterwek, the anti-Romantic professor ... admires the brilliant 
intellectual content of the essays and the 'magic of their style' but claims that the truth is 
often lost amid the dazzling use of language" (Sharpe 9). Schiller's friends also added 
their voices: " ... Herder called them [Letters] 'Kantian sins.' Klopstock, more severely, 
dismissed them as 'non sens' and found their 'pretensions dreadful.' The Danish prince, 
for whom the letters were originally meant, wrote to his sister: 'Schiller is really not a 
philosopher at all. He needs a translator"' (Regin 14 7). 
In the late nineteenth century, E. Kiihnemann held that "the names given by 
Schiller to his concepts are often ill-fitting and conceal, rather than clarify, the underlying 
thoughts" (lves 8). In 1927, W. Bohm saw Schiller "as having insurmountable difficulties 
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in devising a comprehensive systematic approach to his subject matter ... " (Sharpe 46). In 
1928, H. Lutz analyzed Schiller's use of the term nature and concluded that Schiller 
"constantly changed the names of his concepts and made no attempt to work them into a 
coherent system" (lves 8). In 1957, H. S. Reiss claimed the Letters "are a masterpiece 
fraught with difficulties," and "Schiller failed to elaborate his political theory" (Reiss 35). 
Others conclude that "Schiller's essays are hardly systematic" (Kooy 14). Hermann Meyer 
(1953) claims that "Schiller did not wish to use the rational language and method adopted 
by Kant - a language which certainly tries to be as precise as possible and which is 
directed towards the intellect or 'common sense' of the reader," since Schiller "hoped not 
to construct a philosophical system" (lves 8), but to appeal to people's imaginations in 
order to motivate them. Schiller seems to anticipate that his writings would be 
misunderstood; Regin comments that" ... the readers of the Horen [the magazine which 
Schiller edited, and which published the Letters in three installments in 1795] were on the 
whole disappointed too, and complained about the obscurity of the letters. To this Schiller 
replied in a letter to the publisher Cotta that he was not surprised and suggested 
proceeding with their publication. 'Then we will see if the readers are forcing us, or we 
the readers'" (Regin 147). 
On the other hand, although there are negative judgements, the Letters has had 
many admirer too:" ... Schiller could boast offrrm support from some of the most 
outstanding figures of the time. Goethe, as we have noted, was delighted with the letters 
and Kant wrote to Schiller on March 30, 1795 a polite letter in which he expressed his 
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admiration for the work, calling it 'vortrejjlich"' (Regin 147-148). 
It may seem as though Schiller does not systematically define each word, and in 
fact he gives the same words various meanings, and at times changes those meanings in 
subsequent sentences or even in the same sentence, such as:" ... people caught up in the 
process of civilization ... must fall away from nature by the abuse of reason before they 
can return to her by the use of reason" (L6 31 ). In Schiller's writings, civilization, as 
opposed to nature, is sometimes used in the sense of nature itself. Similarly, realistic, as 
opposed to idealistic, is used in the sense of idealistic itself, and rational, as opposed to 
sensitive, is used in the sense of sensitive itself. 
Many critics claim Schiller's lack of clarity is the result of undeveloped thought, 
but this criticism comes from not recognizing Schiller's unique terminology, which was 
already well-developed in the history of Schiller's philosophical reflection. His views of 
alienation or fragmentation in the Letters were not sudden exhibitions of philosophical 
meditation, but the product of his lifework since his early twenties. In his medical 
dissertations The Philosophy of Physiology (1779) and On the connection between the 
Animal and Spiritual Nature of Man ( 1780), he explores the differences between body 
and mind, and searches for how the two are connected. These writings foreshadow his 
later aesthetical essays, in which he examines the dualism between reason and sense or 
mind and body, which he sees as deeply separating the human psyche and causing 
alienation both in the mind and the whole society. 
The approach I take to Schiller's rhetoric is not a common one, as Kontje 
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observes. He writes that for the critic "who is interested only in Schiller's philosophical 
ideas, not the matter of their presentation, rhetoric is clearly something to be avoided" 
(Kontje 5). By contrast, Wilkinson and Willoughby, in their English translation of the 
Letters, correctly point out that Schiller's unique writings are the result of his concept of 
duality and dialectic approach. However, though I admire Wilkinson and Willoughby's 
analysis accompanying their translation of the Letters, I contend that they do not include 
enough attention to detail to show how each word changes meaning, and in what context 
such changes occur. It is true that Wilkinson examines the "interchangeability" of 
Schiller's terminology to show "the dynamic interplay between the two fundamental 
aspects of human nature: sense and spirit, nature and freedom, finite and infmite, or 
however you like to call them'' (Reflections 59); they also show the dialectic approach in 
the Letters (Letters Appendix III 348-350), which I will examine in Chapter 4, but they do 
not demonstrate clear connections between the dialectic method and the eleven definitions 
they cite for the important term Nature. 
Wilkinson and Willoughby emphasize that Schiller's aesthetics originated from 
both his psychological observations and his personal psychology - his conflict as a poet 
and philosopher, and they refer to Jung and Freud while discussing Schiller. This is likely 
due to Wilkinson and Willoughby's view of aesthetics itself: "From the start, ... aesthetics 
was rooted in psychology" (Letters xxii). They continue " ... Schiller's subsequent 
treatment of this 'birth' [of his concept of the play drive] is not mystical at all. It is 
informed by the empirical psychology of his day ... n (Letters xcvi). Concerning Wilkinson 
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and Willoughby~s approach to Schiller as a "psychologist~" and their interpretation that 
Schiller~ s three kinds of drives come from psychological observations, Pugh observes: 
Elsewhere they speak of "the general psychological orientation of his moral 
philosophy" (Letters Glossary 331) ... Wilkinson and Willoughby offer no support~ 
moreover, for the alleged dependence of the "Spieltriebe" on the psychology of the 
eighteenth century, and there is no awareness of how the concept of form and 
matter, which underlie the "Formtrieb" and "Stofftrieb," emerge from Greek 
metaphysics. Metaphysics is in fact a blind spot in Wilkinson and Willoughby's 
interpretation.... (Pugh 291-292) 
In this thesis, I intend to explain the connection between the many levels of 
Schiller's rhetoric and his definition of human development based on his concept of 
alienation or fragmentation, where we find the basis of the entire picture, and where we 
find the small but essential key to the puzzle of his terminology. Schiller's writings are 
not rough or incomplete. Far from it, he is exhaustive, definitive, and complete. Schiller 
clearly knows what he means in his sentences, since his aesthetical writing intends to 
show the work of art as a battle between matter (language) and mind (his thought). 
Ironically, his efforts gave his writings, a lifelong effort, a negative reputation. 
Remembering Schiller almost 20 years after his death, Goethe, Schiller's closest friend, 
told Eckermann that Schiller's philosophical speculation disturbed his poetry. "'It was 
sad', said Goethe, 'to see how so-highly gifted a man tormented himself with 
philosophical disquisitions which could in no way profit him" (Eckermann 38). 
The extensive use of dual definitions for his terms made his writing look 
contradictory; however, those words or concepts must be contradictory since this is the 
core of Schiller's concept of fragmentation. The concept of fragmentation may be clearly 
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seen in Letter 6, where he contrasts the Modems and the Greeks. He writes, "How 
different with us modems! With us too the image of the human species is projected in 
magnified form into separate individuals - but as fragments [ Bruchstiicken ], not in 
different combinations, with the result that one has to go the rounds from one individual 
to another in order to be able to piece together a complete image of the species" (L6 33). 
However, Schiller's concept of alienation is closely interwoven with his use of terms 
throughout the entire Letters, not only in Letter 6, and so thus I intend to revisit his 
concept of alienation. 
It is well known that Schiller was very arbitrary in using terms from Kant, and 
Schaper sees "a whole series of misunderstanding of Kant" in Schiller (Schaper 99). 
However it may be more accurate to say that Schiller reads Kant through the lens of his 
own preoccupation with dualism, attempting to fit fragments into a pattern to construct a 
whole. 
There are two key points to understanding Schiller. One is to recognize his 
historical distinctions: from a pre-historic era, called the state of nature; to ancient Greece, 
which is between the prehistoric era and modem civilization; the natural state, which 
includes the modem era, where we have to struggle to regain freedom; and finally, an 
ideal era after political reform called the aesthetic state. I maintain that those four stages 
are indications of his thought regarding fragmentation. 
Another key to understanding Schiller is to notice that because of his view of 
fragmentation, his terms have dual or various meanings. I claim that Schiller's discourses 
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are not incoherent and unsystematic, but come from his view of alienation - everything 
loses its nature when it is fragmented - and of holism - everything will be united after 
being healed of fragmentation. Schiller defines terms in his unique way depending on the 
context. His concept of alienation in the Letters is not merely part of the history of 
political theory which influenced later thinkers such as Hegel and Marx, but the key to 
understanding Schiller's use of language, and also the key to understanding the core of his 
aesthetics- holism. Converting value and meaning in each term is the main theme in 
Schiller' s aesthetics. The paradoxes in his terms reflect his logic and holism. Schiller's 
terms relate and correspond to each other so closely that it is impossible to define one 
without taking account of its opposite. Words such as nature and civilization, or ideal and 
real, change their meanings when they are either fragmented from or integrated with their 
opposites. For example, nature will be defined as human sensuousness, and also as a 
united human psyche - a synthesis of sense and reason. For Schiller, nature and 
civilization, which oppose each other, will be united under the same definition when they 
overcome their one-sidedness. Therefore, nature, which is the opposite of civilization, is a 
synonym for civilization in a different paragraph. Schiller's hope that we will reach an 
ideal state in the future does not contradict his disappointment that we will not reach that 
ideal state in a fragmented era. It is impossible to realize social reform with our 
fragmented or one-sided nature, civilization, reason, and sense, but it is possible to realize 
social reform with a united or synthesized nature, civilization, reason, and sense. 
Works of philosophy are comparable to works of art for Schiller, in that they both 
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are about freedom, nature, goodness, and beauty- that is to say, about humanity. Creating 
such works of art means engaging in the war to save this fragmented world, to reconcile 
the reason-sense conflict, and, for Schiller who was a playwright, novelist, poet, historian, 
and philosopher, langUage is the most important tool in creating works of art. 
For Schiller, fragmentation, historical distinctions, and various uses of such terms 
need to be connected in order to be understood. Schiller's dialectical approach will be 
seen in each element of his conception of the eras of human development and his 
terminology. In general, the dialectical method of exposition employs the triadic 
relationship of a one-sided thesis, a one-sided anti-thesis which negates the thesis, and a 
synthesis which neither abolishes nor simply unites the two, but which includes and 
preserves the two as correlative principles. I claim that Schiller reconciles binary 
opposites and achieves wholeness in the third or higher stage of such a dialectical process. 
The Letters, the expression of his ideas for political reform, is, in part, Schiller's 
response to the French Revolution. In 1792, just before he started Letters on the Aesthetic 
Education of Man, the French National Assembly awarded him an honorary French 
citizenship, and invited him to run for office in the National Assembly. He was well 
known for a series of plays considered to be sympathetic to the Revolution. However, 
Schiller would not participate in the Revolution itself, with which he was in disagreement. 
The Revolution had declared universal human rights to be above country and race. This 
was a universal truth not previously recognized in European politics- not by England's 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, which was mainly for the bourgeoisie and aristocracy, nor 
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even by the American Revolution of 1776, which still maintained black slavery. Peace is 
the premise for the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens; yet, although the 
French Revolution intended the realization of human rights, it led to the Terror, civil war, 
and international wars. France declared war on numerous countries, including Austria, 
Prussia, Britain, and Holland, to preserve her new government. Over the twenty-three 
years from 1792 to 1815, she experienced only a few years of peace, and was responsible 
for the deaths of an estimated two million people. In 1793, the year of the Terror, Schiller 
wrote that if the revolutionaries were performing acts of reason and true freedom then he 
would abandon literature and "devote all [his] activities to the most glorious of all works 
of art, to the monarchy of reason" ( qtd. in Berghahn 1 07). Instead, because acts of reason 
and freedom were rare, he doubted that "political regeneration" had begun, and despaired 
of such a reformation occurring "for centuries" (ibid). 
In this thesis, beside the Letters, I refer to Schiller's other aesthetic essays, such as 
On the Art ofTragedy (1790), Kallias (1793), On the Pathetic (1793), On Naive and 
Sentimental Poetry (1795), On Grace and Dignity (1793), From the Aesthetical Lectures 
(1792-1793), and Concerning the Sublime (likely written 1794-96 and published 1801 ). 
Those writings, written at various times, are closely interwoven and without 
contradictions, as they were written under the concept of fragmentation and wholeness; 
therefore they are very beneficial to understanding the Letters. I claim that Schiller, while 
writing the Letters, is not suddenly attempting to develop the theme of aesthetics, to 
define terms in isolation, or to suddenly present a coherent view of humanity based on his 
9 
theory of alienation. I therefore disagree with Lutz, who claims that Schiller lacks 
consistency, and concludes that the Letters are "not a public utterance at all, but rather a 
private document testifying to their author's philosophical progress" (Letters xliv 
Introduction). 
First of all, in Chapter 1, I examine the historical importance of Schiller's concept 
of alienation or fragmentation, a concept which influenced Hegel and Marx. I also explain 
his view of antagonism - the reason and sense conflict. In Chapter 2, I consider his 
concept of the stages of human development, in which each stage reflects either a 
fragmented or united condition in the human psyche and political state. In Chapter 3, I 
examine Schiller's terminology and his use of such words as reason, nature, and 
civilization. In Chapter 4, I explain how Schiller's dualism and dialectic attitude are 
closely interwoven. I also deal with his concept of ideality and reality which, while 
opposites, become synonyms under the concept of wholeness. Schiller's concept of 
alienation underlies his lifework through his aesthetic writings, and is the key to 
understand his theory and rhetoric, which have hitherto been negatively judged. In 
Chapter 5, I discuss Schiller concept of play, and its role in social reform. Throughout this 
thesis, I argue that Schiller's terminology is a systematic pattern of definitions based on 
his concept of alienation and his unbroken belief in the future - the belief that someday 
our fragmented condition will be healed when we unite in wholeness. 
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Chapter 1 The Definition of The Fragmented World 
1.1 Holism 
Schiller uses the term aesthetic in reference to life, politics, and morality, and not 
in the restricted sense of a theory of art. In the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, 
his readers are not expected to learn artistic skills, such as painting or playing instruments; 
he never directly connected fine arts and social and individual reform in the Letters. He 
writes that "most perfect of all the works to be achieved by the art of man" is "the 
construction of true political freedom" (L2 7), and to realize this, first of all, his readers 
are expected to grasp the concept of wholeness, integrating the dualisms of reason and 
feeling, of mind and matter, and of nature and civilization. Schiller uses aesthetic in the 
sense of sublating these opposed elements, as in artists who compound material and 
imagination. His aesthetic is a synonym of holism, in the sense of a theory "that in one 
way or another affirm[ s] the equal or greater reality or the explanatory necessity of the 
whole of some system in relation to its parts" (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 
Holism). His aesthetic means overcoming our dual character and gaining harmony. 
Because of this view of wholeness, Schiller does not define words in the Letters in 
a conventional way. Instead, he defines his words in his own way. In this thesis, I discuss 
fragmentation and wholeness, basic concepts in Schiller's holism and teleology. Taking 
account of fragmentation and wholeness leads us to a correct understanding and 
interpretation of his theory of social reform; it is the key to clarifying the definitions of his 
words, and the key to judging his theory's consistency. 
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Schiller suggests grasping the world in wholeness to reconcile fragmentation. 
Fragmentation will be overcome by achieving both our physical possibilities and our 
moral possibilities. We have to recognize and achieve wholeness in order to act as a 
single integrated power. 
One-sidedness in the exercise of [a man's] powers must, it is true, inevitably lead 
the individual into error; but the species as a whole to truth. Only by concentrating 
the whole energy of our mind into a single focal point, contracting our whole 
being into a single power, do we, as it were, lend wings to this individual power 
and lead it, by artificial means, far beyond the limits that nature seems to have 
assigned to it. (L6 41) 
In Schiller, individuals have to develop themselves to work in harmony. The conflict of 
reason and sense makes it impossible to solve political and psychological problems. In 
order to reach the condition of wholeness we have to achieve a condition called the 
aesthetic state, both in the sense of the psyche and in the sense of political government. 
For Schiller, the ultimate definition of humanity comes from grasping and acting 
on the concept of each individual's wholeness. He writes, "Wholeness of character must ... 
be present in any people capable, and worthy, of exchanging a state of compulsion for a 
state of :freedom" (L4 23). Man's total character is the perfect concord of reason and 
sense. "What he is meant to be, however, is neither [an animal with or without reason]; he 
is meant to be a human being. Nature is not meant to rule him exclusively, nor reason to 
rule him conditionally. Both these systems of rule are meant to co-exist, in perfect 
independence of each other, and yet in perfect concord" (L2 4 181 ). In Schiller, all actions 
are aimed at overcoming fragmentation, because freedom results from man's wholeness. 
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1.2 Fragmentation 
Schiller's concept ofjragments can also be called alienation, a term used by Hegel 
and Marx, understood as our separation from ourselves or our true character as the 
integration of reason and sense, and our separation from a society which regards its 
citizens as foreigners. Both Marx and Hegel use the word alienation (Entiiusserung or 
Entfremdung), while Schiller uses stranger (Fremdling) and fragment (Bruchstiick). It is 
Hegel who first uses alienation (Entiiusserung or Entfremdung), by which he means "the 
idea that something which is in fact part of ourselves seems to us foreign and hostile. In 
both the spiritual and material world (such as the world of work), this stage of alienation 
provides the motive force for dialectic change" (Magee 161 ). 
According to W allimann ( 4 -5), Entiiusserung is usually translated as alienation 
and Entfremdung as estrangement. However much depends on the English translators, 
since the terms are impossible to translate into English in a precise way. 
There can hardly be said to be any very common practice among English 
translators. Thus, M. Milligan (Economics and Philosophycal MSS of 1844; cit.) 
translates Entfremdung as "estrangement" and Entiiusserung as "alienation" (or 
"externalisation"); T. Bottomore (Karl Marx: Early Writings) claims that Marx 
does not distinguish between the two terms and translates both as "alienation" (or 
"estrangement"). D. McLellan (Karl Marx: Early Texts) and L. D. Easton and K. 
H. Guddat (Writings ofthe Young Marx) translate Entfremdung as "alienation" 
and Entiiusserung as "externalisation." (Chiodi 124 translator's note) 
Although I use alienation and fragmentation synonymously in this thesis, I prefer 
using the word fragment when discussing Schiller's concept, because Schiller's word, 
fragment (Bruchstiick), is at the core of his concept ofholism. It suggests its own solution, 
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wholeness (Ganze or Totalitiit), as neither Entfremdung nor Entiiusserung does. Schiller 
often describes the contrast between fragment and whole as in the following passage: 
... everlastingly chained to a single little fragment [Bruchstuck] of the whole 
[Ganze], man himself develops into nothing but a fragment; everlastingly in his 
ear the monotonous sound of the wheel that he turns, he never develops the 
harmony of his being, and instead of putting the stamp of humanity upon his own 
nature, he becomes nothing more than the imprint of his occupation or of his 
specialized knowledge. But even that meager, fragmentary [Fragmentarische] 
participation, by which individual members of the state are still linked to the 
whole [Ganze], does not depend upon forms that they spontaneously prescribe for 
themselves (for how could one entrust to their freedom of action a mechanism so 
intricate and so fearful of light and enlightenment?); it is dictated to them with 
meticulous exactitude by means of a formulary that inhibits all freedom of 
thought. The dead letter takes the place of living understanding, and a good 
memory is a safer guide than imagination and feeling. (L6 35) 
For all three philosophers, alienation is caused by specialization, which divides 
and separates human abilities, and which isolates people from their own nature and 
isolates individuals from society and the state, making them feel they are fragments which 
do not have connections with society, with others, or even with themselves. Thus humans 
feel they are outside of their society; they feel they are outside their own personalities. 
Like Schiller, Hegel and Marx regard the ancient Greeks as living in a pre-
alienated condition, in an ideal harmonious relationship between the individual and 
society, because for the Greeks reason and sense, subjectivity and objectivity, intellect and 
feeling, ego and the external world were not yet separated clearly. However, with the 
subsequent development of civilization, wholeness and harmony have been lost. 
Although the three writers agree that human rationality is the origin of alienation, 
they disagree regarding the details. For Schiller, the origin of alienation is the 
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development of reason; for Hegel, it is self-consciousness which wants to achieve 
actuality; for Marx, it is the greed of capitalism in industrial society under the name of 
utility. Marx's focus is capitalism, which he maintains causes alienation- understood as 
the negative condition where workers are distanced from their products since they cannot 
possess them, are distanced from their work activity since it is for the sake of others, and 
are outsiders to others, since workers are in competition as slaves of capitalism. 
The three men agree with regard to self-alienation. The origin of fragmentation is 
actually not society, nor civilization, nor money, but is our rationality, which wants to 
expand its ability into our lives. In Schiller as in Hegel and Marx, alienated people are not 
only laboring workers, but also politicians, authorities, reformers, revolutionaries, 
scientists, and philosophers who do not know that they too are alienated from themselves, 
thus having difficulty realizing what they intend. Their language and their intention, their 
will and their actions, often do not directly correspond. Schiller's concept of self-
alienation- "we have given ourselves a master within" (L6 33), by which he describes the 
psychological abuse brought about by civilization - influenced Hegel's concept of the 
master and the slave. Marx writes of the oppressed worker class and the oppressing 
bourgeois class, and claims that even the oppressing class is alienated since the bourgeois 
are enslaved by capitalism's forces of production. 
All three of them regard alienation as necessary for the material and psychological 
development of humanity, and they claim that we are slowly moving toward the time 
when we will abolish alienation at the end of history, in Hegel and Marx, and as the 
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aesthetic state in Schiller. The three philosophers claim that freedom and self-fulfilment 
will be realized at the last stage. 
For all three philosophers, alienation ensures that the process of dialectic change, 
the development of a synthesis from the interaction of thesis and antithesis, continues 
through history. Schiller displays a sharp sense of the division of human development and 
psychology regarding fragmentation, and his theory of historical distinctions can be seen 
clearly in Naive and Sentimental Poetry. Chapter 2 of this paper will explore the details of 
Schiller's concept of the stages of development for the human psyche and the political 
condition. There is a three-fold transformation of the psychological and political 
condition: development, decline, and development with integration of the first two 
experiences in the last stage. I deal further with Schiller's dialectic concept in Chapter 4. 
Although the three men have similar concepts of fragmentation or alienation, their 
solutions to alienation are clearly different. For Schiller, the solution is achieved by the 
development of integration between reason and sense - the aesthetic ability. For Hegel, it 
is achieved by uniting with others and being a part of the integrated state, through 
incorporating ourselves with family, civil society, and the state, which represents the 
individual's will as wholeness. Schiller and Marx regard the state as a necessary evil1 -
evil in the sense of restricting the individual's freedom. For Hegel, individualism, 
understood as the condition in which the state is in a subordinate condition to its citizens, 
For Schiller, this is a "natural state," such as the ancien regime. In Section 1.8, 
page 31, I discuss Schiller's position regarding the state. 
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leads to the individual alienating himself, since this relationship causes alienation by 
going against the wholeness and hannony of the state. Hegel holds that alienation and its 
overcoming are a process whereby people lose and then regain themselves. Thus 
alienation for Hegel is an essential phase or stimulant for the unfolding of the absolute 
mind (Geyer 26), a condition "when the Geist comes to know itself as the ultimate reality, 
and realizes that everything that it had hitherto regarded as alien to itself is in fact part of 
itself, not in conflict with itself' (Magee 161 ). 
For Marx, the solution to alienation involves, first of all, a stage of "raw 
communism," which does not solve greed, as private property becomes common property. 
The second stage, "ultimate communism," will realize the overcoming of greed and 
private property, and labour will be replaced by "free, joyous, productive activity" (Lavine 
283). To reform society, he suggests there is only one "practical movement"- revolution. 
"A revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be 
overthrown in any other way but also because the class overthrowing it can succeed only 
by revolution in getting rid of all the traditional muck and become capable of establishing 
society anew" (Marx 431 ). 
1.3 The Division of Labor 
Schiller attacks civilization and the current state, and here we clearly see the 
influence of Rousseau, who claimed that humans are isolated and separated from their 
true character, and have been suppressed by the state, authority, and laws. Schiller claims 
that civilization enables us to live and survive with others, but encourages only limited 
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abilities. The division of labor causes an imbalance between the employment of the 
intellect and the use of mechanical skills, and this imbalance causes lack of harmony in 
the human psyche. 
When the community makes his office the measure of the man; when in one of its 
citizens it prizes nothing but memory, in another a mere tabularizing intelligence, 
in a third only mechanical skill; when, in the one case, indifferent to character, it 
insists exclusively on knowledge, yet is, in another, ready to condone any amount 
of obscurantist thinking as long as it is accompanied by a spirit of order and law-
abiding behavior; when, moreover, it insists on special skills being developed with 
a degree of intensity that is only commensurate with its readiness to absolve the 
individual citizen from developing himself in extensity - can we wonder that the 
remaining aptitudes of the psyche are neglected in order to give undivided 
attention to the one that will bring honor and profit? (L6 35-37) 
Schiller uses a machine metaphor when he describes modem society as "an 
ingenious clockwork, in which, out of the piecing together of innumerable but lifeless 
parts, a mechanical kind of collective life ensued. State and church, laws and customs, 
[are] now tom asunder" (L6 35). An individual is reduced to having become "a single 
little fragment of the whole," and cannot develop except as a fragment, and therefore "we 
see not only merely individuals, but whole classes of men, developing but one part of 
their potentialities, while of the rest, as in stunted growths, only vestigial traces remain" 
(L6 33). Schiller allows that exceptional individuals may accomplish more than what is 
expected of them, but holds that "a mediocre man will consume in the office assigned him 
the whole meager sum of his powers" (L6 37). Such men do not have time for leisure. 
1.4 Micro Levels of Fragmentation 
Thus, in Schiller, there are two levels of fragmentation; the micro and macro 
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levels. The first is in the individual's psyche, and the second is a political and social 
condition. Schiller looks at two sides because he holds that the reason and sense conflict 
in the human psyche expands to the society and state, since parts (individuals) construct 
the whole. 
With regard to the inner or micro condition, intellect and sense become strangers 
to each other because of the lack of connection and harmony between them. Once 
civilization had "inflicted this wound [the separation of intuitive understanding from 
sense and the speculative understanding from reason] upon modern man," sense and 
reason "withdrew in hostility to take up positions in their respective field, whose frontiers 
they now began to guard with jealous mistrust'' (L6 33). Then overspecialization lead to 
the "suppressing [of] the rest of our potentialities" (ibid.). 
For Schiller, the ancient Greeks did not have this problem arising from the reason 
and sense split; they enjoyed knowing objects from both sides since they did not yet know 
the clear division caused by the development of civilization, as I explain in detail in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Schiller asks why "the individual Greek [was] qualified to be the 
representative of his age, and why can no single modern venture as much?" and answers 
"Because it was from all-unifying nature that the former, and from the all-dividing 
intellect that the latter, received their respective forms" (L6 33). In the modern era, we 
cannot unite reason and sense because we depend so much on reason, which tends to 
divide the world into two. Civilization makes this problem worse. 
It was civilization itself that inflicted this wound upon modern man. Once the 
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increase of empirical knowledge, and more exact modes of thought, made 
sharper divisions between the sciences inevitable, and once the increasingly 
complex machinery of state necessitated a more rigorous separation of ranks 
and occupations, then the inner unity of human nature was severed too, and a 
disastrous conflict set its harmonious powers at variance. (L6 33) 
In civilization, there is a strong tendency to see things or objects as particles or 
fragments, so we cannot discover the meaning of the whole, and cannot notice fragments 
are actually parts of the whole, or that fragments are connected. Scientists and 
philosophers use the intellect to analyze phenomena in nature, and this is the only way to 
discover truth in the scientific method. Yet this approach impedes our ability to grasp 
nature as a whole, for "intellect must first destroy the object of inner sense if it would 
make it its own. Like the analytical chemist, the philosopher can only discover how things 
are combined by analyzing them, only lay bare the workings of spontaneous nature by 
subjecting them to the torment of his own techniques" (Ll 5). 
The intellect separates and analyzes objects, so objects are fragmented. This 
process reveals the details, but does not reveal the whole. Furthermore, Schiller holds that 
the analytical use of words will escalate the tendency to fragmentation in thought. He 
writes that "in order to lay hold of the fleeting phenomenon, [the philosopher] must first 
bind it in the fetters of rule, tear its fair body to pieces by reducing it to concepts, and 
preserve its living spirit in a sorry skeleton of words. Is it any wonder that natural feeling 
cannot find itself again in such an image, or that in the account of the analytical thinker 
truth should appear as paradox?" (Ll 5). For Schiller, language places a restriction on 
expressing what we really want to communicate. 
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Thus "man can be at odds with himself in two ways" (L4 21) because we isolate 
ourselves as slaves of sense or reason. One is either a savage, when ~~feeling predominates 
over principle," or one is a barbarian, when "principle destroys feeling" (ibid.). "The 
savage despises civilization, and acknowledges nature as his sovereign mistress. The 
barbarian derides and dishonors nature, but, .more contemptible than the savage, as often 
as not continues to be the slave of his slave" (ibid.). Unlike Rousseau, Schiller does not 
use the word savage with the connotation of individuals of innocent and noble status. 
Savages are like animals, without reason, so when he says "a return to the savage state,'' it 
is intended to indicate a return to a violent, amoral, and non-rational status. A barbarian, 
on the other hand, who concentrates on the practical affairs of living life often has "a 
narrow heart, since his imagination, imprisoned within the unvarying confines of his own 
calling, is incapable of extending itself to appreciate other ways of seeing and knowing" 
(L6 39). Those people who believe they are in control of reason and are civilized are 
barbarians in Schiller's view. They are in "complete lethargy," representing "[the other 
extreme] of human depravity" (L5 25). He calls their reason cold reason, merely a "so-
called reason," which does not care about benevolent results. He writes, "Hence the 
abstract thinker very often has a cold heart, since he dissects his impressions, and 
impressions can move the soul only as long as they remain whole" (L6 39). Thus Schiller 
concludes that "In the frrst case [too much focus on the material] [man] will never be 
himself, in the second [too much intellect] he will never be anything else; and for that 
very reason, therefore, he will in both cases be neither the one nor the other, consequently 
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- a non-entity" (LJ3 89). 
1.5 Macro Level of Fragmentation 
The other level of fragmentation is an outer or macro condition; the individual and 
state become strangers to each other since the state treats individuals merely as things. 
The great variety and diversity of people is simplified by the state through classification 
and occupations, and the state treats its citizens merely in terms of rank or job. Schiller 
claims that gradually "the concrete life of the individual is destroyed in order that the 
abstract idea of the whole may drag out its sorry existence, and the state remains forever a 
stranger to its citizens since at no point does it ever make contact with their feeling" (L6 
37). The individual is abused, and the self-interest of rulers and elites produces political 
alienation and hatred among the citizens. 
In Schiller, humans must not be treated as mere "material.'' He writes "The 
statesman-artist must approach his material with a quite different kind of respect from that 
which the marker of beauty feigns toward his. The consideration he must accord to its 
uniqueness and individuality is not merely subjective, and aimed at creating an illusion for 
the senses, but objective and directed to its innermost being" (L4 21). Such statesman-
artists are unlike artisans who do not have to care if they do violence to the material, for 
their concern "is not with the whole for the sake of the parts, but with the parts for the 
sake ofthe whole" (L4 19). They care about the appearance, not the essence, and do not 
respect the material. However, politicians must consider each individual's dignity and 
happiness. Schiller notes that for the political artist, "man is at once the material on which 
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he works and the goal toward which he strives. In this case the end turns back upon itself 
and becomes identical with the medium; and it is only inasmuch as the whole serves the 
parts that the parts are in any way bound to submit to the whole" (L4 19-21 ). 
Originally, a state has to be "an organization formed by itself and for itself, it can 
only become a reality inasmuch as its parts have been turned up to the idea of the whole'' 
(L4 21 ). A state exists for its own sake, which means it is for the sake of those individuals 
who compose the whole. Each member of a state has to agree with ''the idea of the 
whole," since "the state serves to represent that ideal and objective humanity that exists in 
the heart of each of its citizens" (L4 21 ). 
Schiller goes on to describe the modem condition, where "enjoyment [is] divorced 
from labor, the means from the end, the effort from the reward" (L6 37). There is no 
harmony because of specialized knowledge and activity. Humans do not have joy in labor 
which forces them to work for the sake of the state, not for themselves. According to 
Schiller, this is the situation in most European countries of his era. Political and social 
conflicts such as the French Revolution, with all their terrible consequences, occur 
because of such psychological (or micro) and political (or macro) fragmentation. 
However, he contends that they are inevitable. Schiller asks 
With this twofold pressure upon it, from within and from without, could humanity 
well have taken any other course than the one it actually took? In this striving after 
inalienable possessions in the realm of ideas, the spirit of speculation could do no 
other than become a stranger to the world of sense, and lose sight of matter for the 
sake of form. The practical spirit, by contrast, enclosed within a monotonous 
sphere of material objects, and within this uniformity still further confined by 
formulas, was bound to fmd the idea of an unconditioned whole receding from 
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sight, and to become just as impoverished as its own poor sphere of activity." 
(L6 37-39) 
In Schiller, the fragmented condition is caused by the needs of utility. He claims that" ... 
at the present time material needs reign supreme and bend a degraded humanity beneath 
their tyrannical yoke. Utility is the great idol of our age, to which all powers are in thrall 
and to which all talent must pay homage" (L2 7). He questions rationality, which is 
regarded as a practical asset in both society and the individual. As he observes that 
rationality or practicality is hurting people in his own fragmented era, he shows that real 
practicality will come from the mind not being a slave of the material but "playing" with 
material - a synthesis of reason and sense - as Chapter 5 of this paper will detail. 
1.6 Reason and Sense 
Throughout history, humans have failed to realize their abstract ideas through 
politics. There is indeed a great irony in history; religions, ideologies, and theories of 
social reform which were intended to make humans equal and free have failed to realize 
their original humanitarian purpose, and mankind has ended up with power struggles and 
battles over self-interest which usually result in hurt being caused to others. We seem to 
know what we intend to achieve, but do not know how to achieve it. 
For Schiller, the contradiction ofhumanity- the theories of love ofhumankind 
beside our violent, murderous nature - is caused by an imbalance of reason and passion. 
Schiller claims that unless the problem of the human psyche is resolved, we will not be 
able to realize social reform. He holds that this struggle between reason and sense, a 
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conflict which is part of human destiny, originates with two opposing elements - an 
unchanged person and a changing condition. In this, he acknowledges that his concepts of 
person and condition are influenced by Fichte (L4 17 fn), as are his concepts of the formal 
and sensuous drives (LJ3 85 fn). 
Schiller notes Fichte's Lectures on the Vocation of a Scholar (L4 17 fn), as a 
reference concerning person and condition. According to Fichte, humans have a "pure I" -
the archetype of the individual, which affects rational functioning, and a "not I" or 
"empirical I," which affects sensual functioning. Our purpose is to bring harmony to the 
contradiction between the "I" and the "empirical I" by reciprocal action. He writes, "The 
ultimate characteristic feature of all rational beings is, accordingly, absolute unity, 
constant self-identity, complete agreement with oneself. This absolute identity is the form 
of the pure I and is its only true form" (Fichte 148-149). The tool for the integration of 
sense and reason is culture or civilization (Kultur) in Fichte (150). Only through 
cultivating ourselves can we go back to our nature, the "pure I.." The advance of culture 
means that everyone should be educated to develop the skills to realize harmony between 
reason and sense, to realize one's integrated personality in "absolute unity, constant self-
identity, complete agreement with oneself' (ibid. 149). 
In Schiller, the person is beyond time and space, while the condition is within time 
and space. The person must be our "own ground" and it "manifests itself in the eternally 
persisting 'I"' (Lll 75). Schiller writes, "Every individual human being, one may say, 
carries within him, potentially and prescriptively, an ideal man, the archetype of a human 
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being, and it is his life's task to be, through all his changing manifestations, in harmony 
with the unchanging unity of this idear' (L4 17). This •'r' has an absolute and ideal 
concept of its being, "grounded upon itself, that is to say, freedom." The person cannot 
change itself because it "cannot have a beginning in time." The material surrounding the 
"I'' is ever changing, while the "I" does not change. The person is "nothing but form and 
empty potential" (Lll 77) apart from perceptions and sensations, although we can do 
nothing in this material world without a body. The person is "merely the predisposition to 
a possible expression of [man's] infinite nature" (Lll 77). 
On the other hand, the condition, the "determining attributes" of the self, ''must 
proceedfrom something" within time and space (Lll 73). The condition, "apart from any 
spontaneous activity of the mind," makes it possible to exist in the world of matter, yet 
cannot create a personality. Only man's sensuous nature or condition can "turn [his] 
potential into actual power; but it is only his personality that makes all his actual activity 
into something that is inalienably his own" (Lll 77). 
Human personality has a tendency or "disposition to the divine"- to unite the 
elements in an "absolute manifestation of potential (the actualization of all that is 
possible), and absolute unity of manifestation (the necessity of all that is made actual)" 
(Lll 75-77). 
This changing material within [man] is accompanied by his never-changing "1''-
and to remain perpetually himself throughout all change, to convert all that he 
apprehends into experience, i.e., to organize it into a unity that has significance, 
and to transform all his modes of existence in time into a law for all times: this 
is the injunction laid upon him by his rational nature. (Lll 75) 
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This suggests that the person deals with ideality and possibility, and strives to realize its 
character in reality. That is to say, the person is the absolute purpose in our spiritual life. 
On the other hand, the condition is based on practicality and reality, and our senses want 
to realize the condition in ideality; we want to realize the absolute purpose in our material 
lives, as if we have a permanent existence. A finite human body exists by changing, and 
the infinite personality exists by not changing. Realizing both elements, or "the constant 
unity that remains eternally itself amidst the floods of change" (Lll 75), is our goal. But 
this is almost impossible to realize. Schiller calls it an "unending task" or "the way to the 
divine (if we can call a way that which never leads to the goal)" (Lll 75). 
1.7 The Sensuous and Formal Drives 
Because of"the two fundamental laws of [man's] sensuo-rational nature" (Lll 
77), which originate from the person and condition, Schiller holds that human-kind is 
subject to "two opposing forces" in the attempt to achieve the double task of "giving 
reality to the necessity within, and subjecting to the laws of necessity the reality without" 
(L12 79). He calls these forces the sensuous and formal drives. 
The sensuous drive comes from our physical, sensuous nature, and acts in the 
world of matter, time, the senses, and the necessities of living. This drive deals with the 
condition, which is human-kind's natural or physical condition, and with the concept of 
change. Schiller claims that physical existence is known only through sensation, which he 
defines as a state in which "time [is] occupied by content." 
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The formal drive comes out of the person, or man's rational nature, which Schiller 
calls "the absolute existence of man" (L12 81 ). The person, "from [man's] rational 
nature," produces the formal drive which maintains as its eternal purpose the desire to be 
itself. The person wants to be "an absolute and individual unity" and "since we are to all 
eternity we ourselves," the formal drive acts to affirm that "the personality can never 
demand anything but that which is binding upon it to all eternity" (ibid.). When the formal 
drive is demanding something "for this moment," it is also demanding it forever. The 
formal drive "wants the real to be necessary and eternal, and the eternal and the necessary 
to be real. In other words, it insists on truth and on the right" (ibid.). While the sensuous 
drive provides cases, the formal drive gives laws. The formal drive intends to release 
humans from ''the bondage of time" (ibid.) and lead them from the sensuous to the ideal 
world. 
Thus, for Schiller, human nature is faced with two conflicting challenges (Lll 77). 
He holds that the first challenge, arising from the sensuous drive, "insists upon absolute 
reality: [man] is to tum everything which is mere form into world, and make all his 
potentialities fully manifest.'' The other challenge, arising from the formal drive, "insists 
upon absolute formality: [man] is to destroy everything in himself which is mere world, 
and bring harmony into all his changes. In other words, he is to externalize all that is 
within him, and give form to all that is outside him" (Lll 77). Both the formal and 
sensuous drives are directed "toward truth and toward perfection," and are "wholly 
earnest in [their] demands," since the sensuous drive deals with "the reality'' of life, and 
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the formal drive deals with ''the maintenance of dignity'' (Ll5 1 05). 
While the sensuous drive is necessary for humans to exist as matter, it also makes 
"complete fulfillment" ofhuman potential "impossible" (L12 81). Schiller holds that 
''with indestructible chains it binds the ever-soaring spirit to the world of sense, and 
summons abstraction from its most unfettered excursions into the infinite back to the 
limitations of the present" (L12 81 ). He writes that the sensuous drive has changeability 
and extensity, and the formal drive has autonomy and intensity, but we often mix up their 
roles and areas of influence. That is to say, we mistakenly transfer the intensity of the 
formal drive, which is active, to the sensuous drive, which is passive, and use the 
receptive faculty of the sensuous drive, instead of the determining faculty of the formal 
drive. Also, we mistakenly transfer the extensity of the sensuous drive, which is passive, 
to the formal drive which is active, and use the determining faculty of the formal drive 
instead ofthe receptive faculty ofthe sensuous drive (L13 87-89). 
Because in [man's] experience the sense drive precedes the moral, he assigns to 
the law of necessity a beginning in time too, a positive origin, and through this 
most unfortunate of all errors makes the unchangeable and eternal in himself into 
an accidental product of the transient. He persuades himself into regarding the 
concepts of right and wrong as statutes introduced by some will, not as something 
valid in themselves for all eternity. (L24 179) 
Unfortunately, the formal drive may well push us into the "most terrifying 
servitude" (L24 175). When humans want to rise to an unlimited condition, their hearts 
are still limited by matter and time, and the desire to realize unlimited ideal conditions is 
replaced by the desire to realize limited material conditions. Although the purpose of the 
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formal drive or reason is to lead humans to ''truth and morality'' by thinking and activity, 
this is transferred to an ''unlimited longing and absolute instinctual need'' by the passivity 
and feeling ofthe sensuous drive. Therefore, we obtain "care andfear" (L24 175) as the 
product of reason which is mistakenly working in the territory of the sensuous drive, and 
which "mistakes its object and applies its imperative directly to matter" (L24 175-177). 
Humans try to realize "systems of unqualified eudaemonism" (L2 4 1 77) from the formal 
drive in the world of matter. Reason's tendency to a moral ideal becomes the tendency to 
an ideal of desire with "an animality striving toward the absolute" (ibid.). Reason is 
misled by sense, and ''the life of sense knows no purpose other than its own advantage, 
and feels driven by no cause other than blind chance" (L2.J 179). Therefore, without 
"grasping the sublime necessity of reason," man makes selfish advantage ''the arbiter of 
his actions," and "blind chance" the "sovereign ruler of the world" (ibid.). When humans 
use reason mistakenly, they look at the permanent ideal condition in the sense world as if 
matter is permanent. 
Under the guise of rationality, humans, who misapply the formal drive to the 
material world, are actually controlled by desires, passions, or fears. Yet if reason builds 
its own state of moral necessity, if it rejects the natural state, in the sense of a political 
state which provides the material necessities but not political freedom, then reason 
"jeopardizes the physical man who actually exists for the sake of a moral man who is as 
yet problematic, risks the very existence of society for a merely hypothetical (even though 
morally necessary) ideal of society" (L3 13). 
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1.8 State of Reason 
On the basis of this analysis, Schiller holds that there are three kinds of political 
conditions which reflect mental conditions. One is the natural state which is guided by the 
sensuous drive. This natural state - the details of which I examine in the next chapter -
provides only physical needs. The natural state, as found in the German states or France's 
ancien regime, does not offer political freedom, and is not open to the possibility of 
reform. Schiller holds that "the [natural] state as at present constituted has been the cause 
of evil," the cause of the fragmented condition (L7 45). The second is the moral state, 
which is guided by the formal drive, and which carries the realization of political freedom 
- though Schiller holds that such a state will never be fully realized. The third state is the 
aesthetic state which is guided by true reason, in the sense of a synthesis of reason and 
sense, or person and condition. In this state, hwnans fmally realize political and mental 
freedom. Schiller calls this third state a state of reason. The three states represent either a 
one-sided human ability (reason or sense) or united human ability; reason and sense are 
sublated without being annihilated, which Schiller calls reason in the sense of true reason. 
'True' or 'ideal' in this case means the condition ofwholeness which we will attain after 
overcoming fragmentation. (I deal with his definition of the true and ideal in Chapter 4). 
The three states may be described as follows: 
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Aesthetic state = State of Reason 
Will be realized in the future 
Sensuous/Formal drive 
Physical and Mental need 
Second Freedom (Physical/Mental) 
Human nature is reflected in the state. A natural state, influenced by the sensuous 
drive (which Schiller sometimes calls natural character), has rule of force. Moral humans 
cannot stay in this natural state because they respect law, but physical humans can stay 
since they care about physical needs. A moral state, influenced by the formal drive (which 
Schiller sometimes calls moral character), is not created "because [moral character] never 
becomes manifesf' (L3 15). 
Since the moral state has not yet been realized, except in the imagination, and since 
humans need physical satisfaction, which the formal drive often ignores, the moral state 
merely represents a possibility, not a reality. For example, despite the good intentions 
behind the American and French revolutions, which Schiller acknowledges, the results are 
less than moral states. Reason tends to seek only an ideal and rational rule, and 
practicality is subordinate. If reason alone acts, and if it does not care about the conditions 
necessary for human life, it will bring us to mortal dangers as in the French Revolution. 
On the other hand, the ability to realize reform is not to be found "in the natural character 
2 For Schiller, the first freedom entails the concept of freedom; the second freedom 
involves the realization of freedom in the material world by the harmony of the formal 
and sensuous drives. I discuss Schiller's concept of freedom in detail in Section 3.5. 
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of man [ruled by the senses and instinct] that~ selfish and violent as it is, aims at the 
destruction of society rather than at its preservation" (L3 15). Schiller claims that "what 
we must chiefly bear in mind, then, is that physical society in time must never for a 
moment cease to exist while moral society as idea is in the process of being formed; that 
for the sake of man's moral dignity his actual existence must never be jeopardized" (L3 
13). Therefore Schiller holds that the gradual but complete change of the human psyche is 
the way to achieve social reform. Schiller writes, "For the state as at present constituted 
has been the cause of evil, while the state as reason conceives it, far from being able to lay 
the foundations of this better humanity, would itself have to be founded upon it" (L7 45). 
The third political state, the state of reason or the aesthetic state, realizes the ideal 
personality in individuals. An individual's subjective humanity- condition- has to be 
sublated with his objective ideal archetype -person. The state has to represent this ideal 
personality in individuals. 
This archetype, which is to be discerned more or less clearly in every individual, is 
represented by the state, the objective and, as it were, canonical form in which all 
the diversity of individual subjects strive to unite. One can, however, imagine two 
different ways in which man existing in time can coincide with man as idea, and, 
in consequence, just as many ways in which the state can assert itself in 
individuals: either by the ideal man suppressing empirical man, and the state 
annulling individuals; or else by the individual himself becoming the state, and 
man in time being ennobled to the stature of man as idea. (L4 19) 
Schiller chose the latter way, but in this regard, we have to conquer the material in order 
to heal the disintegration of the psyche and politics. "Nature always makes the first 
demand on the human being, a demand that may never be disavowed. For the human 
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being - before being anything else - is an entity who feels. Reason makes the second 
demand on the human being, since a human is an entity who feels rationally, a moral 
person, and it is this person's duty not to let nature prevail over him but rather to master 
it" (Pathetic 48). Reason needs to take certain steps to reach victory, and I deal with the 
details in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 Human Stages of Development 
2.1 The Meaning of History 
Schiller's plays may be seen as the place where he describes our fragmented 
condition and our earnest desire to regain our previous condition - wholeness. His plays 
feature frustrated characters such as Franz Moor (The Robbers), Mary Stuart, and Don 
Carlos, who cannot achieve what they really want - perhaps to go back home, or to their 
original status. They cannot realize their wish because of their psychological and social 
problems- they feel they are fragmented or isolated from themselves and society. We see 
the same concept in Schiller's philosophical writings. For Schiller, humans want to go 
back to nature (home), but are in civilization (a prison, foreign country ... ), and have to 
suffer this fragmented (isolated) condition in the vain hope of wholeness (being united 
with family and home) someday. 
For Schiller, history means the consequences of education or culture expressed by 
the word Bildung in German. The meaning of history is to bring humans to the state of 
reason by means of freedom. Schiller's view of history is connected to his claim that 
humans eventually progress morally to regain wholeness in the psyche and the political 
state. The person - the ultimate "archetype of a human being" - "is to be discerned more 
or less clearly in every individual, is represented by the state, the objective and, as it were, 
canonical form in which all the diversity of individual subjects strive to unite" (L4 17-19). 
In What Is, and to What End Do We Study, Universal History?, Schiller claims that 
fragmented events which seem unconnected with others are actually connected with 
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others, and thus we may be able to find progress, led by reason. Because of the lack of 
complete and reliable sources of historical information, history is not a science but "an 
aggregation of fragments" (What Is 268). 
But now the philosophical understanding comes to its aid, and while it binds these 
fragments together with artificial connections, it elevates the aggregate to a 
system, to a reasonably connected whole. Its authority for this lies in the 
uniformity and invariant unity of the laws of nature and of the human soul, which 
unity is the reason, that the events of most distant antiquity return in the most 
recent times under the coincidence of similar circumstance from the outside, as 
also the reason, that, therefore, from events most recent, lying within the field of 
our observation, a conclusion can be drawn and some light shed, in hindsight, on 
events which faded away in prehistoric times. (What Is 268) 
When considering Schiller's terminology, it is necessary to note his view of 
human progress for individuals and society, since this view is based on the stages of the 
human condition with regard either to wholeness or fragmentation. In considering "the 
development of mankind as a whole, or ofthe whole development of a single individual" 
(L25 183 fn), Schiller claims that there are three stages or phases of the development of 
culture: 
Are not those three stages which we can distinguish in all empirical knowledge 
likely to hold approximately for the general development of human culture? 
1. The object stands before us as a whole, but confused and fluid. 
2. We separate particular characteristics and distinguish; our knowledge 
is now distinct, but isolated and limited. 
3. We unite what we have separated, and the whole stands before us again, no 
longer confused, however, but illuminated from all sides. 
The Greeks found themselves in the first of these three phases. We find ourselves 
in the second. The third, therefore, we may still hope for, and when it comes we 
shall no longer yearn for the Greeks to return. (qtd. by Wilkinson in Letters 234) 
According to Schiller, it is necessary that all humans pass through these stages, in any era 
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or place "to complete the full cycle oftheir destiny'' (L24 171), and that "the human being 
in nature cannot progress other than by cultivating himself and thus passing over into a 
civilized state" (Naive 202). Each stage might be longer or shorter because of the 
circumstances or human will, but a stage cannot be left out or the order changed (L24 
171 ). Schiller notes that man "must pass through several stages - these deviations are 
nevertheless all attendant upon his physical condition, since in all of them the life impulse 
[sensuous drive] plays the master over the form impulse [formal drive]" (L24 181). 
Humans have to pass through stages either as "animal[s] void of reason," such as in the 
state of nature when humans are the same as animals, or as "animal[s] endowed with 
reason" (L24 181 ), such as in the natural state where humans are controlled by reason, 
which suppresses sense. 
We can look at Schiller's stages of human progress from two points of view: as a 
theory of historical development, and as a theory of the development of artistic creativity 
in individuals which will lead them to be moral. His stages are intended to explain human 
political and mental progress as follows: 
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I remind my readers once again that, necessary as it is to distinguish these two 
periods3 in theory, in practice they more or less merge one into the other. Nor must 
we imagine that there ever was a time when man found himself purely at the 
physical stage, or another when he had entirely freed himself from it. From the 
moment man sees an object, he is no longer in a merely physical state; and as long 
as he continues to see objects, he will not entirely have escaped from that physical 
Here Schiller means, on the one hand, a state of nature ("physical stage"), in the 
sense of a prehistoric era when humans lived as animals without rationality, and, 
on the other hand, ancient Greece and a natural state, in the sense of civilized eras. 
These terms will be discussed below. 
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stage; for only inasmuch as he had physical sensations is he able to see at all. In a 
general way, those three moments which I mentioned at the beginning of the 
twenty-fourth letter may well be considered as three different epochs, if we are 
thinking either of the development of mankind as a whole, or of the whole 
development of a single individual; but they are also to be distinguished in each 
single act of perception, and are, in a word, the necessary conditions of all 
knowledge which comes to us through the senses. (L25 183 fn.) 
Schiller admits that "This state of brute nature [state of nature] is not, I admit, to be found 
exactly as I have presented it here among any particular people or in any particular age. It 
is purely an idea; but an idea with which experience is, in certain particulars, in complete 
accord" (L24 173). 
In attempting to lay out Schiller's concept of human development, I have added an 
extra stage at the beginning, before number one in Schiller's ordering above. Schiller does 
not include this prehistoric era in his list, since it is before human culture and civilization, 
but he does describe an animal-like condition, a time before humans obtained 
consciousness called "a state of nature" (L3). So, I regard the four stages as follows: 
Stage 1: A State of Nature (The condition before civilization and political bodies). 
Nature as humanity's animal-like condition. 
Reason as potential human ability which is not yet revealed. 
Sense as actual ability - the impulse for self-preservation. 
In this stage, a state of nature; humans do not have self consciousness yet. They do 
not know the pleasure of ornamentation. Thus they are not human-like; they do not 
appreciate beauty. 
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Stage 2: An Age of Transition (Ancient Greece). 
Nature as true human nature. 
Reason as a sense of intellectual ability, not clearly distinguished from sense. 
(Humans start to use reason, but reason and sense are not yet clearly 
distinguished.) 
Sense as a feeling or physical desire which is not clearly distinguished from 
reason. 
Civilization in its beginnings, just before the development of political bodies 
which will treat humans as material . 
In this stage, humans start to develop civilization and culture and experience the 
pleasure of ornamentation. They start creating works of art. Following the terminology of 
Naive and Sentimental Poetry, this may be called the Naive era, since humans are in a 
natural condition, have well-combined psyches, and are able to reflect such a condition in 
their works of art. 
Stage 3: Natural State (A political state which provides only physical necessities). 
Nature as the real life of humanity -violent, or nature as character lost since 
ancient Greece. 
Reason as intellectual ability, opposed to sense or feeling. 
Sense - feeling opposed to intellect. Reason, in this stage, suppresses feeling, and 
the psyche is divided into two. Humans are often under the control of only one 
side. 
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Civilization as the origin of humanity's violent character and alienation. 
Following the terminology of Naive and Sentimental Poetry, this stage can be also called 
the era of Sentiment, in the sense of an era of struggle to go back to our nature - a united 
psyche. Artists have to struggle to combine their concepts and materials, as individuals 
have to struggle with their sense and reason conflict to realize their total humanity. 
Stage 4: Aesthetic State CA political state based on an aesthetic mental state). 
Nature as humanity's true nature which unites with freedom and beauty. 
Reason as intellect which shows maximum ability, as in works of art. 
Sense as feeling which shows maximum ability, as in works of art. 
Civilization as a necessary tool to realize the aesthetic state for the human psyche 
and political body. 
In this stage, finally, our struggle with reason and sense will cease, the mind and body 
problem will be solved, and we will be able to move to the reformation of the political 
state, just as artists will realize ideal beauty after they conquer the material. 
I believe these four divisions help clarify Schiller's main definitions of nature, 
reason, sense, and civilization, since each stage involves a distinct use of the terms. They 
are key words for understanding not only Schiller's theory of human progress but also his 
concept of wholeness, since they show various meanings in each stage. Therefore I hold 
that Schiller's terminology results from his theory of alienation and not from any 
inconsistency. His holistic view is that the opposing relations will be sublated and bring 
us happiness. On the other hand, in his view of fragmentation, or when we look at divided 
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elements, they bring the disasters and misery ofhuman history, causing political conflict, 
violent revolution, and the peril of death. 
2.2 Reflections: Resistance in the Fragmented Era 
In Naive and Sentimental Poetry, published the same year as the Letters ( 1 795), 
Schiller describes the history of literature regarding the progress of humanity. The ancient 
Greeks had naive character, a harmonious condition to express their nature. In Schiller's 
view, they could grasp objects as a whole, but since their reason and sense were not yet 
clearly divided, they did not analyze or reflect, but simply imitated the object in their 
works of art. He holds that because the naive poet imitates "simple nature and feeling, 
limiting himself solely to imitation of reality, he can have only a single relation to his 
object and, in this respect, he has no choice regarding the treatment" (Naive 204). 
On the other hand, modem individuals have sentimental character in the sense of a 
strong desire to go back to their original harmonious psyche, before civilization developed 
the reason and sense conflict. Sentimental poets show the desire to go back to nature, to a 
united psyche. "This sort of poet reflects on the impression the objects make upon him 
and only on the basis of that reflection is the emotion founded ... " (Naive 204). 
Since sentimental poets reflect on the impressions of objects with their reason, and 
naive poets imitate objects with their reason and sense combined psyches, T. J. Reed uses 
the term reflective instead of sentimental when he writes "The awareness of lost 
naturalness and the impulse to restore it together make modern writing 'reflective', what 
Schiller calls 'sentimentalisch' -again, not a dismissive term, since it is concerned with 
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an anything but shallow or trite emotion" (Reed 75). Sentimental or reflective represents 
the human reaction and resistance to the modem, fragmented era; naive represents the 
tendency to be in harmony and wholeness. In the modem era, the poet's ability is in 
realizing human wholeness by overcoming the fragmented psyche. Thus Schiller claims 
"The ancient poets touch us through nature, through sensuous truth, through living 
presence; the modem poets touch us through ideas" (Naive 201). 
The modem era or natural state is a fragmented era, but this is also the preparatory 
era for the coming age- the age of the aesthetic state. In Naive and Sentimental Poetry, 
Schiller does not deal with the specifics of the coming age of the aesthetic state; however, 
he " ... does not consider sentimental poetry the end of art and human development. In a 
letter to Humboldt dated December 25, 1795, Schiller explains that if sentimental culture 
or humanity is 'complete ... it is no longer sentimental, but ideal ... I present the 
sentimental as only striving after the ideal m ( qtd. by Hinderer and Dahlstrom in Essays 
xiv). 
Naive and Sentimental Poetry has been relatively ignored compared to the Letters, 
since it has the style of a history of literature. Writing on Schiller's philosophical works, 
Regin deals with Naive and Sentimental Poetry in only one paragraph. He comments: "As 
the title indicates, the work falls clearly outside the field of our investigation. It is of great 
importance for literary criticism and prosody, but has little bearing on the development of 
Schiller's thought in a strictly historical or philosophical sense. Yet a few words may be 
said about his idea of the Idyll as the ideal form of poetry, the synthesis of elegy and 
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satire" (Regin 113). However, the true figure and purpose of Naive and Sentimental 
Poetry is not merely the history of literature, but concerns the development of humanity's 
stages. Schiller's history of literature could equally be the history of any human activity 
such as visual art, music, or politics, since this must be called the history of resistance to 
alienation. 
Schiller's concept ofthe artist's character- naive and sentimental- has been 
criticized as an unrealistic view ofthe history ofliterature since its publication in 1795. 
Sharpe comments that, for example, in 1804, 
Like August Wilhelm Schlegel he [Jean Paul Richter] objects to Schiller's 
classification of specific writers as naive or sentimental ... and over-stresses the 
historical nature of the division. Like Herder, toward whose aesthetic ideas he felt 
a greater sympathy, he doubts the usefulness of any such sweeping distinction. 
Schiller's identification of the question of the self-consciousness of the artist, an 
issue so important in Romantic criticism, is ignored by both Schlegel and Jean 
Paul. (Sharpe 11) 
Admittedly it may be simplistic to say the ancient Greeks were naive and modem poets 
are sentimental, but Schiller acknowledges that the distinction of eras is merely a 
generalization of moral attitudes. He writes, "I note that the division attempted here, 
precisely because it is based simply upon the manner of feeling, should determine nothing 
at all in the division of poems themselves and the derivation ofthe poetic types" (Naive 
212 fn). For Schiller, a modem poet is "one who is a modem in the moral sense of this 
term" (Naive 199), and he classifies eras by their prevailing moral attitude, such as one of 
reaction to and reflection on opposing the fragmentation of society. Schiller shows higher 
regard for the resistance of modems than the attitude of the ancient Greeks: 
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This road taken by the modem poets is, moreover, the same road humans in 
general must travel, both as individuals and as a whole. Nature makes a human 
being one with himself, art separates and divides him; by means of the ideal he 
returns to the unity. Yet because the ideal is an infinite one that he never reaches, 
the cultured human being in his way can never become complete as the natural 
human being can be in his way. If we pay attention solely to the relation in which 
both stand to their respective ways of proceeding and to what is optimal for each, 
then the cultured individual would necessarily lag infmitely behind the natural 
individual in perfection. On the other hand, if one compares their two approaches 
with one another, then it becomes apparent that the goal for which the human 
being strives through culture is infmitely superior to the goal that he attains 
through nature. (Naive 202) 
For Schiller, a genius is one who is truly aesthetic, and the aesthetic is found in 
"the intimate merging of the spirit with the material and in the unified relation of a work 
to the capacity to feel and have ideas" (Naive 222). There exist rare persons who are not 
alienated in their psyches even in modem "ages of artificial culture" (Naive 196); such 
geniuses will be able to produce works of art which, as a result of their moral attitude, 
combine material with form in harmonious concord. For example, Shakespeare and 
Goethe, geniuses who could combine reason and sense to write their respective works, 
were naive poets according to Schiller (Naive 197). "Every true genius must be naive or 
he is no genius .... It is a gift of genius alone, always to be at home even beyond the 
confines of what is familiar, and to expand nature without going outside it" (Naive 189). 
If we look at Naive and Sentimental Poetry as the expanded version of Schiller's 
concept of the stages of human development discussed in the Letters, his most important 
intention is going back to nature, to the time before we were fragmented. Letters on the 
Aesthetic Education of Man is the history of fragmentation, and the declaration of the 
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future aesthetic state, and Naive and Sentimental Poetry is the history of poetic resistance 
to fragmentation since we lost the nature we had in ancient Greece. 
Literature and all the fme arts are a reflection of the human desire to go back to a 
natural status- humanity's original, united psyche. Schiller's naive character corresponds 
to nature, and his sentimental character corresponds to civilization. He writes, "For 
ultimately we still have to concede that neither the naive nor the sentimental character, 
considered by itself, can completely exhaust the ideal of beautiful humanity, an ideal that 
can only emerge from the intimate union of both" (Naive 249). Achieving an excellent 
work of art is not only possible in literature, visual arts, or music, but also in the whole of 
humanity through history; each individual would be and must be an artist. The history of 
literature is a reflection of the history of the war to regain freedom, and I explain 
Schiller's concept of the stages of human development below. 
2.3 Stage 1: A State of Nature- Before Civilization 
This stage is called a state of nature (LJ 11 ), a "state of brute nature" (L2 4 173 ), 
or the "physical state" (L25 183), which means an animal-like condition before 
civilization. In this condition, the human is "merely a passive recipient of the world of 
sense" (ibid.). Humans feel like animals, but do not think since they do not yet have 
consciousness or "sheer insight and free resolve" (LJ 11 ). They do not look upon and 
think about the world using reason because they are still "completely one with that world" 
(L25 183). In this condition, humans experience "the savagery of life" (L24 171 ). They do 
not have any law, nor do they have freedom. They do not have any rules, but are slaves of 
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this animal-like condition. Humans hunt to eat, defend themselves to survive, and receive 
objects merely by natural impulse without self-consciousness. This stage is characterized 
only by fear and the desire to act. 
In this stage, humans are not yet themselves in the sense of their original nature as 
a rational existence. They do not yet know their true selves- their "dignity'' (L24 173), 
and they do not see dignity in others. Therefore, they are not truly human. In this stage, 
nature, the power which created humans, merely cares about humans as it cares about 
other animals: "Nature deals no better with man than with the rest of her works: she acts 
for him as long as he is as yet incapable of acting for himself as a free intelligence" (L3 
11). Nature, in this stage, is hiding its true purpose or gift for its human children. Its true 
purpose is bringing humans from stage 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and eventually to stage 4. Humans 
do not yet know their moral necessity, such as freedom which will be derived from their 
innate ability to reason. 
The state of nature in the sense of a pre-civilization or pre-political state is not 
exactly equivalent for Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Schiller. In Hobbes, state of nature 
also means state of war, because humans are free and equal enough to insist on what they 
need, and kill others to preserve themselves, under no constraints. Until reason suggests 
humans move to form a political state, they are in "continual fear and danger of violent 
death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes 89). There is 
no morality and no justice in this condition. On the other hand, in Schiller's state of 
nature, merely a condition controlled by animal-like instinct, humans are not bloody and 
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brutal as in Hobbes. Humans are ignorant brutes, but this is not because of their natural 
character, but because of what Schiller sees as their lack of natural character- human 
dignity aided by reason. In Schiller's state of nature, humans do not have freedom and 
equality as in Hobbes. Schiller would regard Hobbes' freedom (men are free to kill each 
other and are free to choose an absolute monarchy in order to preserve their lives) and 
equality (equal ability to kill each other) as the lack of freedom and equality. Schiller's 
freedom and equality come from knowing our dignity. In Hobbes, reason brings humans 
into political states to choose the most practical way of self-preservation and the duty to 
care about the self preservation of others. However, in Schiller, physical necessity brings 
humans into political states against their will. Until they wake up in the political state, 
they do not even have clear consciousness. 
In Locke's state of nature (Second Treatise, Ch.2), humans have morality, justice, 
and freedom- in the sense of action regarding personal property based on individual will. 
\ 
Humans have, for Locke, a natural capacity to act according to the laws of nature from 
reason, grounded on mutual interdependence, and need a minimum of governance by the 
state. They care about others to preserve each other. In this condition, the laws of nature 
are enacted by each person according to his will, based on reason. However, in Schiller's 
state of nature, there is no freedom, no morality, and no justice, since humans lack self-
consciousness. 
In Rousseau (Origins of Inequality), in the state of nature, humans lead solitary 
lives with the instinct to live. They had plenty of food because the population was very 
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small; they did not have private property and did not have to wage war with others. When 
hwnans got together and started living closely, socialization brought the problem of 
inequality. Humans abandoned the life of happiness, simplicity, and equality, for the 
seeking of wealth and private property. For Rousseau, human misery comes from 
unlimited desire. Unlike Hobbes and Locke, who claim civilization and political 
organization as the progress of the state of nature, Rousseau regards this development as 
regression. 
There are similarities between Rousseau and Schiller in the notion that civilization 
made human misery, with lack of freedom, and inequality with overspecialization of jobs. 
However, unlike Rousseau, Schiller does not mention private property as the main 
problem. His concern is the problem of the human psyche - the split of reason and sense, 
and the misery it has brought to human life. In Schiller's view, humans- unlike 
Rousseau's noble savages - are miserable in the state of nature since basic survival is a 
daily struggle. As they do not have society, political freedom is beyond their conception. 
There is only a short moment when humans could enjoy harmony without the reason -
sense conflict; this is the transition from the stage 1, state of nature, to stage 3, the natural 
state as a political state which provides only the physical necessities but not political 
freedom. This stage of transition is represented by ancient Greece. 
2.4 Stage 2: An Age of Transition - Ancient Greece 
When humans gain self-consciousness, they are already in the political state, and 
are provided with the physical necessities such as food, shelter, and clothes. Humans 
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moved to this stage, which Schiller calls a natural state, because the "force of [man's] 
needs" (L3 11)- physical necessity- propelled them into the state, the political body, 
before they were able to choose what they wanted. Schiller writes that "out of the long 
slumber of the senses [man] awakes to consciousness and knows himself for a human 
being; he looks about him, into his situation before he was as yet capable of exercising his 
freedom to choose it; compulsion organized it according to purely natural laws before he 
could do so according the laws of reason" (L3 11 ). In this context, natural law mean 
innate human instinct without choice, will, or even consciousness. 
This is the beginning of awareness ofthe lack offreedom. However, there is a 
small gap or space when humans did not yet have this problem. This stage is very short 
because it is in the transition from the state of nature to the natural state (as a political 
body). In this transitional space, humans were neither in the state of nature nor the natural 
state as a political body. Schiller sees this stage represented in ancient Greece- at least in 
the idealized, utopian Greece of his vision. He needed such a myth of the past as a basis 
for a possible future. According to this model, the Greeks gained consciousness, reason, 
and civilization, but civilization was not yet harmful since their reason was not yet far 
from their senses. 
Schiller describes nature as an operating power in the world - which can be called 
"mother nature"- an educator or parent which cares about her children. In this stage, 
nature as a ruler of the world finally starts to save humans from their brutal and ignorant 
condition. Schiller says "in this state of sullen limitation [man] gropes his way through the 
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darkness of his life until a kindly nature shifts the burden of matter from his beclouded 
senses, and he learns through reflection to distinguish himself from things, so that objects 
reveal themselves at last in the reflected light of consciousness" (L24 173). This is the 
stage when "The object stands before us as a whole, but confused and fluid" (qtd. by 
Wilkinson in Letters 234 ). As the ancient Greeks do not have the problem of a reason and 
sense split, they can enjoy knowing objects from both sides. In this stage, humans are half 
children and half adult-like; they have reason, but do not need to use reason 
independently. 
The entire edifice of [ancient Greek] social life was erected on feelings, not on 
some clumsy work of art. Their theology itself was the inspiration of a naive 
feeling, born of a joyful imagination and not ofbrooding reason as is 
the belief of the churches of modem nations. Hence, since the Greek had not lost 
the nature in humanity, he also could not be surprised by nature outside humanity, 
and for that reason could have no pressing need for objects in which he 
rediscovered nature. One with himself and content in the feeling of his humanity, 
the Greek had to stand quietly by this humanity as his ultimate and to concern 
himself with bringing everything else closer to it. We, on the other hand, neither 
one with ourselves nor happy in our experiences of humanity, have no more 
pressing interest than to take flight from it and to remove from sight so miscarried 
a form. (Naive 195) 
Ironically, humans found themselves- their true nature, having reason and sense 
in harmony -just after they obtained reason, and just before they fell into the misery of 
civilization, as Schiller claims: 
With the Greeks, humanity undoubtedly reached a maximum of excellence, which 
could neither be maintained at that level nor rise any higher. Not maintained, 
because the intellect was unavoidably compelled by the store of knowledge it 
already possessed to dissociate itself from feeling and intuition in an attempt to 
arrive at exact discursive understanding; not rise any higher, because only a 
specific degree of clarity is compatible with a specific fullness and warmth. This 
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degree the Greeks had attained; and had they wished to proceed to a higher stage 
of development, they could, like us, have had to surrender their wholeness of 
being and pursue truth along separate paths. (L6 39-41) 
The logical mind with moral desires gave humans freedom to choose civilization. 
However, instead of choosing the way to freedom, we lost happiness. Because of our 
dependence on artificial or man-made products, we cannot go back to nature, although our 
natural condition, which we possessed in ancient Greece, can be found in children, or in 
some limited people's simple, childlike actions. 
The ancient Greeks had what we have lost - freedom and beauty which come from 
the unity of the psyche. Schiller says "we then see in nonrational nature only a more 
fortunate sister who remained at home arrogantly confident of our freedom. With painful 
urgency we long to be back where we began as soon as we experience the misery of 
culture and hear our mother's tender voice in the distant, foreign country of art" (Naive 
192). He adds that hwnans, as "mere children of nature," remained "happy and complete," 
but became neither happy nor complete when free to use reason. Our feeling of nostalgia, 
when we look at nature, is a reflection of our own lost nature. According to Schiller, 
simple objects in nature such as flowers and animals "are what we were; they are what we 
should become once more. We were nature like them, and our [aesthetic] culture should 
lead us along the path of reason and freedom back to nature" (Naive 180-181 ). When he 
implies a "back to nature'' stance, he is talking about our true natural character, which was 
found neither in a state of nature, as in stage 1, nor a natural state, as in stage 3, when a 
political body limits our freedom. True human nature is to be found only in the era of 
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transition - the second stage - between the state of nature and the natural state. 
There are similarities between Rousseau and Schiller regarding the "back to 
nature" concept. When both use the word nature they are not talking about going back to 
an animal-like condition. They are talking about the second stage- the transition between 
a state of nature and civilization. In Rousseau, the second state of human history is the 
beginning of a civil state as yet uncontaminated by civilization, without inequality and 
with human dignity in the place of socialization. This is a natural community before the 
political body appears. People start using reason when they understand themselves as 
individuals. This is a perfect time for humans, as Rousseau explains: 
... although men had become less forebearing, and although natural pity had 
already undergone some alteration, this period of the development of human 
faculties, maintaining a middle position between the indolence of our primitive 
state and the petulant activity of our egocentrism, must have been the happiest and 
most durable epoch .... The example of savages, almost all of whom have been 
found in this state, seems to corrfrrm that the human race had been made to remain 
in it always; that this state is the veritable youth of the world. (Inequality 65) 
This golden age-like stage, such as in ancient Greece, which is Schiller's generalization of 
the category, can be seen in any era, race, or individual, as he writes: 
Beneath a serendipitous sky, in the uncomplicated relationships of that original 
condition, and with limited knowledge, nature is easily satisfied and a human 
being does not become a savage until need produces fear in him. All people with a 
history have a paradise, a state of innocence, a golden age. Indeed, each individual 
human being has his paradise, his golden age that he recalls with more or less 
enthusiasm, depending upon how poetic his nature is. (Naive 228) 
The reason humans could not stay in such an ideal stage is similar in both 
Rousseau and Schiller. In Rousseau, there is a special character which only humans have. 
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This is "the faculty of self-perfection," an unlimited ability which is "the source of all 
man's misfortunes" (Inequality 45), which pulls humans from nature into the political 
state. In Schiller, reason tends to progress, and cannot stop, but since it has to deal with 
sense it cannot avoid falling into a worse condition. 
For many German writers, such as Winckelmann, Holderlin, Schiller, Nietzsche, 
Hegel, and Marx, ancient Greece was the model of an ideal society and the ideal human 
condition. The common concept among those thinkers is that before modem civilization 
and alienation, before the separation from our true nature and enslavement in society, 
there was an ideal state. An individual Greek had a simplicity and wholeness of character 
which was not subject to the contradiction between reason and feeling, between the 
mental and physical. And the Greeks could develop their abilities as much as possible, as 
they did not experience a tension between principle and passion. Schiller is clearly under 
the spell of Winckelmann, who greatly influenced German writers regarding the harmony 
and beauty considered to exist in ancient Greece. According to Macleod, "It has become 
an academic commonplace to say of classical German aesthetics that it is underpinned by 
the notion of 'the middle"' (Macleod 27). For Winckelmann, the middle or golden mean 
is represented by beauty in the fme arts of Greece. The physical and mental, and rational 
and sensuous unity brings harmony and beauty, for "Beauty is nothing other than the 
middle between two extremes. Just as the middle path is always the best, it is always the 
most beautiful. In order to find the middle, one must know the two extremes" ( qtd. by 
Macleod 27). According to Macleod, "Such a middle way also suggests a temporal 
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location of 'in-betweenness': a nostalgic version of classical Greek perfection, a utopian 
call for an aesthetic state that could restore such wholeness" (27). Schiller uses Greece to 
show nature in the sense of humanity's original character which had beauty and freedom 
from the unity oftwo elements. The Greeks had an "all-unifying" concept of nature, 
uniting matter and form, but modern humans have "all-dividing intellect" (L6 33), which 
divides matter and form. 
To the Greek, nature is never mere nature, for which reason he need never blush to 
know her; to him, reason is never mere reason, for which reason he need never 
shudder to tread under its rule. Nature and morality, matter and mind, Earth and 
Heaven, flow together with wondrous beauty in his poems. He introduced 
freedom, which is at home not merely in Olympus, also into the business of 
morality, and one will therefore want to indulge him, if he misplaces 
sensuousness, too, into Olympus. (Grace 341) 
Schiller's four stages can be considered theoretical history; whether or not an 
event truly happened in the past is not his primary focus. He uses the term "era" when 
describing the process of creating works of art, itself a metaphor for the stages of progress 
of individuals and the political state. History and the individual will pass through the 
same stages as works of art. Much as a sculptor has to struggle to combine his conception 
with such materials as wood and stone, a human as a work of art, has to struggle to 
combine mind and body, or reason and sense, to regain a harmonious condition. 
2.5 Stage 3: A Natural State- Provides Only Physical Necessities 
Stage 3 is the era of the natural state, which Schiller defines as "any political body 
whose organization derives originally from forces and not from laws" (L3 13). He uses 
the term nature in a negative way in stage 3, and a natural state, or modern political state, 
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provides the bare minimum of physical necessities. Nature in the sense of human 
character is violent and irrational under such a natural state. This state does not recognize 
that each individual has the dignity to seek freedom. In this stage, the individual starts to 
question his lack of freedom under the natural (political) state; "But with this state of 
compulsion, born of what nature destined him to be, and designed to this end alone, he 
neither could nor can rest content as moral being. And woe to him ifhe could!" (L3 11). 
In this stage, the division of labour induces humans to use reason and sense independently 
and expand the gap between them. Humans try to go back to the harmonious condition 
which they had before, but since they are using their abilities separately, their political and 
mental conditions become alienated, meaning that each person is isolated from his true 
nature and purpose, and also isolated from others; each becomes merely part of a 
machine, to serve and labour without joy. Thus this stage could also be called the era of 
alienation. It immediately follows the stage represented by ancient Greece, a stage humans 
had to leave because reason, in its drive for development, has a tendency to separate from 
sense. 
Schiller claims that civilization ruins mental and social harmony by fragmentation. 
Since reason as a natural innate characteristic is a factor in the development of the four 
stages, and therefore brought about civilization itself as an element of our advancement, 
we can regard civilization as a temporary "adversary." 
If the manifold potentialities in man were ever to be developed, there was no other 
way but to pit them one against the other. This antagonism of faculties and 
functions is the great instrument of civilization - but it is only the instrument; for 
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as long as it persists, we are only on the way to becoming civilized. Only through 
individual powers in man becoming isolated, and arrogating to themselves 
exclusive authority, do they come into conflict with the truth of things, and force 
the common sense, which is otherwise content to linger with indolent 
complacency on outward appearance, to penetrate phenomena in depth. (L6 41) 
Civilization is the only way to go back to our nature, in the sense of our original 
integrated psyche. This is the plan of nature as a rule or force of the world, which leads 
humans to reach the final stage, by using civilization both as a necessary evil and a 
necessary good. Schiller writes "I readily concede that, little as individuals might benefit 
from this fragmentation of their being, there was no other way in which the species as a 
whole could have progressed" (L6 39). Without darkness, without chains, without 
restrictions, we will not know how to seek light and freedom. According to Schiller, 
heroic efforts are required to go back to nature and the harmonious life. To return to 
paradise, we have to be like children who have not separated reason and sense. Schiller's 
solution is that only an individual's virtue can repair the gap between matter and form, 
insight and action, or the individual and society. 
2.6 Stage 4: The Aesthetic State 
The Greeks were born with harmony within themselves and with others, but in 
stage 4, which is the aesthetic condition of individuals in the aesthetic political state, 
simplicity is obtained through aesthetic semblance - equidistant from material and mind, 
and we can expand the aesthetic semblance in the fine arts into all conditions of human 
life. For Schiller, the task of the eternal and ultimate person is to achieve integration of 
the fragmented relation between our rationality and sensuality, of the individual and the 
56 
state. Our reason ultimately will be synthesized with sense as the true rational condition 
by the help of civilization. Therefore, the cause of fragmentation leads to the solution. 
The formal drive, which is the impulse of reason, is enthusiastic to realize the 
moral state, or as Schiller writes, "The pure moral impulse is directed towards the 
absolute" (L9 59). But such a way will not bring victory for reason: "Far too impetuous to 
proceed by such unobtrusive means, the divine impulse for form often hurls itself directly 
upon present-day reality and upon the life of action, and undertakes to fashion anew the 
formless material presented by the moral world" (L9 59). 
Schiller holds that sense (the receptive faculty) has to achieve maximum passivity, 
and reason (the determining faculty) has to achieve maximum activity, while each remains 
independent from the other (L13 87). Only the third drive can bridge the gap, and allow 
for the realization of the goals of sense and reason. This third drive - what Schiller calls 
"the play drive"- is the impulse to experience reason and sense, or the formal drive and 
sensuous drive at the same time. The third drive is the synthesis of the opposed elements, 
as I explain in Chapter 5. 
The object of the play drive is beauty, which is experienced only by uniting the 
two drives; by using this third drive, Schiller argues, man will be able to realize himself as 
existence in the world by drawing the world "into himself in all its infinitude of 
phenomena, and subject it to the unity of his reason" (LJ3 87 -89). In this condition, "We 
unite what we have separated, and the whole stands before us again, no longer confused, 
however, but illuminated from all sides'' ( qtd. by Wilkinson in Letters 234 ). 
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Schiller expresses his concept of fragmentation and integration in his theory of 
human development, as this chapter has shown. However, his definitions of words such as 
nature, reason, civilization, and freedom reveal much of his thinking regarding this 
concept as well, and the next chapter examines his usage of such terms. 
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Chapter 3 Terminology - Fragmentation and Wholeness 
3.1 Fragmentation in Language 
Schiller uses the words lower, and higher or lofty, in the Letters to indicate the 
dual nature of various words. In this chapter, I explain both what he calls higher or 
narrow - by which he means not commonly used - defmitions, and his lower or broad -
by which he means commonly used - definitions. Also, I observe that those dual meanings 
in Schiller's terms, in the Letters, are combined as the result of his aesthetic approach -
which is guided by the goal of harmonizing the opposing elements. 
For Schiller, a splendid work of art combines form and matter almost equally. A 
writer who puts his ideas into language is the same as a sculptor who puts his ideas into a 
material substance. It could be said that the Letters is itself Schiller's work of art, as he 
tried to show the combination of a poetic mind and a conceptual mind in his philosophical 
analyses: 
The language places everything before the understanding, and the poet shall bring 
everything before the imaginative power (present); the poetical art wants 
intuitions, language gives only concepts. Language, therefore, deprives the object, 
whose presentation is entrusted to it, of its sensuousness and individuality and 
impresses on it a property of its own (universality), which is alien to it. It mixes-
to make use of my terminology - into the nature of that to be presented, which is 
sensuous, the nature of the presenting, which is abstract, and therefore brings 
heteronomy into the presentation of the same. (Kallias 525) 
There is a strong connection rhetoric in his philosophical writings between 
Schiller's and his theory of fragmentation and wholeness. For Schiller, language is a tool 
to express thought, but it can also hide truth. For example, intellect understands objects or 
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concepts by analyzing each element as a fragment. Thus Schiller holds that philosophical 
writing, because analytical, tends not to seek objects as part of a wholeness. Schiller 
disagrees with much technical terminology in philosophical writing, as he clearly states in 
the beginning of the Letters. 
But it is precisely this technical form, whereby truth is made manifest to the 
intellect, which veils it again from our feeling. For alas! intellect must first destroy 
the object of inner sense if it would make it its own. Like the analytical chemist, 
the philosopher can only discover how things are combined by analyzing them, 
only lay bare the workings of spontaneous nature by subjecting them to the 
torment of his own techniques. In order to lay hold of the fleeting phenomenon, he 
must first bind it in the fetters of rule, tear its fair body to pieces by reducing it to 
concepts, and preserve its living spirit in a sorry skeleton of words. Is it any 
wonder that natural feeling cannot fmd itself again in such an image, or that in the 
account of the analytical thinker truth should appear as paradox? (Ll 5) 
Schiller holds that the technical form of philosophy often does not express truth, but 
deforms it. When readers receive what someone wrote, it is no more than the remains of a 
thought. Words have to be a direct reflection of real life for Schiller, but it is difficult to 
express our thought clearly in language. 
The rules of grammar restrict the poet less; he offers it up to nature; his sentence 
construction becomes more irregular; so is, for example, sometimes the more 
frequent use, sometimes the omission of conjunctions natural and purposive. At 
times the language paints even the object itself. Often the objective of an object is 
animated by the subjective of the expression in the language ... 
(Aesthetica/ Lectures 4 78) 
Thus objects of nature might be lost "through the abstract nature of language" (ibid.). In 
the following sentences, Schiller uses the term 'poetic' in the sense of 'aesthetic' - the 
overcoming of the disagreement between the intention and the language without losing 
either. 
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Shall, therefore, a poetical presentation be free, then the poet must "overcome 
the tendency of language to the universal through the greatness of his art and 
triumph over the matter (words and their laws of inflection and construction) 
through the form (namely the application of the same)." The nature of the 
language (precisely its tendency to the universal) must be fully submerged in the 
form given to it, the body must lose itself in the idea, the sign in the indicated, the 
reality in the appearance. Free and victorious must that to be presented stride forth 
from the presenting, and, despite all fetters of language, stand there in its entire 
truth, liveliness and personality before the imaginative power. With one word: The 
beauty of poetical presentation is ''free self-action of nature in the fetters of 
language." (Kallias 526) 
For Schiller, language is not only a medium offme art but also a way to regain 
freedom. To achieve total humanity and wholeness, we need different kinds of language 
use. In the beginning of the Letters, Schiller remarks that the free mode, suggested for the 
Letters by his patron Duke of Augustenburg, is not a restriction for him but rather a 
necessity: "Little practiced in the use of scholastic modes, I am scarcely in danger of 
offending against good taste by their abuse. My ideas, derived from constant 
communicating with myself rather than from any rich experience of the world or from 
reading, will be unable to deny their origin: the last reproach they are likely to incur is that 
of sectarianism" (Ll 3). The Letters is the declaration of Schiller's unique philosophical 
expressions opposing ''the use of scholastic modes." In a letter to Goethe, he writes: 
You and I, and other good people, know very well that man ... always acts as a 
whole, and that nature proceeds by way of synthesis. But it would never occur to 
us to deny on that account the need for analysis and distinctions in philosophy ... 
any more than we should attack the chemist for destroying nature's syntheses. But 
this Herr Schlosser [Goethe's brother-in-law, who had just published a second 
attack on Kant] and his like want to sniff and fumble their way through 
metaphysics. They insist on knowing everything by way of synthesis. This 
apparent richness, however, merely conceals the most wretched and platitudinous 
emptiness. The affectation of these gentlemen for keeping man in a permanent 
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state of totality, for spiritualizing the physical and humanizing the spiritual is, I 
fear, nothing but a miserable attempt to ensure the survival of their own wretched 
self in all its obscurantism. (qtd. by Wilkinson in Letters 223) 
Wilkinson points out that recognizing the obscurity of language was common at 
that time in Germany. She claims that one of Schiller's aims is ''to confess the faith he 
shared with many of his contemporaries, including Kant and Herder, that a thought can be 
transposed into different terms without becoming an altogether different thought - a faith 
which is essential to belief in popularization as he understood it" (Gutenberg 313 ). If we 
apply Schiller's aesthetic to understand his rhetoric, it will clear up his obscurity. Schiller 
follows his own advice in the Letters, since he claims that "In a truly successful work of 
art the contents should effect nothing, the form everything; for only through the form is 
the whole man affected, through the subject-matter, by contrast, only one or other of his 
functions" (L22 155). Applying this to language, it could be said that language (material) 
has to be conquered by form (an artist's intention). 
On the other hand, if someone - even a reader of the Letters - tries to look at the 
work of art as content (material), he is looking at the object as only a part or fragment, and 
will not grasp the entire work. Schiller explains as follows: 
But it is by no means always a proof of formlessness in the work of art itself if it 
makes its effect solely through contents; this may just as often be evidence of a 
lack of form in him who judges it. If he is either too tense or too relaxed, if he is 
used to apprehending either exclusively with the intellect or exclusively with the 
senses, he will, even in the case of the most successfully realised whole, attend 
only to the parts, and in the presence of the most beauteous form respond only to 
the matter. (L22 157) 
The Letters was first of all written to Schiller' s patron Duke Augustenburg, but in 
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the revised version Schiller replaces the name of the Duke, dedicating the work to public 
readers - the middle class Burgers who were gaining economic power at that time in 
Germany (Kontje 123-134). Kontje points out that Schiller probably intends the Letters 
itself to be understood based on the aesthetical judgement which is explained in the 
Letters. He notes that because of Schiller's intention- that of reversing the value ofthe 
real and ideal for his readers - he is expecting readers, as aesthetically educated people, to 
understand the Letters: 
If we trace the image of Schiller's reader as it emerges in the Aesthetic Education, 
however, we fmd a tendency to address the reader as if he were already a member 
of a select group of individuals in the aesthetic state .... In addition to these direct 
appeals to the reader, the basic stylistic changes in Schiller's theory as he moves 
from the depiction of reality to the philosophical deduction of an ideal involve a 
changing model of the reader's activity which again serves to distinguish him from 
the ordinary members of society. (Kontje 135-136) 
Schiller regards his readers as his confidants who know how to judge the Letters as a 
work of art. According to Schiller, beauty will be limited by material in actual life, and 
also it will be received as a faded figure by our limited psyche- in either "a state of 
tension" because of the disagreement of reason and feeling, or "a state of relaxation" 
because ofthe exhaustion ofreason and feeling (LJ7117-119). However, he hopes his 
readers will not succumb to either state, and offers this encouragement: 
Beauty will, therefore, in actuality never show herself except as a particular and 
limited species, never as pure genius; she will in tense natures lay aside something 
of her freedom and variety, in relaxed natures something of her vivifying power. 
But we, who have by now become more familiar with her true nature, should not 
let ourselves be confused by such discrepancies in her appearance. Far from 
following the ordinary run of critics, who define the concept of beauty from their 
individual experience of it, and make her responsible for the imperfections 
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displayed by man under her influence, we know that it is, on the contrary, man 
himself who transfers to her the imperfections of his own individuality, who by his 
subjective limitation perpetually stands in the way of her perfection, and reduces 
the absolute ideal to two limited types of manifestation. (LJ7 119) 
For Schiller, one-sided definitions are ultimately false definitions. He sees 
humanity as violent when looking at human nature as a fragment of the reason-sense split; 
but when he regards human nature as a unity of reason and sense, a wholeness, he 
discovers an indispensable relation between human nature and reason, freedom, beauty 
and civilization. In this chapter, I deal with the contrasts between sense and reason, nature 
and civilization, and the first and second order of freedom, and I explore ways in which 
Schiller holds that it is possible to establish a harmonious interaction between those 
opposed terms. 
3.2 Reason 
Schiller uses reason, in a lower or false sense, when discussing one-sided human 
nature which lacks sense, or has conflict with it. He uses reason in a higher or true sense 
(sublated with sense) when discussing the entire human nature. Similarly, he uses sense in 
the lower or false sense, when discussing one-sided human nature which lacks reason, or 
has conflict with it. And he uses sense in the higher or true sense (sublated with reason) to 
designate the entire human nature. 
When Schiller considers reason in this ideal meaning, it is clearly different from 
intellect, which is used in the narrow sense of reason which has a tendency to exclude 
sense. A one-sided reason will bring the danger even of death, as in the French 
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Revolution, where people misused their rationality. However, true reason will eventually 
bring us to an ideal political state after we pass through such hazards. Schiller uses either 
a lower or higher definition of reason and sense depending on which era or stage (as I 
explained in Chapter 2) he is talking about. If the era represents a fragmented state, reason 
and sense follow the lower or one-sided definition, and if the era represents a united state, 
they follow a higher or true definition. The following three categories apply to each of the 
human stages: 
Category 1 - under the natural impulse 
(applies to stage 1 -A State ofNature) 
• Reason in the sense of the intellectual ability; it is not used yet since humans do not have 
even self-consciousness. 
• Sense in the sense of sense and feeling from the law of nature, which is understood as an 
innate self-preserving impulse. 
Category 2 - the conflict between two laws or two desires I alienation 
(applies to stage 3 -the Natural State) 
• Reason in the sense of the law of reason, which is understood as an innate moral 
tendency - the opposite of sense. Reason as cold reason without love of humankind. 
Reason in this usage attempts to realize a moral political state, but often falls into power 
conflict; Schiller writes, "For reason is satisfied as long as her law obtains 
unconditionally" (L4 93). 
• Sense in the sense of feeling arising from the law of nature, which is understood as an 
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innate self-preserving impulse. Sense as the violent human tendency under the 
suppression of cold reason. 
Category 3 - in the sense of ideal human personality I wholeness 
(applies to stage 2 - ancient Greece and stage 4 - the aesthetic state) 
• Reason which comes from the synthesis of sense and intellect. Reason's ultimate 
purpose is to bring us to a harmonious condition. Reason as the synonym of nature - the 
unity of sense and reason. 
• Sense as human impulse or feeling, in a cooperative relationship with intellect. Sense as 
the synonym of nature - the synthesis of sense and reason. 
In the modem era, category 2 in the above, one-sided sense is suppressed by one-
sided reason; that is, analytical ability overrides humane temperament. We cannot 
progress without reason, but this reason ignores sense, and expands fragmentation in the 
psyche, so that sense leads to violent and bloody tendencies. Schiller writes, "Feeling is 
excluded as long as we are thinking, and thinking excluded as long as we are feeling" 
(L25 189). 
Reason comes from the law of the reason or categorical imperative, which is an 
innate moral tendency - by which Schiller means an inclination from the formal drive. 
Reason wants to realize morality in the self and society. This desire is often misapplied to 
hurt others in order to make ourselves winners in temporal circumstances, to promote 
ideological dogma, to realize political power, or to win wars. For Schiller such activities 
are a misuse of reason in the area of matter: 
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That very drive which, applied to [man's] thinking and activity, was meant to lead 
him to truth and morality, brought now to bear upon his passivity and feeling, 
produces nothing but unlimited longing and absolute instinctual need. The first 
fruits which he reaps in the realm of spirit are, therefore, care and fear; both of 
them products of reason, not sense; but of a reason which mistakes its object and 
applies its imperative directly to matter. (L24 175-177) 
Attempting to realize ideality in the material world, we will be never satisfied, or never 
realize happiness. That is to say, reformers or revolutionaries will gain social power, but 
they will not regain their mental freedom to release their fragmented psyches. Schiller 
states, "An unlimited perpetuation of being and well-being, merely for the sake of being 
and well-being, is an ideal which belongs to appetite alone, hence a demand that can only 
be made by an animality striving towards the absolute" (L2 4 177). 
Using only the intellect is problematic, as is using only feeling. First of all, 
intellect focuses on the specifics, and does not want to see wholeness, so it will never fmd 
an ultimate solution. For example, Schiller claims that our tendency to impose 
preconceived notions upon nature is one of the major impediments to the progress of 
natural science (Ll3 89 fn 2). He asserts that "the intellect remains eternally confined 
within the realm of the conditioned, and goes on eternally asking questions without ever 
lighting upon any ultimate answer" (L24 177). 
The second problem regarding the use of the intellect involves the formation of 
human character. Schiller criticizes attempts at influencing character which involve 
suppressing passion under the name of principles. He writes that "if we are to become 
compassionate, helpful, effective human beings, feeling and character must unite, even as 
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wide-open senses must combine with vigour of intellect if we are to acquire experience" 
(L13 89 fu 3). He asserts that these humane qualities are, in fact, diminished when we 
attempt to substitute the intellect for feeling, or principles for passions (ibid.). 
For Kant, reason (Vernunft) regulates the quest for and the securing of 
knowledge. When Schiller uses Vernunft to indicate the cause of alienation or 
fragmentation, he is following Kant's definition. However, Schiller also uses the word to 
mean true reason, a higher form of reason which is the synthesis of reason and feeling, 
and which is necessary for the attainment of morality. For Schiller, only true reason 
regards things as whole. He writes, the "Form of [true] reason [Vernunft] is the kind and 
manner, as it expresses its power of combination" (Kallias 485). As in category 3, true 
reason which leads us to act rationally, that is morally, comes from the sublation of 
feeling and intellect. Schiller holds that "Nature (sense and intuition) always unites, 
intellect [Verstand] always divides; but Reason [Vernunft] unites once more" (L18 127 
fn). In the integrated definition, reason and sense will solve the conflict as an ultimate 
rational condition called the aesthetic state, which I deal with in Chapter 5. 
There are clear differences between Schiller's concept of reason ( Vernunft) and 
that of Hobbes. Hobbes distinguishes reason (the equivalent of Verstand) in the sense of 
the faculty for mathematics and logical thinking (Leviathan Ch. 5 and 27), from reason 
(the equivalent of Vernunft) in a higher sense, one which supports a "Law of Nature" or 
rule for survival (Ch.14). This second form of reason is a tool to satisfy the human drive 
for self-preservation; it leads men to live in peace as far as is possible, and when war is 
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unavoidable, to use all means to gain victory (Leviathan 92). The goal of reason 
(Vernunft) is to avoid violent death, and in this regard reason promotes morality. 
In Schiller, the desire to preserve oneself comes from a natural impulse or sense, 
but not reason (Vernunft). Unlike Hobbes' reason (Vernunft), Schiller's reason (as in 
Kant) often ignores self-preservation because of its purpose - realizing morality in the 
sense of freedom. In Locke, reason (the equivalent of Vernunft) guides action, or provides 
a way to reach truth and knowledge, and is necessary in order to be moral. Unlike Locke, 
Schiller does not trust only reason's (Vernunft as in Kant) judgement. 
In Rousseau, life should be guided not by reason but feeling. Schiller was an avid 
reader of Rousseau, and quoted Heloise on the title page of Letters: "Si c' est Ia raison, qu~ 
fait l'homme, c'est le sentiment, qui le conduit" (Heloise 239). Through this novel 
Rousseau describes how strong are our feelings, and how difficult it is to have harmony 
with reason. Like Rousseau, Schiller distrusts reason, as in category 2, since it brought 
civilization and inequality, and he emphasizes valuing sense and feeling. Both of them 
claim that cold reason, in the sense of intellect [Verstand] which disregards human 
concerns, often makes mistakes of judgement. Rousseau did not hold a teleological view 
regarding reason, unlike Schiller, who believed that the ultimate purpose of reason will 
solve the problem it caused. 
3.3 Nature 
The concept of nature is one ofthe essential keys to understanding Schiller's 
rhetoric. Nature has various definitions in his writings, and if we grasp the details of this 
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multiplicity they in turn make clear the definitions of other terms. Nature which opposes 
civilization will be a synonym of civilization later. Thus, beauty, freedom, morality, and 
love are attributes of nature. As those terms are interwoven very closely, it is impossible 
to define them separately. 
Schiller employs different meanings of nature in almost every other sentence 
throughout the Letters. Wilkinson and Willoughby analyze eleven kinds of uses under 
three categories (Letters 322-326). They write, concerning nature, that "nowhere is the 
confusion of Schiller's terminology more apparent - or more irritating! The senses 
available to him, both secular and sacred, were many" (ibid.). Nevertheless, Wilkinson 
writes of Schiller's unique terminology: 
... if Schiller's terms are inexact, then it is not random inexactitude, if inconsistent, 
not haphazard inconsistency; that if his thought is guilty of illogicalities, it is not 
therefore without meaning; that if the form of the whole is confused, it is a most 
intricately designed confusion; and that the overriding intention has a clearly 
defined- and also defmable- character, which is apparent in the detail of the 
language no less than in the dynamics ofthe total structure. (Reflections 57-58) 
However, although Wilkinson and Willoughby hold Schiller's rhetoric to be 
comprehensible, since it is a reflection of Schiller's "dynamics of the total structure," they 
do not explain why he employs so many meanings of the term 'nature.' I assert that those 
various uses of nature may be clarified by recognizing their relation to Schiller's stages of 
human development, which show either fragmentation or wholeness. 
The following distinctions are based closely on Wilkinson and Willoughby 
(Letters 322-326). But what I add is an account of which stage, in my judgment, will 
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apply to each use of nature (I add labels such as N 1, N2 ... to make the explanation 
clearer) to prove that Schiller's terminology is based on his concept of fragmentation. 
Nl Nature in the first category is in "its widest sense" (L20 139) "the source of all 
things" (323), which gave us our lives and all of existence. This category, it seems to me, 
corresponds to all four of the stages, and is a ''mother nature" which affects humans in a 
neutral way. 
In the second category nature is "that which stands over against us, and to which 
we are related in various ways" (323). This category is divided into five kinds of use 
because of different relations with humans: 
N2 Nature "as power or force" (323) for us. I assert that this usage applies to 
stage 1 (the state of nature) when humans are animal-like, and to stage 3 (natural state) 
when humans are under restriction by governments which merely give them physical 
necessities but not a political necessity - freedom. 
N3 Nature which is perceived by humans as "completely one" (L25 183) with 
themselves since they do not have rational thought and self-awareness in their pre-historic 
condition. I contend that this usage applies to stage 1 (state of nature) when humans are 
animal-like, when they do not yet have self-consciousness. 
N4 Nature as material, such as stone, which is used as a sculptor's material (L4 
19). Schiller uses this example to contrast with human nature in the sense of human 
dignity which cannot be treated as material by political states. I hold that this indicates 
stage 3 (natural state), which does not treat humans as spiritual but as material. 
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N5 Nature- "a kindly nature" which brings humans into a rational state (L24 173) 
-which leads humans to be moral and aesthetic in the sense of uniting feeling and reason-
mother nature's gift. I hold that this usage applies to stage 2 (Greece), and stage 4 
(aesthetic state). Nature gave the Greeks happiness in the past, and in the current 
condition is still watching and leading us to reach an aesthetic state under the guidance of 
reason. 
N6 Nature as "sense and intuition"- the opposite of intellectual ability (LIB 127 
fn). This usage, I hold, applies to stage 1, the animal-like condition, and stage 3, the 
problematic condition because of the antagonism between sense and reason. 
Nature in the third category means "Natur in the sense of man's own, 'human', 
nature" (324), and under this category there are five uses according to Wilkinson: 
N7 Human Nature- that which humans are given to preserve themselves as a 
natural impulse. I hold that this usage applies to stages 1 and 3. 
N8 Human Nature which is made from two elements- sense and reason. I contend 
that this usage applies to stages 3, when both have conflict, and stage 4 when they 
integrate. 
N9 Human Nature which leads us to "involuntary" action (325) based on feeling 
and sense, without rational considerations. I hold that this usage applies to stage 1, 
(animal-like condition), and stage 3 (physical desires bring us into political bodies against 
our will). 
NlO Human Nature which leads us to act voluntarily based on rational 
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considerations and self-awareness, but which is often misused because too much 
rationality causes lack of growth of feeling. I contend that this applies to stage 3, where 
we make mistakes in using the intellect. 
Nll Human Nature as a harmonious condition under the reciprocal action of 
feeling and reason. I assert that this usage applies to stage 2 - the Greeks, and to stage 4 -
the aesthetic state which is not yet realized. 
Nature in the second category (different relations with humans and nature) and the 
third category (human nature) will be applied to various stages, with either a fragmented 
or integrated society and psyche. Schiller explains why a human has to step through 
several stages: "But what makes him man is precisely this: that he does not stop at what 
nature herself made of him, but has the power of retracing by means of reason the steps 
she took on his behalf, of transforming the work of blind compulsion into a work of free 
choice, and of elevating physical necessity into moral necessity" (L3 11). Nature as the 
origin of all existence plans to bring humans to its ultimate purpose - realizing a state of 
reason where we can realize laws of reason (moral tendencies), accompanied by sense. I 
claim that each category in Wilkinson and Willoughby's analysis corresponds to humans 
in either a fragmented condition or a united condition, so the following may clarify the 
Issue: 
Category l, Nature. a general term. as in "mother nature." (stage 1-4) N1 
Category 2. Nature in the sense of its relation to humans 
• Fragmented condition 
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2.1 Nature which makes humans slaves of physical necessity. 
(stage 1, a state of nature) N2, N3, N 6 
2.2 Nature which makes humans violent because of the antagonism of reason and 
sense. (stage 3, natural state) N2, N4, N6 
• Integrated condition 
2.3 Nature which makes humans moral with a united psyche. Reason and sense are 
not yet divided. (stage 2, Greece) N 5 
2.4 Nature which makes humans harmonious and moral with a united psyche-
sense and reason in reciprocal action. (stage 4, aesthetic state) N5 
Category 3. Nature in the sense of human nature 
• Fragmented condition 
3.1 Human nature which is based on natural impulse and sense. 
(stage 1, a state of nature) N7, N9 
3.2 Human nature which is violent since humans are slaves of impulse and sense, 
not using reason correctly. (stage 3, natural state) N7, N8, N9, NlO 
• Integrated condition 
3.3 Human nature with unity between reason and sense. (stage 2, Greece) Nll 
3.4 Human nature with unity between reason and sense with the help of the play 
drive. (stage 4, aesthetic state) N8, Nll 
From Nl to Nll, each definition applies to each stage; also, each definition applies to 
either a fragmented of integrated condition. Thus, I claim we can divide each definition 
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into four categories, based on each stage. From stages 1 to 4 we see different aspects of 
nature, as follows: 
Stage 1: A State of Nature - under the natural impulse 
• N7 Human nature in the sense of a natural impulse to preserve ourselves, without 
reason. 
• N2, N3, N6 Nature in the sense of its relation with humans, is defined as an unavoidable 
force which controls humans as the slaves of instinct. Nature in this sense is "completely 
one " (L2 5 183) with humans since they do not have rational thought and self-awareness. 
Stage 3: Natural State - under the conflict between two laws or two desires I 
fragmentation 
• N7 Human nature is defined as "sense and intuition" - the opposite of intellect ability 
(Ll8 127 fu), and also as the natural impulse to preserve ourselves. 
• NlO Human nature is also defined as consciously acting based on rational 
considerations and self-recognition, but which is often misused because too much 
rationality causes lack of growth of feeling. 
• N8, N9 Human nature is also defmed as violent character which brings unintentional 
action based on feeling and sense, without integrated rational considerations, that is, 
rationality incorporated with sense. 
• N6 Nature in the sense of its relation with humans, defined as the loss of an integrated 
psyche, lost since civilization appeared. Therefore the condition of this era is "unnatural" 
(Naive 182), which means lack of freedom, beauty, rationality, and morality. 
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Stage 2: Ancient Greece - the ideal human personality I wholeness. 
• Nll Human nature in this stage means having integration of reason and sense; there is 
no distinction between them. 
• N5, Nll Nature in the sense of its relation with humans, defmed as a harmonious 
condition in society when societies and states were just beginning, and fragmentation had 
not yet started. Humans lived moral and harmonious lives. 
Stage 4: the Aesthetic State - the ideal human personality I wholeness. 
• Nll Human nature is defined as the harmonious unity of reason and sense. It is defined 
as true rationality cooperating with feeling. 
• N5, Nll Nature in the sense of its relation with humans, defmed as a reformed political 
condition where humans fmally can realize the ideal state without the conflict between the 
individual and state, without fragmentation. In this stage nature unites with civilization, 
sense unites with reason, and individuals unite with states. 
Some critics see a problem with Schiller's treatment of nature's contradictory 
character- which can be brutish but also helpful for humans. For example, Kooy points 
out a problem which "has to do with Schiller's shifting attitude towards nature, that is, 
brute physical nature, and the determinism inherent in it. This problem crops up most 
clearly in his incompatible descriptions of beauty, as the appreciation of the forms of 
nature and art, and sublimity, as the overcoming of determinism in nature by a free act of 
will" (Kooy 15-16). In Schiller, nature indeed has dual or several characters which can be 
harmful or beneficial for humans. This is because brute nature is only one aspect of 
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nature. As in the above examination, I hold that Schiller clearly would know which 
meaning he intends, based on either a fragmented condition /era or united condition /era. 
He claims that there are two kinds of human nature, as there are two kinds of definitions 
of civilization. One is actual nature as a fragment (the sensuous side of human nature) 
which "exists everywhere," and the other is genuine nature as wholeness (human nature 
as living form - the synthesis of body and mind, which I will discuss in the next chapter) 
which is "all the more rare, since it requires an inner necessity to exist" (Naive 236). 
Schiller claims: "Nature, we know, although an infinite magnitude as a whole, reveals 
itself in each individual effect to be dependent and deficient. Only in the totality of its 
appearances does it express a grand, self-sufficient character" (Naive 250-251 ). In 
Schiller, going back to nature in the sense of our original mental state is our moral and 
rational desire. 
Since this interest in nature is founded upon an idea, it is able to reveal itself only 
to minds receptive to ideas, that is to say, moral minds .... Still, nature will always 
have something of this effect even on the most callous individual. For the 
potential for morality, common to all people, is all that is needed to produce this 
effect and we all, without distinction, are driven to the contemplation of this idea, 
despite the tremendous distance between our deeds and nature's simplicity and 
truth. (Naive 181-182) 
In Schiller, being natural and simple means being beautiful and free. "Why is the 
naive beautiful? Because the nature therein asserts its right over affectation and disguise" 
(Kallias 515). For Schiller, nature, in the sense ofhumanity's original character as seen in 
ancient Greece, is a synonym of .freedom. Humans gain freedom when they are free from 
fragmentation in their psyches and society. It is possible to use nature and freedom 
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interchangeably, as he explains: 
... I must first determine the concept nature and secure it before any 
misinterpretation. The expression nature is dearer to me than freedom, because it 
indicates at once the field of the sensuous, whereupon the beautiful is confined, 
and implies beside the concept offreedom also at once its sphere in the sensuous 
world. In contrast to technique, nature is, what is through itself, art is, what is 
through a rule. Nature in artfulness, what gives itself the rule- what is through its 
own rule ... When I say: the nature of the thing: the thingfollows its nature, it is 
determined through its nature: so contrast I therein nature to all that, which is 
different from the object, which is considered merely as accidental to the same and 
can be dismissed, without at the same time canceling its essence. It is, as it were, 
the person of the thing whereby it is distinguished from all other things, which are 
not of its kind .... Merely that is indicated through the expression nature, 
wherethrough it becomes the determined thing that it is. (Kallias 503-504) 
It is clear that Schiller's concept of nature is unique since every use of the term is 
based on whether it is one-sided or synthesized. Nevertheless, we still can compare 
Schiller's concept of nature with that of other philosophers. First of all, Hobbes' view of 
the nature, as it relates to humans, is a materialistic and mechanistic one. Hobbes writes 
"Nature ... is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can 
make an Artificial Animal" (Hobbes 9). He describes life as motion, so he regards 
machines as having artificial life. For Hobbes, human nature has two aspects. One leads to 
violent and brutish behaviour; men kill each other for self preservation in the state of 
nature. The other aspect is rational and leads to cooperation following the laws of nature; 
men seek peace and enter the contracts in order to build a political state, with the aim of 
regulating freedom in order to avoid war. Being natural, for Hobbes, means using reason 
to preserve life. 
In Locke, nature, in the sense of its relation with humans, is "a state of perfect 
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freedom to order their actions~ and dispose of their possessions, and persons as they think 
fit, within the bounds of the law of nature~ without asking leave, or depending upon the 
will of any other man" (Locke 269). In this state, humans are equal~ and have a rational 
and moral life without government. They have an innate rationality and morality called 
the law of nature which leads them to respect life~ health, and freedom for oneself and 
others (Locke 271). 
In Rousseau, nature means a natural state before civilizatio~ and this state is not a 
state of war as in Hobbes, and does not have property as in Locke. In Rousseau's natural 
state there is neither property nor inequality. Humans do not have reason here, only a 
natural impulse which enables them to obtain food. They are not miserable compared with 
modem man, who has unlimited desire. There are three kinds of human nature in 
Rousseau: one is a completely natural animal-like condition, where humans do not have 
reason, only feeling and impulse. Another is civilized humanity, where humans lead 
miserable lives because of the loss of freedom and equality. The third is an ideal human 
nature with reason but without the harm done by civilization, as in Schiller's Greece. 
In Schiller's view, the natural condition of humans before civilization is not 
violent as in Hobbes, and not as harmonious as Locke contends, since humans do not 
have reason. Schiller's view of nature, as it relates to humans, is similar to Rousseau's~ 
though Schiller's human nature in the state of nature is not as harmonious as Rousseau's~ 
since humans are slaves of impulse. But civilized human nature is miserable since it 
brings the reason and sense conflict and classificatio~ and inequality as in Rousseau. 
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3.4 Civilization 
Civilization or culture (both words are translated from 'Kultur ') has two meanings 
in Schiller. One is real or lower civilization which "inflicted this wound [all-dividing 
intellect] upon modem man" (L6 33), and caused the fragmentation of the individual and 
society. In Schiller, in the lower or false sense (fragmented condition), civilization means 
only one-sided human rationality, which opposes human nature in the sense of an original 
reason-sense united psyche. Culture and civilization caused human misery by expanding 
the sense and reason split. Schiller claims "It was civilization itself that inflicted this 
wound [fragmentation] upon modem man" (L6 33). 
The other definition is ideal or higher civilization in the sense of a holistic 
condition which unites the psyche; reason and sense are sublated, and this is a necessary 
tool for us to regain our freedom. "Culture [Kultur] is supposed to put humans in a state 
of freedom and to assist in realizing the concept of a human person as a whole" 
(Concerning the Sublime 71). In the higher or true sense (united condition), civilization 
means true human rationality incorporated with human nature. Higher civilization 
removes the violent tendency with the control of sensuous desire; thus humans will be 
moral and free. "A human being who is morally cultivated, and only this sort of human 
being, is completely free.... Nothing that nature does to him is violence, since it has 
already become his own action before it gets to him, and the dynamism of nature never 
reaches him, since he deliberately cuts himself off from everything that nature can reach" 
(Concerning the Sublime 72). 
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If we look at the object from a fragmented or a short-sighted view, civilization or 
culture will be regarded as harmful. However, if we look at the object from an integrated 
or a "long-sighted'' view based on Schiller's stages of hwnan development, current 
civilization, which is harmful, will be regarded as beneficial. 
As detailed in Chapter 1, according to Schiller, there are three kinds of people: 
savages, barbarians, and civilized persons. He writes, "The man of culture [gebildet] 
makes a friend of nature, and honors her freedom while curbing only her caprice" (L4 21 ). 
The true civilized man is a moderate person who has a balanced respect for both sides, our 
natural impulse for self-preservation and rationality, and is able to realize political reform. 
Such a person does not have masters over his psyche to misdirect his life. If nature and 
reason's demands are fulfilled, this makes "permissible for Propriety to make the third 
demand on the hwnan being and to require of him regard for society in the expression of 
feelings and reflections and to show himself to be a civilized being" (Pathetic 48). 
The definitions of civilization I present below are in accord with Schiller's 
concept ofhwnan development. As a result, the way in which civilization changes its 
meaning from lower (fragmented or one-sided) to higher (united or synthesized) becomes 
clear: 
Category 1 - under the natural impulse 
(applies to stage 1 -A State ofNature) 
• Civilization is not revealed yet since hwnans are under the power of nature, a 'mother 
nature' or force, as mere animals. 
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Category 2 - under the conflict between two laws or two desires I fragmentation 
(applies to stage 3- The Natural State) 
• Civilization - the source of human misery which brought humans fragmentation by the 
division of labor and the expansion of the disharmony between reason and sense, state and 
individual, with lack of freedom both in the psyche and in politics. 
Category 3 - the ideal human personality I wholeness 
(applies to stage 2 - Ancient Greece, and stage 4 - the Aesthetic State) 
• Civilization - the necessary tool which brings humans integration between reason and 
sense, state and individuals. An aesthetic state is only possible in a civilization where we 
can use both reason and sense in a condition of wholeness. 
If we review the four stages, civilization plays a positive role as an educator, 
leading humans to the aesthetic state where people live with a hannonious relationship of 
the mind and body. The hostility between sense and reason, or nature and civilization is, 
as a result, necessary for humanity's progress. The aesthetic state will be realized only in 
civilization or culture - what Schiller calls the "aesthetic culture" (Ll 0 69). Leisure will be 
found in the highly developed civilization which can provide food, technology, and an 
organized social system, but not in a wilderness, or a prehistoric condition where we have 
to struggle to live. 
For Hobbes and Locke, civilization means a rational and moral condition. This is 
because civilization and the state can bring peace and freedom to preserve hwnanity. 
However, for both Rousseau and Schiller, civilization and the state are the cause of 
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misery; they brought individual and political conflict and lack of freedom - isolation from 
nature. 
3.5 Freedom 
Schiller defines two kinds of freedom (L19 13 7fn). One is freedom of the first 
order, which is displayed by "acting rationally" (ibid.). This freedom is a priori and 
rational, as in Kant - every rational human has the thought of freedom. "Only of him who 
is conscious of himself can we demand reason, that is, absolute consistency and 
universality of consciousness; prior to that he is not a human being at all, and no act of 
humanity can be expected of him" (L19 135). Before the first freedom, humans are the 
same as the animals without reason; they lead a merely sensuous existence. When a 
human obtains reason, he wants to realize morality in accordance with his pure original 
self, the person. We are free to think about this absolute and universal concept of 
freedom, and Schiller calls having such a concept the first freedom. 
However, humans have a "mixed nature" (L19 13 7 fn), involving the sensuous and 
formal drives, and though we have the first freedom as a concept, this mixed nature 
interferes with rational action when we attempt to bring a speculative freedom into reality. 
Thus, for Schiller, the flexible and practical way to realize the concept of freedom is as 
freedom ofthe second order, that is to say, freedom in real life. This freedom is displayed 
by "acting rationally within the limits of matter, and materially under the laws of reason" 
(ibid.). The second freedom is born from the first freedom: "We might explain the latter 
quite simply as a natural possibility of the former" (ibid.). 
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In Schiller's view, the revolutionaries of 1789 could not avoid seeking freedom 
since they had the first freedom- as the concept of universal human rights. He holds that 
they tried to change a natural condition to a moral condition, both in their psyches and in 
society. He writes, "For the work of blind forces possesses not authority before which 
freedom need bow, and everything must accommodate itself to the highest end that reason 
now decrees in [man] as person. This is the origin and justification of any attempt on the 
part of a people grown to maturity to transform its natural state into a moral one'' (L3 13 ). 
However, the revolutionaries' intention to realize the first freedom as a pure idea brought 
devastating results. They would have needed the second freedom to achieve their aims in 
real life. 
The struggle to gain freedom may be categorized in the following stages: 
Category 1 - under the natural impulse 
(applies to stage 1 -A State ofNature) 
• Bothfirst and second .freedom do not exist since humans do not have speculative minds 
-they have a merely animal-like existence. 
• The political State does not exist yet. 
Category 2 - under the conflict between two laws or two desires I fragmentation 
(applies to stage 3 -the Natural State) 
• Individuals are fragmented in their psyches and political condition First .freedom exists 
in every person's speculation, but second .freedom is not yet gained. Attempts at societal 
reform - humans want to actualize their idea of freedom in real life - are difficult and 
84 
largely unsuccessful since reason has a tendency to ignore sensuous nature and material 
needs. 
• The political State - the natural state which makes individuals fragments does not 
provide moral freedom. Individuals and the state are strangers to each other. 
• Because hwnans have to live as physical beings, they are forced to stay in a natural state 
which can provide food, clothing, and shelter. States which may be regarded as the source 
of fragmentation were also a necessity. Schiller asks, "Can the state be blamed for having 
disregarded the dignity of human beings as long as it was still a question of ensuring their 
very existence? Or for having hastened to divide and unite by the [mechanical] forces of 
gravity and cohesion, while there could as yet be no thought of any [organic] formative 
principle from within?" (L5 25-27). 
Category 3- hwnan ideal personality I wholeness 
(applies to stage 2 - Greece, and stage 4 - aesthetic state) 
• Second freedom is finally obtained since there is no antagonism between reason and 
sense, nature and civilization, individual and state. 
• The State - the aesthetic state which treats the individual as a part of the whole; in this 
case the whole (state) serves the part (individual). 
Schiller's concept of freedom is clearly different from that ofHobbes, who claims 
that freedom means having the basic right to do whatever is necessary to preserve oneself. 
For Hobbes, in the state of nature, a state where individuals have the power to gain 
necessities to preserve themselves, everyone is equal and free in this sense. Hwnans are 
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free since they can do anything- based on what they want to gain. However, this state will 
lead humans to kill each other, and they will likely die in their youth. 
For Locke, freedom or liberty means having the choice to act, or to decline to act, 
unburdened by necessity, and is, along with life and property, a possession. Locke's state 
of nature is a state ofliberty, where individuals coexist, respecting each other's rights. 
For Rousseau, freedom includes "natural freedom" or the independence of the 
individual, as in natural humans. But in a civilized and social condition, we need "moral 
freedom," where each individual takes the interests of others into account when deciding 
on a course of action. He holds that the "general will," the unanimous agreement among 
citizens, is to be carried out by governments. Any individual who disagrees with the 
general will must force himself, or be forced, to do what is right, to be free. 
Unlike Rousseau, Schiller does not deny the need for property. He also does not 
see freedom in humans in a state of nature, but his concept of freedom could be close to 
Locke's. It is not clear if he would agree with Rousseau's "general will," though it may be 
acceptable if it is created after the reformation of the psyche. Comparing reason, nature, 
civilization, and freedom among Schiller, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau reveals that the 
greatest difference between Schiller and the others is that, for Schiller, freedom (second) 
means a harmonious relation between sense and reason. For the others, this may not be 
the case. 
To realize freedom in real life- as in the aesthetic state- humans first of all must 
gain freedom in their psyches to reform their fragmented condition, and then can move to 
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gain freedom in their state. 
Exclusive domination by either of his two basic drives is for [man] a state of 
constraint and violence, and freedom lies only in the co-operation of both his 
natures. The man one-sidedly dominated by feeling, or the sensuously tensed man, 
will be released and set free by means of form; the man one-sidedly dominated by 
law, or the spiritually tensed man, will be released and set free by means of matter. 
(LJ7119) 
In Schiller, freedom in real life is ultimately a synonym for beauty, humanity, and 
rationality. Human lives are controlled by matter; we have to devote energy and time to 
have the necessities to keep our bodies alive. When humans are controlled by gravity and 
mass, they lack freedom and naturalness. Likewise, a dog on a chain, a bird in a cage, a 
worker labouring without joy, and a human in prison are all similarly controlled by mass. 
There is no opportunity to be free, beautiful, and natural under such conditions. 
But that freedom is itself an effect of nature (the word taken in the widest sense) 
and not the work of man, that it can, therefore, also be furthered or thwarted by 
natural means, follows no less inevitably from what has just been said. It arises 
only when man is a complete being, when both his fundamental drives are fully 
developed; it will, therefore, be lacking as long as he is incomplete, as long as one 
of the two drives is excluded, and it should be capable of being restored by 
anything which gives him back his completeness. (L20 139) 
Only when we regain our original human nature - the integrated psyche - will we have the 
second freedom of being ourselves. The second freedom is a synthesis of restriction, such 
as gravity, and the concept of freedom (first freedom), as I discuss in detail in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 4- Schiller's World of Dualism 
4.1 Dual and Dialectic Attitude 
In this chapter I intend to analyze Schiller's systematic view of humanity, which 
parallels his view of alienation. He has a remarkably developed ability to observe 
fragmentation in every feature of experience, and he also sees dialectic movement 
attending the transformation to wholeness. This movement reconciles or sublates binary 
opposites and achieves wholeness through the third or higher stage of the dialectical 
process, which preserves the two elements as correlative principles without simply uniting 
them. For example, the development of humanity may be seen in three stages or levels: 
ancient Greece, the Natural state, and the Aesthetic state. Likewise, there are three kinds 
of drives: a formal drive, a sensuous drive, and a play drive, the latter in each case being a 
synthesis of the first two. 
Wilkinson and Willoughby show three types of hierarchical relationships in the 
Letters, and I reproduce part of their schematic representation here: 
Table 4.1 Wilkinson and Willoughby's Three Kinds of Synthesis 
Type I. In this, familiar, type the term at the apex is different from either of those at the base or 
contains them both: 
6 asthetisch L~ lebende Gestalt L~ 
Stofftrieb F ormtrieb sinnlich sittlich Leben Gestalt 
Type 11 Here a single concept is polarized by qualifying adjectives. A feature of this type is that 








Type Ill In this type, which we have termed binary synthesis, the term at the apex is the same as 
one of those at the base, but is printed in capitals to indicate that it is a higher concept, embracing 
both the limited concept of the same name and its opposite. The mark of this type of synthesis is 
that either of the terms at the base can move to the top. 
a b c 









... With the following diagram we have tried to illustrate what Schiller appears to have had in 






physical moral (intellectual) 
But it is important to realize that a horizontal extension is also necessary: the aesthetic and the 




aesthetic moral aesthetic moral 
(Letters Appendix ill p349-350) 
Although Wilkinson and Willoughby observe the tendency of dualism and dialectic style 
in Schiller, they claim that Schiller's descriptions are not precisely dualistic or dialectic: 
89 
If we ourselves made do with a scale of triangles rising sideways, it was partly to 
reflect the fact that Schiller frequently operates with the synthesis of two 
antitheses (though not always); partly to correct the false assumption that all his 
syntheses are of the familiar, symmetrical, kind involving three terms- far more 
often they are asymmetrical and binary, one of the antitheses reappearing, raised to 
a higher level, as the synthesis; finally in order to insist that this is not then broken 
down into two new antitheses, but itself enters as one of the antitheses into the 
process immediately above. We are inclined to think that neither the dualism nor 
the dialectic is essential to Schiller's model. But what we learnt through the 
attempt to depict it in this way is the characteristics that are: asymmetry as well as 
symmetry, subordination as well as co-ordination, hierarchical transformations, 
continuously open-ended- and a sloping base to indicate that man's physical 
nature has priority in time. (Whole Man 203) 
Wilkinson and Willoughby point out (Letters lxviii) W. Bohm's basic mistakes 
(1927): Bohm regarded Schiller's terminology in terms ofhomonyms, such as the 
sensuous drive/material drive (actually they are synonyms). Here, Wilkinson and 
Willoughby see Schiller's motives, and write: "It is, of course, perfectly true that these 
terms do on occasion change sides. But not without rhyme or reason. The reason varies" 
(ibid.). Yet, they do not make clear "the reason" behind Schiller's rhetoric. I hold that 
"the reason" for Schiller's multiple terminology is his concept of either a fragmented or 
united condition, that it to say, the reason does not vary. 
Wilkinson and Willoughby understand that Schiller distinguishes his words as 
higher or lower, and changes their meanings. However, their explanation of why there are 
so many kinds of symmetry is unclear. Their diagrams are somewhat confusing, and I do 
not think their visual aids help readers to grasp what Schiller means. In addition, it seems 
as though Wilkinson and Willoughby are not aware that Schiller's historical distinctions 
could be clearly connected to his terminology. I have prepared a table based on my 
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contention that Wilkinson and Willoughby probably looked only at isolated elements, not 
the whole system: 
Table 4.2. Regarding Historical Distinctions 







._ Satire-Elegy- Idyll 




1, Condition Person 
2, Time Absolute 
3, Sense Reason 
4, Sensuous Drive Formal Drive 
5, Natural State Moral State 
6, Restriction First Freedom 
7, Feeling Intellect 
8, Real Ideal 
9, Fact Truth 
10,Poetry History 
11, Poetry Philosophy 
12, Matter Form 
13, Nature Civilization 
14, Nature Art 
15, Work Play 
16, Actual Beauty Ideal Beauty 
c 
Synthesis 
Wholeness Cldealitv/ Actuality=True=Aesthetic) 
True Humanity (Condition/Person) 
True Existence (Time/ Absolute) 
True Reason/Sense 
Play Drive (Formal/Sensuous) 
Aesthetic State (The State of Reason) 
True Freedom (Second Freedom) 









True Beauty (Ideal/ Actual) 
As I summarize in Table 4.3 below, throughout the Letters, there are binary 
elements, as in columns A and B, which are, in Schiller's view, completely opposed 
because in isolation they represent the alienation of human beings. Schiller emphasizes 
the importance of a third element, synthesized or sublated from the first two, which I list 
in column C. 
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It would, therefore, be a question of abstracting from man's physical character its 
arbitrariness, and from his moral character its freedom; of making the first 
conformable to laws, and the second dependent upon sense-impressions; of 
removing the former somewhat further from matter, and bringing the latter 
somewhat closer to it; and all this with the aim of bringing into being a third 
character ... (L3 15) 
The theme of the Letters is how to create new elements, that is to say, the third 
character, from the binary elements, as "Only the predominance of such a character [the 
synthesis of elements] among a people makes it safe to undertake the transformation of a 
state in accordance with moral principles" (L4 17), and Schiller repeatedly demonstrates 
this synthesis for each set of elements in columns A and B. 
For instance, he refers to the sublating process in many places in the Letters:~. 
such as when discussing beauty: 
Beauty, it was said, unites two conditions which are diametrically opposed and 
can never become one. It is from this opposition that we have to start ... In the 
second place, it was said, beauty unites these two opposed conditions and thus 
destroys the opposition. Since, however, both conditions remain everlastingly 
opposed to each other, there is no other way of uniting them except by destroying 
[aufgehoben] them. (L18 123-25) 
Elements such as beauty, freedom, reason, and play, as the third characters (column C in 
table 4.3) represent the synthesized condition, that is to say, the reciprocal action of the 
binary elements. Schiller notes:" .... beauty results from the reciprocal action of two 
opposed drives and from the uniting of two opposed principles" (L16 111 ). He explains 
that such reciprocal action "gives rise to, and sets limits to, the activity of the other, and in 
which each in itself achieves its highest manifestation precisely by reason of the other 
being active" (L14 95). 
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Schiller frequently uses forms of the word aujheben in two meanings in the 
Letters, as Wilkinson and Willoughby point out (305). One is generally to preserve or 
save and the other is to annul or abolish. For example, in L 1 it is translated dissolved, in 
L13 it is destroyed, in L14 it is reconciling, in L18 it is destroying, in L20 it is annulled, 
and in L23 it is translated destruction. As Wilkinson and Willoughby point out, even 
when Schiller is not using the word aufheben, he repeatedly demonstrates the concept of 
the synthesis of the binary elements as a completely new third element They write that 
the dialectical concept "had already made its appearance, though without the actual 
occurrence of the word aujheben, in XV. 9: 'they made both [opposites] indiscernible, for 
they knew how to fuse them in the most intimate union"'(Glossary 304-305). Wilkinson 
and Willoughby also note "In this double sense [preserve and destroy] aujheben was to 
become a keyterm of Hegel's dialectical method .... It seems likely, in view of his 
expressed admiration for Schiller's treatise, that it was from XVill.4 [quoted above] that 
he took it" (Glossary 305). 
In the above distinctions, the wholeness side represents the synthesis (represented 
here by the C column) of the fragments which it has subsumed. Schiller writes that "All 
improvement in the political sphere is to proceed from the ennobling of character ... '' (L9 
55). SoC means the realization of true truth, or true ideality/ true actuality which means 
the aesthetic. Moving from the Fragments column (thesis, anti-thesis) to the Wholeness 
column (synthesis), words change their meanings based on historical progress (which 
could be regarded as individual progress) as the above table shows. The side of wholeness 
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is represented by the aesthetic state, and this may be regarded as the reason Schiller often 
indicates that certain terms are synonyms for each other, such as beauty (line 16, C)= 
nature (line13, C), freedom (line 6, C), play (line 15, C), or truth (line 9, C), and so on. He 
regards beauty as the center of those other terms, since beauty in the sense of an 
aesthetic/holistic condition represents true nature, true freedom, and true play as a result 
of wholeness. The same synonymous relationship holds for the other terms, such as 
humanity (line 1, C) = reason (line 3, C), and so on. 
Schiller often uses terms interchangeably, such as the combination of nature (line 
13, A) and reason (line 3, B), besides nature (line 13, A) and civilization (line 13, B), or 
the combination of feeling (line 7, A) and moral state (line 5, B), besides feeling (line 7, 
A) and intellect (line 7, B). Wilkinson and Willoughby regard such terminology as one of 
the reasons that Schiller's dual and dialectic approach is not well organized. However, I 
observe that Schiller never deviates from his rule - using opposite comparisons from A 
and B, because A originates from sense or condition, and B originates from reason or 
person, and thus he shows correspondences in his dialectic terminology. And C results 
from the correspondence of any item from column A and any item from column B. For 
example, (true) civilization is the synthesis of nature and reason, or (true) ideal state is the 
synthesis of restriction and freedom (first), or (true) nature is the synthesis of poetry and 
actuality. Such flexible alternate usage of words is strictly systematic, and Schiller never 
used A with A, B with B, or (A with B) with A. The system may be simplified as follows: 
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condition, time, sense, sensuous drive, 
natural state, restriction, feeling, 
real, fact, poetry, matter, nature, 
work, actual beauty ... 
FRAGMENTS 
person, absolute, reason, formal drive, 
moral state, freedom (first), intellect 
ideal, history, philosophy, form, civilization, 
play, ideal beauty .... 
It appears that when Wilkinson and Willoughby say "neither the dualism nor the 
dialectic is essential to Schiller's model" (Whole Man 203 ), they do not see that there is a 
clear connection between Schiller's dualism and the dialectic approach. For example, 
regarding their diagram Ill-a (Table 4.1), I hold that, their Natur in the bottom left 
corresponds to nature, side A- line 13 in my Table 4.3; their Freiheit in the bottom right 
corresponds to first freedom, side B - line 6 in my table; and their top FREIHEIT 
corresponds to true freedom (second freedom), C-line 6 in my table. In my view, 
Wilkinson and Willoughby's three types of diagrams (Table 4.1) may be replaced by my 
diagram (Table 4.4), based on the condition- one-sided or synthesized: either only A orB 
or C (Table 4.4). There are clear parallels and correspondences for the words, lines, and 
rows. Throughout Schiller's dialectics, I clearly see binary opposites A and B effectively 
synthesized as a third element, C. Therefore, I claim that Wilkinson and Willoughby's 
view that dualism and dialectic are not essential in Schiller's model should be revised. 
Schiller's dual and dialectic approach may also be seen in his treatment of the 
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three types of sentimental poetry- satire, elegy, and idyll. Those distinctions follow his 
analysis of moral attitude - how we develop a fragmented psyche - that is to say, one-
sided reason and sense, or one-sided ideal and actual, and how this reflects our desire to 
go back to nature. I discern, in Schiller, that the stages of human development and the 
types of poetry correspond based on his dual (fragmented) and dialectic (from fragments 
to wholeness) approach (see Table 4.2), and I outline this correspondence as follows: 
1. Naive (in the era of human wholeness) 
This represents the ancient Greeks. Their poetry "move[ s] us through nature, 
individuality, and a vivid sensuality ... " (Naive 220). The impression made by naive poetry 
is "always joyful, always pure, always peaceful" (Naive 205 fn). 
2, Sentimental (in the era of alienation or fragmentation) 
This represents the modem era. Poetry shows conflict between reason and sense and 
utilizes "ideas and a lofty spirituality" (Naive 220); however "we always end up wavering 
between two diverse conditions" attempting to reconcile "the image of the imagination 
with an idea of reason ... (Naive 205 fn). The sentimental poet must contend with "two 
conflicting images and feelings, with the actual world as a limit and with his idea as 
something infinite'' (Naive 204 ). 
In sentimental poetry, there are always conflicts or tension between the ideal and 
experience, and the attitude of poets to the polarities is categorized into three types of 
reactions: 
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a, Satire: Contradiction or Energetic motion (Sense as Fragment: Thesis) 
The mind is occupied by the conflict between ideal and actual conditions, and this 
condition represents the conflict between the actual world and the ideal world. In such a 
context, some poets become satirists, resisting oppression. "The poet is satirical if he 
takes as his subject matter the distance from nature and the contradiction between the 
actual and the ideal. .. " (Naive 205). 
b, Elegy: Divided between Ideal and Actual I Alternation (Reason as Fragment: Anti-
thesis) 
The mind is divided by either ideal or actual conditions interchangeably. This condition 
describes the conflict between the actual world and the ideal world, and expresses the 
resistance by reason. "If a poet sets nature off against art and the ideal off against the 
actual world, such that the presentation of the ideal dominates and the satisfaction taken 
in it becomes the prevailing feeling, I call him elegiac" (Naive 211 ). 
c, Idyll: Agreement or Energetic rest (Sense/Reason as Wholeness: Synthesis) 
The mind is occupied by the harmony between ideal and actual conditions. This condition 
describes the victory after the conquering of fragmentation. It is a blueprint for the future. 
"The concept of this idyll is the concept of a battle completely resolved in the individual 
as well as in the society, the concept of a free union of inclinations with the law, the 
concept of a nature purified to the point of supreme moral dignity" (Naive 232). 
In Schiller's three stages of human progress, or three stages of poetry in the 
sentimental era, he demonstrates a dialectic progression which will clearly be seen in his 
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terminology. The construction of Schiller's thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, is motivated 
by his goal of achieving wholeness, which involves realizing universal human rights, that 
is to say, ideality, through action in reality. 
There are parallels between Schiller's ideal/real definitions and his other 
definitions, such as play/work, matter/form, restriction/first freedom, and in the 
definitions of nature/civilization and reason/sense. Because of his concept of holism, one 
side has to correlate with the other side to be complete. The fragmented condition which 
is described as an opposed relationship, such as nature and art, or reason and sense, has to 
be sublated as wholeness, as we observe in his dialectic methodology. It is essential to 
define the terms from this point of view, either fragmented or united, because terms will 
change based on the context, as I explain in the following sections. 
4.2 Two Kinds of Ideality 
The words which refer to Schiller's aesthetic solution, such as ideality, truth, play, 
beauty, art, and semblance, will be defined from two aspects- the aspect of the false, in 
the sense of terms commonly used in daily life, and the true, in the sense of a real-ideal 
synthesized condition, as he states in the following: 
Fortunately, however, in the rational nature of a human being there is not only a 
moral predisposition that can be developed by the intellect, but also an aesthetic 
tendency toward this moral development within his sensuously rational nature, 
that is to say, his human nature, a tendency that can be awakened by certain 
sensuous themes and cultivated by purifying his feelings in line with this idealistic 
impetus of the mind. I turn now to the treatment of this predisposition that is, to be 
sure, conceptually and essentially idealistic ... (Concerning the Sublime 72). 
In Schiller, the two aspects of ideality are a lower ideality and a true or higher 
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ideality. Ideality in the lower meaning arises from the formal drive and its speculative, 
rational approach to realize freedom. It is unrelated to Kant's concept of the noumenal. For 
example, we can observe lower ideality in the French revolutionaries' desire for freedom, 
even if they lacked practicality. On the other hand, higher ideality, for Schiller, comes 
from the dialectical synthesis of the formal and sensuous drives. 
Similarly, for Schiller, reality has a lower and higher meaning. His lower reality 
comes from the sensuous drive and it has a pragmatic attitude to life. It is unrelated to 
Kant's concept of phenomena. Schiller's higher reality is the dialectical synthesis of the 
formal and sensuous drives. Thus, higher reality is a synonym of the higher ideality. When 
using the word ideality, Schiller is not interested in what is transcendental at all, but is 
interested in the realization of human rights. In his view, the true idealistic, a synonym of 
the aesthetic, does not mean the opposite of realistic but has to be practiced in real life. 
Because of the way he defines both ideality and reality (each has a higher and a 
lower form), there is strong doubt among scholars concerning Schiller's attitude to the 
real and ideal in the Letters. Kooy comments that "One perennial problem is that in 
setting out the programme for 'aesthetic education' Schiller cannot decide whether he is 
offering a real solution that might actually be achieved in practice or instead an ideal 
solution that ought to be striven for but can never fully be realized. His idea of aesthetic 
culture seems sometimes to be constitutive of experience, sometimes merely regulative of 
it" (Kooy 15). I hold that Kooy' s view is incorrect, though it may easily seem correct if 
we do not note that Schiller's terms have double meanings- they are always dealing with 
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dual aspects. In Schiller, beauty in the ideal has to be occupied by matter and form, while 
beauty in real life is often partial to either matter or form. Schiller strongly claims that we 
are able to realize what is true and ideal in this life as aesthetic semblance, the condition 
of matter and form synthesized. For Schiller, true ideality does not exist in the clouds or 
beyond the sky, but can exist in each individual person. Truth and ideality are reachable 
by combining the dual world- that is to say, by synthesizing a pragmatic attitude with an 
idealistic approach to life. 
In Schiller, opposed terms are neutralized and turn into ideal or true elements, 
such as 'ideal civilization' or 'ideal nature' which I have discussed. Those ideal terms are 
related to each other, and often used as synonyms for each other. For example, true 
ideality is often used as the synonym of true reality. Or, true civilization is often used as a 
synonym of true nature, that is, nature and civilization sublated. When "these systems of 
rule ... coexist" (L2 4 181 ), all of the opposed terms will be combined under the name of 
wholeness. Therefore, for Schiller, perfection means wholeness. "Everything perfect ... is 
contained under the concept of technique, because it consists in the agreement of the 
manifold to the one" (Kallias 511 ). 
4.3 Two Kinds of Truth 
Thus, in Schiller, even truth has genuinely true or higher and partial or lower 
meanings. One is pure or true truth as wholeness, which is represented as semblance - a 
matter-form combined condition- which I explain in a following section. True truth 
comes from the synthesis of sense and reason, or matter and form. In Schiller's view, it 
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must represent a harmonious condition for an individual, state, or culture. In Schiller, 
reality does not mean true, and seeking after the real does not lead to truth: "Supreme 
stupidity and supreme intelligence have a certain affinity with each other in that both of 
them seek only the real and are completely insensitive to mere semblance" (L26 193). 
Truth in its higher meaning represents synthesis from both the idealistic and the realistic. 
Schiller writes, "a high degree of human truth is compatible with both and ... their 
deviations from one another make for a change in the individual, but not in the whole, and 
in terms of the form, but not in the content" (Naive 250 fn). 
The other truth, for Schiller, is impure or lower truth as a fragment; this kind of 
truth comes from either lower ideality or lower reality, or form or matter, or is partial to 
one side. Truth in the lower category is limited even if it could be observable as existing 
in the phenomenal world. That is to say, truth in the partial category can be scientific 
truth, which scientists concentrate on, analyzing objects as merely fragments, and losing 
sight of the genuine truth which is to be found in wholeness. Only the synthesis (C) of the 
thesis (A) and anti-thesis (B) brings us a completed condition. This is the crucial element 
in leading humans to ideality in Schiller, as he states in a letter to Goethe: "Two things 
have to be part of the poet and the artist: that he lifts himself above reality and that he 
remains within the sensuous realm. Where these two are joined, there is aesthetic art" 
( qtd. by Hinderer and Dahlstrom Essays xvi). 
Schiller applies his view of two kinds of truth to truth in works of art, such as in 
tragedy. In tragedy, there are representations of historic events to show "things that had 
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happened and how they happened" (On the Art ofTragedy 18). He calls this historic truth. 
On the other hand~ there is a more crucial truth called poetic truth, which stimulates our 
concept of freedom. 
Since~ however~ [tragedy] is in a position to achieve its purpose~ namely, the 
emotion~ only on the condition of utterly conforming to the laws of nature, it is 
subject to the rigorous law of natural truth without its historical freedom being 
violated in any way. In contrast to 'historical truth' this natural truth is called the 
'poetic truth.' Thus it is understandable how poetic truth often suffers when 
historical truth is strictly observed and, vice versa, how much more poetic truth 
stands to gain when historical truth is rudely violated. (On the Art ofTragedy 18) 
In Schiller, the aesthetic judgement of works of art has to be based on the characteristics 
of the objects in the works of art, and how well they show humanity the way to regain 
freedom. For him, poetry is the tool to lead us to freedom~ the tool to stimulate our desire 
to go back to nature . 
... all aesthetic effect is based on the poetic, not the historic truth, none of our 
satisfaction with ideal characters is lost by recalling that they are poetic fictions. 
The poetic truth consists, not in the fact that something actually happened~ but 
rather in the fact that it could happen~ thus, in the internal possibility of the matter. 
The aesthetic force must, accordingly, already lie in the possibility depicted. 
(Pathetic 66) 
For Schiller, "Tragedy ... has a poetic purpose, that is to say, it presents an action in order 
to move us and, by moving us, to delight us. If then it treats some given material for this 
purpose, it becomes free in the imitation precisely for this reason" (On the Art ofTragedy 
18). Referring to vices and acts of revenge performed on the stage, but not based on 
historical events, Schiller observes "The aesthetic judgement contains in these cases more 
truth than one usually believes" (Pathetic 68). He says this because such staged events can 
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stimulate our desire to regain freedom. 
Schiller's historic truth is the equivalent of lower truth, and poetic truth is the 
equivalent of higher truth. Here, he uses poetic to indicate true truth or true ideality, that is 
to say, the aesthetic. In his concept of the development of human stages, Schiller is mainly 
focusing on poetic truth, not on historical truth. For him, it is not important if the Greeks 
were truly harmonious or not, but it is important to use their name to describe the 
character which is signified in their works of art - works in which form and matter are 
synthesized. 
4.4 Realist and Idealist 
At the end of Naive and Sentimental Poetry, Schiller deals with two kinds of 
character in ordinary human existence, apart from poetry; he divides basic human 
character in the modem era into the realist and the idealist. A formula may help clarify 
Schiller's concept: The naive character minus the poetic element equals a realist, and a 
sentimental character minus the poetic element equals an idealist (Naive 250). As in 
Schiller's definitions of the real and ideal, nature and civilization, and sense and reason, 
the realist and the idealist also have two kinds of defmitions for each. In the first, the 
positions are opposed; "between the two the same relation must obtain as is found 
obtaining between the effects of nature and the actions of reason" (ibid.). The realist's 
motivation comes from ''the necessity of nature" and the idealist's motivation comes from 
"the necessity of reason." The realist has ''the uniform testimony of the senses" and "a 
resignation and submission to natural necessity." Schiller holds that "The sphere of [the 
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realist's] knowing and acting extends to everything that exists conditionally. But he also 
never brings it beyond conditioned sorts ofknowledge ... " (Naive 251). On the other hand, 
the idealist has "a restless spirit of speculation that presses on toward what is 
unconditional in all knowledge and, in the practical sphere, what is left is a moral rigor 
that insists on something unconditioned in actions of the will" (Naive 250). The idealist 
"is satisfied only by the philosophical insight that leads all conditioned knowing back to 
some unconditioned knowledge, and that attaches all experience to something necessary 
in the human mind. The very things to which the realist subjects his thinking, the idealist 
must subject to himself, to the power of his thought'' (Naive 252). 
For the realist, providing the necessities of life is the most important task; for the 
idealist, gaining freedom is the most important task. "While the realist in his political 
tendencies aims at prosperity, even if it should be at the expense of the moral self-
sufficiency of the people, the idealist will make freedom the aim, even if it is a threat to 
prosperity. For the realist independence of the condition is the supreme goal, 
independence from that condition for the idealist" (Naive 255). Therefore, although the 
idealist has knowledge about what is the right action to take, he often lacks the ability of 
realization. Therefore, the idealist, ''with his philosophical knowledge ... can be master of 
the whole and in the process have gained nothing as far as particulars and the execution 
are concerned. Indeed, because in each case he presses for the ultimate reasons why 
everything is able to come about, he can easily forget the most proximate reasons why 
everything actually comes to be" (Naive 253). 
104 
For Schiller, idealists and realists stand in opposition: "Thus it happens that while 
the speculative intellect ridicules common sense for its narrowness, common sense 
lampoons the speculative intellect for its barrenness" (Naive 253). 
The realist proves himself to be a friend of the human, without having a very high 
conception of human beings and humanity; the idealist thinks of humanity in so 
grand a manner that he comes dangerously close to despising human beings .... The 
realist ... would never have acquainted the human sprit with its independent 
greatness and freedom .... But for his part, the idealist would just as little have 
cultivated the sensuous power and developed the human being as a natural entity, 
which is an equally essential part of his vocation and the condition of all moral 
ennoblement. (Naive 255-256) 
However, Schiller does not exclude either of the opposing characters, because "only by 
means of the perfectly equal inclusion ofboth can justice be done to the rational concept 
of humanity" (Naive 250 fn). Therefore, in a synthesis, the realist and the idealist become 
interrelated as a new characters. A true realist, like a true idealist, is someone who 
contains both sides - the real and ideal, sense and reason, nature and civilization. From 
Schiller's point of view, a realist in the lower meaning is not a true realist, since he lacks 
the tendency to realize freedom, and an idealist in the lower meaning is not a true idealist, 
since he lacks the ability to realize freedom, and neglects the necessities of life. Schiller 
applies his schema of idealist and realist to mistakes found in revolutions - real-life 
attempts at social reform- as discussed below. 
4.5 Two Kinds of Revolution 
In considering revolution, Schiller sees two possible ways of expressing the will, 
of realizing freedom. One is "realistically, when the human being opposes brute force 
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with brute force, when as a part of nature he masters nature,'' and another is 
"idealistically, when he takes a step beyond nature and thereby negates the concept of 
brute force in regard to himself' (Concerning the Sublime 71 ). The realistic way is 
achieved through physical culture, but ultimately this would lead to a situation in which 
"human freedom would quickly be at an end" (71) because man cannot direct and control 
the forces of nature forever. On the other hand, the idealistic way is able to achieve moral 
culture. 
To clarify which level of idealist or realist, or ideal or real Schiller is referring to, 
the following table may be useful: 
Table 4.5 Schiller's Categorization of Revolutions 
Fragments 












Fulfillment of the both 
Aesthetic 
(True) Ideal I Real 
(True) Idealist I Realist 
(True) Idealistic I Realistic way 
In his definitions of the way of revolution, Schiller uses the idealistic way in the sense of a 
true idealistic way, which is the compound of the one-sided idealistic way which lacks the 
realization of freedom, and the one-sided realistic way which lacks the aspiration of 
freedom. As the underlined words indicate, his realistic way here is one of fragmentation, 
and his (true) idealistic way here is the way of wholeness. 
Schiller uses realistic (the lower or one-sided realistic) in the sense of physical 
power, involving force or fighting; humans in this fragmented condition are under natural 
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impulses to defend or preserve themselves. On the other hand, he uses idealistic (the 
higher or true idealistic) in the sense of physical and mental power combined, as 
wholeness. Idealistic in this context is far different from idealistic in the lower sense, 
which often lacks the ability to realize freedom in real life. Idealistic in the true sense 
contains the ability to control both physical and mental power. It is not natural force, or 
instinct, or the passion to be violent. It is also not mere abstract thought which will end up 
as a dream. Schiller writes, "Chained as he is to the material world, man subordinates 
semblance to ends of his own long before he allows it autonomous existence in the ideal 
realm of art. For this latter to happen a complete revolution in his whole way of feeling is 
required, without which he would not even find himself on the way to the ideal" (L27 
205). For Schiller, the French Revolution would be an example of physical culture, the 
conquering of force by force, and he had been skeptical about the future ofthe Revolution 
since its beginning. Only idealistic culture, in the sense of an aesthetic culture, can solve 
mankind's dilemma - lack of freedom. 
As in Table 4.5, it is very important to know that Schiller's concept of alienation 
(fragments and wholeness) regulates each of his words, definitions, and themes. And once 
we apply this concept, we will recognize that his concepts are not confused at all. To 
understand Schiller's language, it is essential that we should always go back to the simple 
schema of fragments-fragments-wholeness. We have to know in which position or level-
either the lower definition as fragment or the higher definition as wholeness - of ideal or 
real, idealistic or realistic, he is discussing. For example, if we apply the definition of 
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idealist, in which he meant lower, into the definition of ideal in which he meant higher, 
great confusion can result. 
4.6 Two Kinds of Aesthetic Semblance 
Schiller uses semblance (Schein) to express the character of beauty, since it is a 
kind of illusion which does not truly exist as an empirical phenomenon. Semblance in the 
sense of the pure appearance of beauty leads humans to play with beauty guided by 
neither of the other two drives, and thus humans enjoy matter as form. When we 
experience beauty in a work of art, or in nature, the beauty in the object is a kind of visual 
illusion. Concerning "the reality in the appearance"(Kallias 521 ), Schiller writes, 
"Reality is called here the real, which is always only the material in respect to a work of 
art and must be set against the formal or the idea, which the artist executes in this 
material. The form is to an art work merely appearance, i.e., the marble seems to be a 
man, but it remains, in reality, marble" (Kallias 521-522). In Schiller, semblance is what 
we experience in the beautiful object, and does not indicate reality; he writes, "The reality 
of things is the work ofthings themselves; the semblance of things is the work of man; 
and a nature which delights in semblance is no longer taking pleasure in what it receives, 
but in what it does" (L26 193). 
A defmition ofhumanity which clearly divides humans from animals considers 
whether or not we enjoy semblance; "And what are the outward and visible signs of the 
savage's entry upon humanity? If we inquire of history, however far back, we fmd that 
they are the same in all races which have emerged from the slavery of the animal 
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condition: delight in semblance., and a propensity to ornamentation and play'" (L26 191-
193). We see what does not exist in reality because of illusion or aesthetic semblance., and 
feel the object is beautiful. To an animal a painting can be merely a dull paper., music can 
be noise, a sculpture could be a rock. But for hwnans they are beautiful, and inspire us to 
stop and el1ioy the moment. This is the appreciation of artistic or technical illusion which 
only humans have. The beautiful is like a rainbow, something which actually does not 
exist as an object and which will not be seen by some animals, but which hwnan eyes can 
see and hwnan minds appreciate. The object of art is in our eyes and produced by us, as 
Schiller writes that the object viewed "is something different from the sensation we 
receive; for the mind leaps out across light to objects" (L26 195). 
[pictorial and plastic art] detaches all the contingent limitations from its object and 
also leaves the mind of the observer free because it imitates only the appearance 
[Schein] and not the actuality. Yet., since all the magic ofthe sublime and the 
beautiful lies only in the appearance and not in the content, art possesses all the 
advantages of nature without sharing its chain. (Concerning the Sublime 85) 
In experience, ideal beauty - which exists only as a concept - will be impossible in reality 
but possible in appearance. 
In Schiller, there are two kinds of semblance; one is true or pure semblance as 
wholeness which overcomes matter, and the other is false or impure semblance as 
fragments which cannot overcome matter. Schiller calls false semblance a dishonest, 
dependent semblance, such as "lying colours" which "mask the face of truth and are bold 
enough to masquerade as reality," and he calls true semblance an honest, autonomous 
semblance, a "beneficent semblance with which we will fill out our emptiness and cover 
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up our wretchedness .... [an] ideal semblance which ennobles the reality of common day" 
(L26 201 ). Schiller further claims that some "shallow critics" complain that "the solid 
virtues have disappeared from the face of world, and that being is neglected for the sake 
of seeming" (L2 6 201 ), and he notes that those critics attack not only dishonest 
semblance, but autonomous and ideal semblance as well. Those critics claim that we add 
too much decoration in manners and fine art, and this goes against morality. However, for 
Schiller, we should not treat the material with undue respect, since the material is going to 
be, or has to be, the expression of form. Referring to the opinions of such critics, Schiller 
writes "With the judgement of this kind they show a respect for substance as such which 
is unworthy of man, who is meant to value matter only to the extent that it is capable of 
taking on form and extending the realm of ideas'' (L26 201). 
Schiller calls true semblance aesthetic semblance and he calls false semblance 
logical4 semblance. He writes, 
It goes without saying that the only kind of semblance I am here concerned with is 
aesthetic semblance (which we distinguish from actuality and truth) and not 
logical semblance (which we confuse with these): semblance, therefore, which we 
love just because it is semblance, and not because we take it to be something 
better. Only the first is play, whereas the latter is mere deception. (L26 193) 
In logical semblance we believe what we experience concerning the material world is 
truth; we cannot conciliate matter and form, and we confuse fact with truth, since "only 
when its concept can be referred back to the facts of experience is intelligence to be 
pacified" (L26 193). 
4 Schiller defines logical as "the condition of rational determination" (L20 141 ). 
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Everyone has the capacity of aesthetic semblance to enjoy beauty in objects, but 
few people are able to gain morality in action and mind from this ability. Schiller's 
suggestion for the revolution of feeling (L27 205) is establishing aesthetic semblance in 
each individual, and then we will move to a political state, and in this sense aesthetic 
semblance becomes universal. This is the "lofty conception of aesthetic semblance" 
(ibid.). First of all, we have to have true culture, so that we would not misuse aesthetic 
semblance, which "will not become universal as long as man is still uncultivated enough 
to be in a position to misuse it; and should it become universal, this could only be brought 
about by the kind of culture which would automatically make any misuse of it 
impossible" (ibid.). 
Because humans are limited to the material world, lower semblance, which is not 
yet able to overcome matter, has been merely a tool for their various purposes. For 
example, the semblance of serial killers, in the sense of experiencing beauty, could be the 
servant of their purpose - killing and collecting dead bodies. The semblance of some 
artists, in the sense of experiencing beauty, could be the servant of ideological 
propaganda, or the servant of fame, money, or merely limited to enjoying the material, 
and so their psyches would merely stay in the field of the material and not yet of form. 
Such semblance is limited to the material field; for killers, it is bodies; for artists, it is 
merely for the necessities of living or the material. Our hearts must be caught by beauty, 
but must not be caught by other interests. Schiller writes, "Wherever, then, we fmd traces 
of a disinterested and unconditional appreciation of pure semblance, we may infer that a 
Ill 
revolution of this order has taken place in [man's] nature, and that he has started to 
become truly human" (L27 205). 
4. 7 Two Kinds of Art 
Schiller uses the concept of art (Kunst, Kunstler) in the sense of civilization and 
technique, besides the use of fine art in the Letters. Art, in the first sense, has two 
meanings - either higher or lower. He refers to lower art in the sense of lower civilization 
or technique which has built the modem state, or natural state. For example, for Schiller, 
language is ''the torment of [the philosopher's] own techniques [Marter der Kunst]" (Ll 
5) since it disturbs our thoughts and we cannot send our message to others precisely. Here 
Kunst is used to indicate a tool which deforms truth. 
On the other hand, higher or ideal art means higher civilization or technique. 
Schiller holds that we will find true or higher aesthetic semblance, a term which may be 
applied not only to fine art but to life and politics, in this higher civilization. He claims 
such semblance has an "autonomous existence in the ideal realm of art" (L27 205). Higher 
art produces a holistic cure to develop the human psyche as wholeness; that is to say, 
higher civilization will rebuild a humanity which has been enslaved by the development 
of the current civilization. "Taste [Geschmack] does not only promote our felicity, but 
rather also civilizes [zivilisiert] and cultivates [kultiviert] us" (Aesthetical Lectures 460). 
Schiller comments that "It must ... be wrong if the cultivation of individual powers 
involves the sacrifice of wholeness. Or rather, however much the law of nature tends in 
that direction, it must be open to us to restore by means of a higher art the totality of our 
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nature which the arts themselves have destroyed" (L6 43). 
The opposite of technique is nature, but technique is also the tool for going back to 
nature. Schiller writes, "In contrast to technique [Technik], nature is, what is through 
itself, art [Kunst] is, what is through a rule. Nature in artfulness [Kunstmaj3igkeit], what 
gives itselfthe rule- what is through its own rule" (Kallias 503). Art (civilization or 
technique) and nature (our instinct, sense and feeling) are necessary tools to reconcile 
each other. Technique is skill to make objects beautiful, as in works of arts, but also skill 
to make humans beautiful to realize freedom. Schiller writes, 
What, therefore, is nature in artfulness? Autonomy in the technique? It is the pure 
harmonization of the inner essence with the form, a rule, which is at the same time 
followed and given by the thing itself (From this ground, in the world of sense, 
only the beautiful is a symbol of the completed in itself or of the perfected, 
because it does not need to be related as the purposive something outside itself, 
but rather at the same time commands and obeys itself and carries out its own 
law). (Kallias 508-509) 
For Schiller, higher freedom (second freedom) will be established by applying a higher 
rule - an inner rule which comes from our eternal ego person, and an outer rule from the 
condition; thus freedom and rule in this context are not opposed. Nature in artfulness 
means the reconciliation of opposed relations between fragments, as in the following: 


















Nature in Artfulness 
(True Art) 
Between A and B there is a deep antagonism, and when we sublate them we can regain 
true freedom, nature, beauty, and humanity. Artfulness is used to indicate holistic healing 
for every fragmented element. Schiller claims "The artfulness only serves to make 
freedom visible ... " (Aesthetical Lectures 475), and "Freedom in the appearance is indeed 
the ground of beauty, but technique is the necessary condition of our representation of 
freedom" (Kallias 503). For Schiller, freedom in its true meaning (second freedom) is 
freedom which is able to be realized, not merely in someone's dream, and to realize it we 
need the help of civilization. 
Thus, in Schiller, aesthetic education has two meanings. One is lower aesthetic 
education which depends on an individual's taste, and makes it possible for us to be free 
from both the sensuous and formal drives temporarily, in a limited place- fine art. True or 
higher aesthetic education actually starts from this point- being free from both drives, 
realizing our nature. Schiller's concept of the naive can be called the era of nature because 
this indicates original humanity as wholeness, and his concept of the sentimental can be 
called the era of technique because this indicates the way to return to nature. Only through 
civilization and technique, or the artistic way, can we realize being beautiful. For Schiller, 
beauty is the technique to go back to our natural character in the sense of the united 
psyche, and he claims: "Beauty is nature in artfulness" (Kallias 503). He writes, 
"Technique [Technik] is the combination of the manifold according to purposes and 
necessary to beauty ... " (Aesthetical Lectures 475). Aesthetic education (in fine art) is 
merely a playful moment, but (higher) aesthetic education will realize this playful moment 
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in our lives. For Schiller~ the highest purpose of the highest aesthetic education must be 
and will be realized in politics. Being artists does not help us to be moral at all, but being 
artists in our lives helps us to be moral. 
4.8 Two Kinds of Works of Art 
Fine art itself is also divided into two meanings. One is lower or real fine art, 
which is barely able to show an attempt to conquer matter by form. For example,-beauty 
"ennobles ... the beautiful tools and clothing of common architecture," but "they are~ 
through the shimmer, which beauty casts upon them only in passing~ merely related to the 
works of beautiful art" (A esthetical Lectures 465). 
The second meaning of fine art is higher or ideal fine art~ which can be realized 
with the harmonious cooperation of form and material in this empirical world. The object 
is able to show the result of conquering matter by the power of form. Schiller's definitions 
of ideality and the ideal work of art correspond to each other as in the following schema: 
Table 4.7 Schiller's Ideality and the Ideal Work of Art 
A 
Ideality 





Real work of art 
Matter 
Sense 
C (Actual World) 
True Ideality/ Actuality 
True IdeaVActual work of art 
Ideal work of art (Sculpture ... ) 
Ideal work of art (Humanity) 
Since everything must be represented as material~ it is impossible to reach the highest 
ideal beauty because in this sense of ideal beauty the object should not be disturbed by 
material, which means objects should not carry material at all. 
Since in actuality no purely aesthetic effect is ever to be met with (for man can 
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never escape his dependence upon conditioning forces), the excellence of a work 
of art can never consist in anything more than a high approximation to that ideal of 
aesthetic purity; and whatever the degree of freedom to which it may have been 
sublimated, we shall still leave it in a particular mode and with some definite bias. 
(L22 153) 
In this context, ideal does not mean perfect or the highest which can be found only 
in abstract thought, but not in this material world. Practically speaking, a work of art 
cannot avoid leaning to either one side or the other, but it still can realize perfection in 
experience, in the sense of approaching the highest beauty in real life, by sublating matter 
and form. This unending development is the characteristic of works of fine art. If we 
reduce the tendency of leaning to only one side, either matter or form, ''then the nobler 
that art and the more excellent that product will be" (L22 153). 
Schiller holds that "Art in general has the aim of truth or perfection, of the 
relationship of the manifold to unity, and realizes it with the understanding" (Aesthetical 
Lectures 465). Here, he is talking about the fine arts, but this general aim of the fine arts 
often is used to imply different levels of art for ordinary life. That is to say, art, in works 
of art, is the technique to create beauty, and this technique must be applied to hwnans 
themselves. That is, we ourselves must be the most important work of art for us to realize 
our lost nature. "Since nature provides for the purpose of man, but places its fulfillment 
into his will, the present relationship of his condition to his destiny can, therefore, not be 
the work of nature, but must be his own work. Thus, the expression of this relationship in 
his form belongs not to nature, but directly to himself; that is, it is a personal expression" 
(Grace 356). 
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4.9 Tragedy and Comedy 
Schiller regards the work of art as a metaphor of humanity, representing the state 
of the psyche and the social struggle to gain freedom. For him, "Art must delight the spirit 
and oblige freedom" (Pathetic 49), and artists must describe "every expression of 
humanity and moral resistance" (Pathetic 55). Poetry in the aesthetic sense "can develop 
[the human being] into a hero'' who struggles and resists his condition, and gives him the 
"strength to be everything he ought to be" (Pathetic 67). 
Schiller holds this view regarding tragedy: " ... tragedy is imitation of an action, 
which shows us human beings in a state of suffering .... Only the suffering of entities both 
sensuous and moral, such as we are, can arouse our sympathy" (On the Art of Tragedy 18-
19). Tragedy indicates human destiny - the development of the historical stages - by 
representing our struggle to gain freedom from the conflict of mind and matter, or reason 
and sense. "In general, the concept of suffering and of a suffering in which we are 
supposed to participate already determines that only human beings in the full sense of the 
word can be the object ofthe suffering" (On the Art ofTragedy 19). Tragedy can 
represent the struggle of fragmented humans, and their will to return to their original 
natural character, as whole beings. 
When we watch a play, we prefer to watch a story in which the hero's freedom is 
threatened rather than the outcome after the hero has regained his freedom. "If a portrayal 
of pathos lacks an expression of nature suffering, it has no aesthetic force and our hearts 
are left cold" (Pathetic 59). According to Schiller, this is because our aesthetic judgement 
117 
is based on the moral urge to achieve freedom. 
When we make aesthetic judgements, we focus far more on power than on its 
orientation and far more on freedom than on lawfulness. This becomes obvious 
enough from the very fact that we would rather watch power and freedom 
expressed at the_ cost of lawfulness than watch lawfulness expressed at the cost of 
power and freedom. That is to say, as soon as scenarios arise where the moral law 
is coupled with impulses whose force threatens to carry away the will, the 
character rises in aesthetic quality if he is able to withstand those impulses. 
(Pathetic 68) 
Evil individuals who are "free from all morality" or "pure intellects" who are "free from 
the coercion of sensuousness" are unfit for tragedy (On the Art of Tragedy 19). Therefore, 
tragedy has more important elements than comedy, since the former aims to show our 
resistance and our attempts to regain freedom. Schiller holds that "Many times there has 
been a dispute over which of the two, the tragedy or the comedy, deserves to be ranked 
ahead of the other. If what is being asked by this question is simply which of the two 
treats the more important object, then there is no doubt that the tragedy has the advantage" 
(Naive 207 -208). 
Schiller quotes Winckelmann's description of the Greek sculpture Laocoon as an 
example of a great work of art which shows the struggle between our will to be free and 
its obstacle- in this case, Laocoon's desperate resistance and the monster which is killing 
Laocoon and his sons. Concerning Winckelmann's description of this "battle between 
pain and resistance" (Pathetic 54), Schiller exclaims: "How genuinely and how 
sensitively the intellect's battle with the suffering of the sensuous nature is developed in 
this depiction and how accurately the phenomena are presented in which animality and 
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humanity, nature's coercion and reason's freedom, reveal themselves!" (Pathetic 54-55). 
Schiller fmds perfection in Laocoon because it arouses the viewer's sympathy while 
remaining beautiful. He writes, "If the works of art have moral aims, they stand in 
relationship with the aesthetical works ... thus their beauty works only yet more ardently. 
If beauty, through compliance with the purpose of sympathy, has suffered nothing at all, 
then have such art works the greatest perfection (as for example the group of Laocoon)" 
(Aesthetical Lectures 465-466). 
On the other hand, Schiller claims that "the beautiful does not have need of the 
expression of suffering" (Aesthetic Lectures 476). Unlike tragedy, comedy is the means by 
which poets can show their aesthetic ability - the ability to represent the resolution of the 
mind and matter conflict. He holds that it is comedy which "demands the more important 
subject" (Naive 208). In this context it is more difficult to prove the quality of comedy 
than tragedy. Schiller writes, "In tragedy so much happens already by virtue of the subject 
matter, while in comedy nothing happens because of the subject matter; everything 
happens because of the poet .... The object carries the tragic poet along; the comic poet, on 
the other hand, must prop up and sustain his object in the loftiness of the aesthetic, 
through his subjectivity" (Naive 208). That is to say, for Schiller, comedy represents the 
united condition as wholeness, and tragedy represents the fragmented condition with lack 
of freedom. He writes that comedy's aim is "to produce and nourish this freedom of 
mind," while "the aim of tragedy is to help restore freedom of mind by aesthetic means 
when it has been violently overcome by a passion" (Naive 208). 
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For Schiller, life itself has tragic aspects because we have been divided and 
comedic aspects because we can regain freedom. Tragedy is the battle between mind and 
body, or between form and matter, while comedy is the peace following the battle; the 
victory is represented by form in the sense of living form. 
4.10 Two Kinds of Form 
For Schiller, form is an ideal concept directed towards the absolute, truth, and the 
permanent and unchangeable; it originates from the "I" which is the "absolute existence 
of man" (Ll2 81). This most human-like element is, ironically, the origin of 
fragmentation. According to Pugh, form is "a concept of central importance in Schiller's 
mature aesthetics,'' and Schiller could well have been influenced by Aristotle and 
Plotinus, who inherited Plato's concept of form and focused on ''the never ending struggle 
of form against matter" (Pugh 88). 
In Schiller, form (Form or Gestalt) has a dual meaning. One is a true or higher 
form, as wholeness or living form which is defined as the objects or actions which keep 
equilibrium with sense and reason or matter and form. Form in this sense is truly an ideal 
concept in Schiller, one which we are able to realize in the material world. The second 
form is a false or lower form, as a fragment which is based on only the formal side, but 
not the material side. 
According to Schiller, even excellent works of art, which almost combine matter 
and form, are still not able to reach ideal beauty in the sense of a beauty beyond 
phenomena, which cannot be seen in this world. However, we are able to reach ideal 
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beauty in practice as living form (lebende Gestalt) by creating ourselves as works of art -
form and matter synthesized perfectly as appearance. 
The object of the sense-drive, expressed in a general concept, we call life 
[Leben], in the widest sense ofthis term: a concept designating all material being 
and all that is immediately present to the senses. The object of the form-drive, 
expressed in a general concept, we call form [Gestalt], both in the figurative and in 
the literal sense of this word: a concept which includes all the formal qualities of 
things and all the relations of these to our thinking faculties. The object of the 
play-drive, represented in a general schema, may therefore be called living form 
[ Lebende Gestalt]: a concept serving to designate all the aesthetic qualities of 
phenomena and, in a word, what in the widest sense of the term we call beauty. 
(Ll5 101) 
Schiller writes, "Reason ... declares: The beautiful is to be neither mere life, nor 
mere form, but living form, i.e., beauty; for it imposes upon man the double law of 
absolute formality and absolute reality" (LJ5 1 07). Thus, for Schiller, living form or true 
semblance must be called truly ideal and truly beautiful. He holds that a block of marble 
can become living form through the transforming work of an architect or sculptor, but for 
a living human to be a living form, "his form would have to be life, and his life form'' 
(Ll5 101 ). He writes that only when a person's "form lives in our feeling and his life 
takes on form in our understanding, does he become living form; and this will always be 
the case whenever we adjudge him beautiful" (ibid.). 
Wessell sees Schiller's concept of living form as the unity of rationalism and 
empiricism. 
Rationalism, for instance, conceives of unity as onto logically objective, i.e. unity 
inheres in things-in-themselves. Such unity is grounded in an analytical oneness. 
To be is to be one .... This structure appears as order. The maximinization of order 
is perfection. Perfection is, in other words, the "form" of oneness in a manifold. 
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Empiricism, on the other hand, views unity as subjective, i.e. there is no unity 
inherent in things-in-themselves. Things are present to human consciousness as 
atomistic contents, as sense perceptions. Unity is introduced into the manifold by 
the mind (=subjectivity). The mind synthetically combines or holds the many 
together. This unity resides in the "determination" of the mind to view sense 
perceptions togther. Such a synthesizing act, insofar as it transcends mere spatial 
and temporal conjoining, is habit(= inclination). The synthetic activity itself is a 
function of a deeper principle ofunity, namely that of life. In other words, the 
determination of the mind to connect things is structured by the dual principle of 
pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, that is of life. (Wessell 124) 
As the way to unite the manifold, Schiller suggests we become living form, which means 
the combination of the subjective experience of beauty and universal validity - form. 
According to Wessell, Schiller uses form or Gestalt as "a code name" for "aestheticians 
who tried to explain beauty in terms of'Vollkommenheit.''' Wessell writes that 
Vollkommenheit is "simply the oneness ofbeing (=that which constitutes being) insofar 
as this unum 'forms' the many into connexial whole [sic]," and the Gestalt "constitutes 
the perfection of aesthetic awareness and hence the reality of beauty" (Wessell 58). 
Schiller's intention is to build a bridge between the world of phenomena which we 
experience through our senses and a theoretical or ideal world which we cannot 
experience as phenomena. It may seem impossible to build such a bridge, but Schiller 
holds that it can be done. The proof is ''the infinite being realized in the finite" in 
experiencing beauty " ... since in the enjoyment of beauty, or aesthetic unity, an actual 
union and interchange between matter and form, passivity and activity, momentarily takes 
place, the compatibility of our two natures, the practicality of the infinite being realized in 
the finite ... is thereby actually proven" (L25 189). According to Hinderer and Dahlstrom, 
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Schiller's ideal beauty is "not a mere form (a spatial and/or temporal Gestalt of Spiel), as 
it was for Kant, but rather 'the living form"' (Essays xx). 
Whereas Kant construed beauty as a pleasure derived merely from the free play of 
mental faculties, Schiller's conception of beauty as the living form satisfies the 
ideal "play-drive" in human beings that optimally integrates two radically 
opposing drives; a sensuous or material drive for change (becoming) and a formal 
drive for permanence (being), which results in a conception of beauty as a 
dynamic, exuberant unity of opposites. (Essays xx) 
To be living form, we have to resolve the conflict between matter and form, and to 
illustrate this concept, Schiller uses the metaphor of war, as I explain in the following 
section. 
4.11 The Metaphor of War 
Not only in the Letters, but in various other writings, Schiller uses war as an 
allegory of our resistance to dualism. For example, Athena, the Greek goddess of wisdom, 
is fully armed, and this has symbolic meaning for Schiller (L8 51). Athena's battle dress 
symbolizes the battle between reason and sense, or the formal and sensuous drives, with 
the goal of "true enlightenment" (ibid.). If we want to gain harmony in mind and society, 
that is to say, freedom, we have to battle "against error" (ibid.) to reach a synthesis of 
opposite elements, and this is very hard fighting indeed. Therefore, according to Schiller, 
many people refuse to think about the problem or to act; they do not use reason to be 
wise, but rely on politicians or higher authorities such as the church or state. 
In the poem TO A YOUNG FRIEND As He Dedicates Himself to Philosophy, 
Schiller reveals some key points in his aesthetics. 
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Feelest thou power enough, to fight the most difficult battles, 
When thy reason and heart, senses and thoughts disunite? 
Courage enough, to wrestle with doubt, the immortal Hydra. 
And to manly attac~ th' enemy inside thyself? 
With an eye that is healthy, a heart of innocence holy, 
To unmask the deceit, tempting thee as if the truth? 
Flee, if thou art not secure with the leadership in thine own bosom, 
Flee, the enticing abyss, ere be consumed in the maw! 
Several went for the light and only in deep night have fallen; 
There in the twilight's glow childhood wanders secure. 
(Poet of Freedom vol II 32) 
This poem describes an aesthetic battle, where aesthetic means showing the victory of the 
war between matter and form, or restriction and freedom, civilization and nature, or 
reason and sense. For Schiller, beauty is a rare victory by form over matter. 
The nature of the medium or of the matter must therefore appear completely 
defeated [besiegen] by the nature of the imitated. Now it is, however, merely the 
form of the imitated, which can be conferred upon the imitating; therefore, it is the 
form, which must have conquered the matter in the artistic presentation. With a 
work of art, therefore, the matter (the nature ofthe imitating) must be lost 
[ verlieren] in the form (of the imitated) .... The body in the idea .... The reality in 
the appearance. (Kallias 521) 
Here, Schiller employs an allegory of war between matter and form. "Free, therefore, were 
the presentation, if the nature of the medium appears fully destroyed [ vertilgen] through 
the nature of the imitated, if the imitated asserts its pure personality also in its 
representative, if the representing seems to have been completely interchanged through 
complete rejection or rather renunciation of its nature with the represented - briefly - if 
nothing is through the matter, rather all is through the form" (Kallias 522). 
If an artist's idea is expressed well by the material in the work of art, form 
(idea) overcomes the material to realize itself in the phenomenal world. "Removed alike 
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from uniformity and from confusion, there abides the triumph of form" (L4 23). Schiller 
writes: 
In a truly successful work of art the contents should effect nothing, the form 
everything; for only through the form is the whole man affected, through the 
subject-matter, by contrast, only one or other of his functions. Subject-matter, 
then, however sublime and all-embracing it may be, always has a limiting effect 
upon the spirit, and it is only from form that true aesthetic freedom can be looked 
for. Herein, then, resides the real secret of the master in any art: that he can make 
his form consume [vertilgen] his material; and the more pretentious, the more 
seductive this material is in itself, the more it seeks to impose itself upon us, the 
more high-handedly it thrusts itself forward with effects of its own, or the more the 
beholder is inclined to get directly involved with it, then the more triumphant the 
art which forces it back and asserts its own kind of dominion over him. 
(L22 155-157) 
Schiller here describes the war between form and matter and the victory of each 
individual person -"the aesthetic mode ofthe psyche" (L22 151), that is to say, the third 
character of the human condition synthesized as the play drive, which I discuss later. 
In the passage quoted above, Wilkinson and Willoughby choose the English word 
consume as the translation of German vertilgen, although this word generally means 
abolish, annihilate, or destroy. They claim that here Schiller is indicating an organic 
metaphor, a concept which spread among 18th century philosophers to compare 
individuals or society to a living organism which grows, like a plant or animal, and cannot 
be separated into parts, as can a machine. They claim consume is a suitable translation 
since Schiller is talking about "artistic metamorphosis" (Letters Glossary 319) or "organic 
transformation" (Letters commentary 267), in which he does not mean completely 
destroying matter, but is implying taking matter into form to be a living organism. 
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Indeed, Schiller uses this metaphor in the Letters. Ancient Greece had "organic 
form" (L6 35): a living organism in which individuals are treated as parts united with the 
whole, but civilization and the state formed humans into a collection of parts, as 
fragments merely collected by gravity. However, Wilkinson and Willoughby appear to 
ignore Schiller's allegorical treatment of war in the paragraph quoted above from Letter 
22. In Letter 23 he explains5 what he means by the analogy of art in Letter 22 and refers to 
the "war against matter" (L23 169) involving the play drive. Moreover, we see the theme 
of war not only in the Letters but throughout his writings. As a representative sample, the 
following will help to demonstrate that consume is unlikely to be a suitable translation in 
Letter 22, as Schiller is not dealing with organic concepts, but with the war between 
matter and form: 
Shall ... a poetical presentation be free, then the poet must 'overcome the tendency 
of language to the universal through the greatness of his art and triumph over 
[besiegen] the matter (words and their laws of inflection and construction) 
through the form (namely the application of the same).' The nature ofthe language 
(precisely its tendency to the universal) must be fully submerged [ untergehen] in 
the form given to it, the body must lose [ verlieren] itself in the idea, the sign in the 
indicated, the reality in the appearance. (Kallias 526) 
It would not be wrong to say that after form conquers matter it is consumed. However, 
Schiller's vertilgen indicates his idea ofbeauty- the condition in which matter appears to 
be completely eliminated and consumed inside form. For Schiller, matter is not abolished 
or annihilated, but is sublated into the wholeness of the new element, as ifit was 
5 In the beginning of L23, Schiller states that in L22 he is using the analogy of "the 
practice of art and the judgment of its works'' (L23 161) to illustrate his inquiry 
into how humans gain freedom in mind and politics. 
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abolished. The observer is only aware of pure form. This appearance is called aesthetic 
semblance, the victory of beauty in the material world. Concerning this matter, I therefore 
agree with Pugh's observation that we should choose "annihilate" instead of"consume" 
(Pugh 292). 
Pugh also points out Wilkinson and Willoughby's inconsistent attitude; they use 
destroy as a translation ofvertilgen in a different part of Letter 11 (which also deals with 
the metaphor ofwar) without any note. There, regarding two "absolute fundamental laws 
of [man's] sensuo-rational nature,'' Schiller writes, "The first insists upon absolute reality: 
he is to tum everything which is mere form into world, and make all his potentialities 
fully manifest. The second insists upon absolute formality: he is to destroy [ vertilgen] 
everything in himself which is mere world, and bring harmony into all his changes" (L11 
77). Note that here vertilgen is used in the same context as in the passage from Letter 22: 
"he can make his form consume [vertilgen] his material ... " (L22 155-157). Pugh 
therefore claims that "Wilkinson and Willoughby's organic view of artistic creation, a 
cherished conviction among many British scholars, is clearly their own idea and not 
Schiller's" (Pugh 293). 
Wilkinson and Willoughby admit that, strictly speaking, Schiller rarely uses the 
metaphor of a living organism, but nevertheless they claim that he frequently 
"accommodates" this metaphor in his asymmetrical syntheses: 
The metaphors of organic growth are few, and not calculated either by their nature 
or by position to carry the weight of a concept which is notoriously recalcitrant to 
theoretical treatment. It is accommodated instead by a system of asymmetrical 
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syntheses which, though assimilated into the verbal texture and never made 
explicit as a schema, is none the less 'there' and abstractable by means of 
linguistic analysis. (Letters cxxviii) 
As I note in the beginning of this chapter, Wilkinson and Willoughby hold that Schiller's 
rhetoric is "often ... asymmetrical and binary, one of the antitheses reappearing, raised to 
a higher level, as the synthesis; finally in order to insist that this is not then broken down 
into two new antitheses, but itself enters as one of the antitheses into the process 
immediately above'' (Whole Man 203). They use the following triangles to indicate this 
kind of three term relationship: 
Table 4.8 Wilkinson and Willoughby's Three Term Relationship (Letters Appendix III p350) 
a b c d 
FREIHEIT NATUR NATUR VERNUNFT 
~ ~ /·~ /~ 
Natur Freiheit Freiheit Natur Natur Vemunft Vemunft Natur 
They claim that those asymmetrical syntheses can be the expression of the living 
organism metaphor: ''the analogy [such as "he can make his form consume [ vertilgen] his 
materiaf' (L22 157)] is clearly with the assimilative processes of living organisms, and 
implies the concept of a hierarchy of forms in which the lower are constantly being 
assimilated into the higher" (Letters Glossary 319). However, if they use consume to 
describe the interaction between the higher (form) and lower (matter) elements, their 
illustration cannot use triangles as shown in Table 4.8; it has to indicate a one-way 
relationship between the top and bottom, such as in the following schema: 
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Using this table, the phrase "he can make his form consume [vertilgen] his material" 
(L22 157) becomes understandable. Wilkinson and Willoughby write, "As in organic 
transformation, the raw material is broken down during the process and subordinated to a 
different principles of organization, serving a different end" (Letters commentary 267). 
Wilkinson and Willoughby connect this organic hierarchy with Schiller's 
asymmetrical, triangular synthesis, but if they do so their triangular schema represents 
conflict between higher concepts such as the true or ideal form (living form) and lower 
concepts such as matter. Indeed, when they say the lower is assimilated by the higher, a 
contradiction results. Following Wilkinson and Willoughby's schema of Table 4.8, I 
construct a similar diagram, Table 4.1 0, to illustrate that lower concepts (such as matter) 
are consumed by higher concepts (such as form) throughout Schiller's rhetoric in the 
Letters. 














Ideality ~ Reality 
vertilgen 
In this table, if we follow the interpretation that Schiller's rhetoric is based on the 
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concept of a living organism in which higher elements consume lower elements, we have 
to put vertilgen between the top and bottom elements as the bold arrows indicate. In this 
context, we cannot illustrate Schiller's sense of the battle between the two drives or two 
characters, which he repeatedly explains throughout the Letters. In addition, for example 
in a, there is no clear role or function of (lower) Form ifwe put vertilgen between (higher) 
FORM and (lower) Matter. In fact, the act of consuming or annihilating lower Matter does 
not come from higher FORM (Living Form), but it comes from (lower) Form which is in 
the process (not the result) of conquering the opposite side, Matter. Higher FORM 
includes Matter, but it does not consume or annihilate Matter, because FORM as a 
synthesis does not trigger the motion of verti/gen since it is the result of vertilgen. FORM 
does not exist until vertilgen occurs between the lower elements. And likewise for b and c 
in Table 4.10, REASON and IDEALITY are the result ofvertilgen after Reason or 
Ideality conquer Sense or Reality. 
In the phrase, "make his form consume [vertilgen] his material" (L22 157), 
Schiller uses the verb vertilgen to explain the battle between opposed elements - such as 
between Form and Matter, Reason and Sense, or Ideality and Reality- in the lower levels. 
The two lower opposed elements are antagonistic; Form, Reason, or Ideality are often not 
as strong as their opposed elements- Matter, Sense, or Reality. "Beauty is only a property 
ofform and cannot be presented immediately in the mass" (Aesthetic Lectures 465). 
Often, the lower right side elements conquer the lower left side elements. Beauty is the 
rare victory of form overcoming the danger of being defeated by matter: 
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... the forces of nature, as we know, wage perpetual war with what is particular, or 
organic, and artful technology is ultimately defeated by cohesion and gravity. For 
that reason, too, beauty of form, as a mere product of nature, has its particular 
golden age of maturity and decay, which indeed accelerates the play, but can never 
arrest it; and its customary end is, that mass gradually becomes master over form, 
and the vital impulse toward form in preserved matter digs its own grave. 
(Grace 358) 
Here Schiller's concept of the war between form and matter is expressed, as he contrasts 
serious war and playful victory, and as he contrasts reason and sense, ideality and reality, 
or nature and civilization. The metaphor of war is crucial to understanding Schiller's 
symmetrical syntheses; therefore vertilgen should be interpreted as the metaphor of war, 
not of a living organism. 
Schiller's metaphor of war is related to his view that our progress in history is 
based on our efforts to battle with nature - physical necessity - to regain freedom by 
reason. He states that the world is "nothing but the conflict of natural forces among 
themselves and with human freedom. As far as history has evolved until now, it has far 
greater acts of nature (among which all human emotions must be numbered) to relate than 
of self-sufficient reason" (Concerning the Sublime 81 ). Therefore, there are two kinds of 
actions based on either being defeated by material or winning over it. According to 
Schiller, if an act is motivated by sense it can be called common or vulgar; and an 
architectural work, for example, is "common if it shows us nothing but physical purposes" 
(Pathetic 50). On the other hand, if an act is motivated by reason, it is noble; "We call it 
noble if, independent of all physical purposes, it at the same time portrays ideas" (ibid.). 
If we are completely defeated and our freedom is taken without resistance, we are 
131 
the same as animals. Schiller writes that a person in pain is "simply a tormented animal 
and no longer a suffering human being, for a moral resistance to suffering is absolutely 
required of a human being and only by this means is the principle of freedom within him, 
intelligence, able to make itself known" (Pathetic 49). In Schiller, fighting to regain 
freedom, such as in Laocoon, shows "the nobler side of humanity" (Pathetic 50). This 
nobleness comes from our reason; indeed, "Nothing is noble unless it springs from 
reason" (Pathetic 49). 
Regarding the French Revolution, Schiller observes human nobleness in the 
revolution which is the first attempt to regain freedom. He claims that man " .. .is 
demanding restitution of his inalienable rights. But he is not just demanding this; over 
there, and over here, he rising up to seize by force what, in his opinion, has been 
wrongfully denied him'' (L5 25). Schiller sees the revolutionary elements in man's "first 
crude attempts at embellishing his existence"(L27 205), despite the resulting chaos, as the 
beginning of human progress. "As soon as ever he starts preferring form to substance, and 
jeopardizing reality for the sake of semblance (which he must, however, recognize as 
such), a breach has been effected in the cycle of his animal behaviour, and he finds 
himself set upon a path to which there is no end" (ibid .. ). When we resist whatever 
oppresses us, and attempt to regain freedom, we express our humanity and reveal beauty. 
4.12 Two Kinds of Ideal Beauty 
In Schiller, there are two kinds of ideal beauty. The first is a "highest ideal beauty" 
which is not realized in the world, so we are not able to see it. 
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The highest ideal of beauty is ... to be sought in the most perfect possible union 
and equilibrium of reality and form. The equilibrium, however, remains no more 
than an idea, which can never be fully realized in actuality. For in actuality we 
shall always be left with a preponderance of the one element over the other, and 
the utmost that experience can achieve will consist of an oscillation between the 
two principles, in which now reality, now form, will predominate. Beauty as idea, 
therefore, can never be other than one and indivisible, since there can never be 
more than one point of equilibrium: whereas beauty in experience will be eternally 
twofold, because oscillation can disturb the equilibrium in twofold fashion, 
inclining it now to the one side, now to the other. (L 16 111) 
Schiller goes on to differentiate two kinds of ideal beauty - one is ideal beauty 
which will never be realized, and another one is ideal beauty which "exists in fact" (L16 
113), and is able to be realized. Schiller is not dealing with ideal beauty in the former 
meaning, but dealing with actual beauty in the latter meaning, which we are able to see in 
this world. He writes " ... we descend from this region of ideas on to the stage ofreality, in 
order to encounter man in a definite and determinate state, that is to say, among 
limitations which are not inherent in the very notion of man but derive from outward 
circumstance and from the contingent use ofhis freedom" (Ll7 117). In everyday life, we 
encounter either impure beauty - in the sense of beauty which is not able to conquer 
matter by form- or pure beauty as living form. Schiller calls ideal beauty (living form) in 
this world "mere nature," or "the beauty of frame (architectonic beauty)" (Grace 342). 
This beauty is defined as "the sensuous expression of a concept of reason" (Grace 34 7), 
which "unites two conditions which are diametrically opposed and can never become 
one" (L18 123). The following table will simplify Schiller's concept ofbeauty. Here, we 
clearly see the same pattern of Schiller's dual (fragmented or united) and dialectic 
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approach in his concept of human development: 
Table 4.11 Ideal Beauty 
Fragments 
A 
















Realization of Both 
True Ideal Beauty 
Living Form 
True Reason/ Sense 
Aesthetic State 
Will Be Realized 
The perfection of humanity comes from being in the condition of wholeness, "in the 
harmonious energy of [man's] sensuous and spiritual powers" (Ll7 117 -119), while 
imperfection comes from being fragmented, under the domination of either the body or 
mind, or sense or reason. Therefore, humans experience one of two conditions - either a 
"state oftension" because of lack of harmony, or a "state of relaxation" because of lack of 
energy. Schiller writes, 
... we are already assured in advance by pure reason that we shall find actual, 
consequently limited, man either in a state of tension or in a state of relaxation, 
according as the one-sided activity of certain of his powers is disturbing the 
harmony of his being, or the unity of his nature is founded upon the uniform 
enfeeblement of his sensuous and spiritual powers. Both these contrasting types of 
limitation are, as I now propose to show, removed by beauty, which restores 
harmony to him who is over-tensed, and energy to him who is relaxed, and thus, in 
accordance with its nature, brings the limited condition back to an absolute 
condition, and makes of man a whole perfect in itself. (L17 117 -119) 
Thus, there are two characteristics of beauty in experience. One Schiller calls energizing 
beauty, and the other is melting beauty. In the modem era- one of"discipline and form," 
under the domination of civilization - "we find nature as often suppressed as mastered, as 
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often outraged as transcended'' (L16 113). There is a lack of nature in respect of our 
sensuous side (such as instinct and feeling) and this causes lack of energy, under the 
suppression of reason. Energizing beauty is beneficial for people who lack energy. 
On the other hand, in a pre-civilized era - one of "vigour and exuberance'' (L16 
113) - there is a lack of civilization or sophistication, and people are tense because of lack 
ofharmony as a result of too much sense and feeling. In this era, "we fmd true grandeur of 
conception coupled with the gigantic and the extravagant, sublimity of thought with the 
most frightening explosions ofpassion .... "(ibid.). For people who are under stress, 
melting beauty is beneficial for relaxation, as Schiller holds that "the effect of melting 
beauty is to relax our [physical and moral] nature" (ibid.). 
Beauty reflects the mental state of individuals. "In order to get some idea of how 
beauty can become a means of putting an end to that twofold tension [between material 
life and abstract form], we must endeavor to seek its origins in the human psyche" (L17 
121). Energizing beauty means the tendency to unite our dualism with the formal drive to 
create our personality, while melting beauty means the tendency to unite our dualism with 
the sensuous drive to create our personality. Schiller claims there exists "a twofold need 
in man to which that twofold beauty corresponds" (Ll6 115). When the two kinds of 
beauty are sublated, ideal beauty will be realized. Schiller examines those forms of beauty 
"in order finally to dissolve both these contrary modes of beauty in the unity of ideal 
beauty, even as those two opposing types of human being are merged in the unity of ideal 
man" (Ll6 115). 
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The two kinds of beauty can also be found in works of art, which have to be 
judged on their aesthetic value to determine if they are presenting form through material 
well- that is to say, if they offer an objective representation. "The great artist, one could 
therefore say, shows us the object (its presentation has pure objectivity), the mediocre 
shows himself (his presentation has subjectivity), the bad, his matter (the presentation 
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determined through the nature of the medium and through the limits of the artist)" 
(Kallias 523). When we see a work of art which lacks the artist's concept in the material, 
it will need melting beauty. When the work of art has weakness on the material side, it 
needs energizing beauty. The following table simplifies the categories of beauty. 
Table 4.12 Schiller's Categories ofBeauty 
A: Fragments 







Ideal Beauty I Living Form 
B: Fragments 













(Need Melting Beauty) 
For Schiller, ideal beauty in actual experience is the equivalent of ideal humanity. 
Since it is the only way to be healed from fragmentation, "Beauty would have to be shown 
to be a necessary condition ofhuman being [sic]" (LJO 71). He holds that "Without 
beautiful things there would be a constant battle between our natural calling and our 
rational calling" (Concerning the Sublime 84). Beauty, as the synonym of living form, is 
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the synthesis of the logical nature and sensuous nature, or form and matter. He writes, 
For precisely therein beauty shows itself in its highest radiance, when it overcomes 
the logical nature of its object; and how can it overcome, where there is no 
resistance? How can it impart its form to the fully formless matter? I am at least 
convinced, that beauty is only the form of a form and that that, which one calls its 
matter, must by all means be a formed matter. Perfection is the form of a matter, 
beauty, on the other hand, is the form of this perfection; which stands thus to 
beauty as matter to form. (Kallias 483-484) 
Perfection comes from the way of expression of form and matter, and this perfection 
displays beauty. "By means of beauty sensuous man is led to form and thought; by means 
of beauty spiritual man is brought back to matter and restored to the world of sense. From 
this it seems to follow that there must be a state midway between matter and form, 
passivity and activity, and that it is into this middle state that beauty transports us" (LJB 
123). For Schiller, beauty lies in the middle ofthe opposed elements; it is between one-
sided nature and civilization, or one-sided intellect and feeling- that is to say, beauty is 
the sublation of the binary elements; it is true nature and true civilization, true intellect 
and true feeling. 
Beauty is the product of the accord between mind and senses; it speaks to all the 
capacities of the human being at once. For this reason it can be felt and 
appreciated only on the supposition of a complete and free use of all the human 
being's powers. One must bring to the work an open sensibility, an expansive 
heart, a fresh and vigorous mind; one must have one's entire nature together. This 
is in no way the case for those alienated [geteilt] within themselves by abstract 
thinking, stifled by petty formulas of business, or weary from strenuous 
concentration. (Naive 245) 
Following Kant (114), Schiller calls ideal or pure beauty free beauty, and false or impure 
beauty adhering beauty which is dominated by a particular purpose. He writes, 
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Free beauties are those, with which we presuppose no characteristic purpose. For 
example, with a rose we are conscious of no determined purpose of its form and 
constitution. The adhering beauty, however, stands under the constraint of a 
concept, which exclusively permits only certain kinds of beauty and presupposes a 
purpose in the object. An unmixed, pure judgement of beauty is passed only in 
regard to free beauty. (Aesthetical Lectures 468) 
The highest beauty in experience is realized in our lives. People who do not "have [their] 
entire nature together" (Naive 245) are people who cannot realize the beauty in 
themselves; they cannot unite the mind and the senses. 
4.13 Objectivity of Beauty 
Schiller's solution to the problem of fragmentation comes from conquering the 
gap between the theories of beauty's objectivity and subjectivity; in the objective view, 
beauty comes from an external world which does not depend on our feeling, while in the 
subjective view, beauty comes from our feeling, as in "beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder." Schiller claims that beauty is objective experience, not only subjective 
experience. He writes, "Those who have dismissed the objective concept of beauty, hold 
beauty to be entirely subjective. Those who have accepted it, attempt to explain the 
concept either objectively or subjectively" (Aesthetical Lectures 467). Beauty is the 
representation of dualsm as the synthesis of binary elements. Schiller disagrees with the 
theory which sees beauty as merely sensuous experience; he comments on Burke's view: 
"Burke, in his Philosophical Enquiry ... makes beauty into mere life'' (LJ5 103 fn). 
"Burke says, beauty arouses inclination, without desire for possession; a true, but only 
subjective explanation .... he derives true beauty also merely from physical causes ... " 
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(Aesthetica/ Lectures 469-4 70). Schiller also disagrees with other theories which regard 
beauty as merely form. "As far as I know, every adherent of dogmatic philosophy, who 
has ever confessed his belief on this subject, makes it into mere form" (Ll5 103 fn). 
It is interesting to observe, that my theory is a fourth possible form, to explain the 
beautiful. Either one explains it objectively or subjectively; and indeed either 
sensuous-subjective (as Burke among others), or subjective-rational (as Kant), or 
rational-objective (as Baumgarten, Mendelssohn and the entire flock of perfection 
men), or finally sensuous-objective: a term, whereof thou wilt now of course not 
yet be able to think much, except if thou comparest the three other forms with one 
another. Each of these preceding theories has a part of experience in favor of itself 
and obviously contains a part of the truth; and the error seems merely to be, that 
one has taken this part of beauty, with which it agrees, for beauty itself. 
(Kallias 483) 
Schiller intends to defeat the paradox- that the objectivity of beauty constitutes 
rational experience, while beauty comes from sensuous experience. Some researchers 
claim that Schiller does not adequately defend the concept of the objectivity of beauty, but 
we first of all have to define what objectivity means for Schiller. Since his definition of 
reason in an ideal sense is a compound of reason and sense, being objective means 
experiencing the harmonious relation of reason and sense. "I call beauty a duty of 
phenomena, because the requirement corresponding to it in the subject is grounded in 
reason itself' (Grace 349). In this context, being rational means being sensuous enough to 
be rational. For Schiller, beauty is the tool to establish the state of reason. Accordingly, in 
the experience ofbeauty, reason judges the object subjectively: 
In order to resolve this apparent contradiction ["nothing seems to remain to 
beauty, on account of which beauty could be the object of a reasoning pleasure"] 
we must recall, that there are two ways by which phenomena become objects for 
reason, and are capable of expressing ideas. It is not always necessary, that reason 
139 
draws these ideas from the phenomena, for reason can place ideas into them. In 
both cases the phenomena will be adequate to an idea of reason, but with a 
difference: in the first case, reason finds the idea objectively within, as if it only 
receives the idea from the object, because the conception must be posited, in order 
to explain the constitution, and often even the possibility of an object; whereas, in 
the second case, it makes that which is independent of its conception in the 
phenomenon, spontaneously into an expression thereof, and thus treats something 
merely sensuous, as if it were more than sensuous. Thus, in the first case, the 
connection of the idea with the objective is objectively necessary, whereas in the 
other, this connection is supremely subjectively necessary. I need not say, that by 
the former I understand perfection, by the latter beauty. (Grace 345-346) 
For Schiller, then, beauty is sensuous experience; however, beauty expands its sensitivity 
beyond the experiential world: the sublime and the beautiful together make " ... the 
aesthetic education a complete whole and expand the human heart's sensitivity to the 
entire scope of our calling, extending even beyond the world of senses" (Concerning the 
Sublime 84). Beauty as sensuous experience has to overcome our intellect to be objective, 
to realize ideal beauty in experience. Beauty is ''mere effect of the world of sense"; but 
since "reason makes transcendental use of this effect of the mere world of sense," we may 
place beauty "subjectively into the intelligible world" (Grace 346). 
Beauty is ... to be viewed as a citizen of two worlds, belonging to the one by birth, 
to the other by adoption; she receives her existence in sensuous nature, and attains 
to the right of citizenship in the world of reason. From this it is also explained how 
it happens, that taste, as a faculty of judgement of beauty, steps into the middle 
between mind and sense, and connects these two natures, each scornful of the 
other, in happy concord: as it teaches matter respect for reason, it also teaches that 
which is rational its sympathy for sensuousness; as it ennobles perception into 
ideas, it transforms the world of sense in a certain way into a realm of freedom. 
(Grace 346) 
Tills does not mean that the sensuous side should be stronger than the intellect. For 
example, works of art which are made only by passion are not fine works in Schiller's 
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aesthetical judgment. Both passion and intellect must be free from their own restrictions. 
"There does indeed exist a fine art of passion; but a fme passionate art is a contradiction 
in terms; for the unfailing effect of beauty is freedom from passion. No less self-
contradictory is the notion of a fine art which teaches (didactic) or improves (moral); for 
nothing is more at variance with the concept of beauty than the notion of giving the 
psyche any definite bias" (L22 157). 
In Schiller, only the objectivity of beauty can cancel the gap between matter and 
form. He writes that " ... just because it is both these things [beauty's character as form and 
life] at once, beauty provides us with triumphant proof that passivity by no means 
excludes activity, nor matter form, nor limitation infinity ... " (L25 187). He goes on to say 
that man can achieve second freedom despite depending ''upon physical things," and 
"Beauty is proof of this and, I must add, she alone can furnish such proof' (L25 187). 
Since we can realize ideality in experience, that is to say, the bridge between the dualities 
of the world such as the ideal and the real, this can lead us to moral freedom in the sense 
of realizing our original humanity as wholeness, mentally and politically. Thus we can be 
moral, which means following our nature to be free. Schiller writes, 
... beauty offers us .. ~ an instance of man not needing to flee matter in order to 
manifest himself as spirit. But if he is already free while still in association with 
sense, as the fact of beauty teaches, and if freedom is something absolute and 
supra-sensual, as the very notion of freedom necessarily implies, then there can no 
longer be any question for how he is to succeed in raising himself from the limited 
to the absolute, or of how, in his thinking and willing, he is to offer resistance to 
the life of sense, since this has already happened in beauty. (L25 189) 
The objectivity of beauty instantaneously establishes the way of being free and 
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moral since it the synthesis of matter and form. Throughout the Letters, each explanation 
of the relationship between opposed terms corresponds to the subjectivity and objectivity 
in beauty in the sense of the perfection ofhumanity. Thus, I contend that Schiller spends 
the entire Letters attempting to prove the objectivity of beauty. If we consider his view of 
the universe, either fragmented or not, it is clear that he is applying the basic schema C is 
the synthesis of A and B (wholeness is the synthesis of fragment and fragment) to beauty, 
as he does to other terms: 
























Schiller's ground of the objectivity of beauty lies in his theory of humanity as represented 
in the table above. Therefore, we see the concept of the objectivity of beauty: True 
objectivity is the synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity; True Nature/Civilization is the 
synthesis of Nature and Civilization; True Reason/Sense is the synthesis of Sense and 
Reason; and Living Form (True humanity) is the synthesis of Matter and Form. As in the 
above table, there are two kinds of objectivity in Schiller. One is one-sided or lower 
objectivity as in one-sided ideal and one-sided civilization which are fragmented; another 
is true or higher objectivity, as in true ideal or true civilization. He holds that "Every 
beauty of art requires, as imitation of nature, truth, and stands therein under objective 
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judgement" (Aesthetical Lectures 460). 
While analyzing beauty, we should note what Schiller warns about the hazards of 
analyzing the essence of beauty. We should recognize that "[beauty's] whole magic 
resides in its mystery, and in dissolving the essential amalgam of its elements we fmd we 
have dissolved its very being" (Ll 5). In civilization, language is a necessary tool. 
However, language expands fragmentation since it makes our analytical mind more 
fragmented, and moves our focus away from truth. The terms which represent humanity's 
dual character, such as objectivity and subjectivity, nature and civilization, reason and 
sense, or ideal and real, are the result of our rational minds, but also the result of 
fragmentation; therefore, language escalates the fragmentattion in thought. Schiller's 
intention is a harmonious unification of language (art or technology) and nature (our 
original intentions or thoughts before language made them fragmented). Without 
wholeness, there is no universal validity for each element in the world. There is no 
exception to this universal view in Schiller, as he stresses the world of alienation 
throughout his terms, as in freedom and regulation. 
4.14 Freedom and Regulation 
We see a pattern in Schiller's view of first freedom (the concept of freedom) and 
regulation similar to the one we find in his concept of fragmentation and wholeness -
which I have described as the relationship between nature and civilization, or reason and 
sense. Those are opposed but will be united, as in the following schema: 
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(True Humanity/ Living Form) 
(True) Ideality 
(True) Freedom (second) 
(True) Nature 
(True) Beauty 
Under the cooperating relation between the two sides - reason and sense, intellect and 
passion, and technique and nature - freedom (second) will be born by integrating freedom 
(first) and regulation. Schiller writes that the aim of man depends on his "concept ofthe 
dignity of man, which rests upon the self-activity on his reason, upon his freedom from 
sensuous impulses" (Aesthetical Lectures 460). Regulation in A means mass and gravity, 
or restrictions from other humans, such as brute force or an oppressive state. Schiller 
writes that " ... no object in nature and yet far fewer in art are free of purpose and rules, 
none is determined through itself, so soon as we reflect upon it. Each is there through 
another, each is there for another's sake, none has autonomy" (Kallias 493). 
In the above table, freedom (first) in B means the a priori, rational, and universal 
thought of freedom every human wants to realize, but does not have the power to realize 
since this concept, from the formal drive, does not correlate with the sensuous drive. 
Freedom (second) inC means a freedom which is visible and practical; that is, it is able to 
be practiced in accordance with regulations. 
When humans were the "slave[s] of nature" (L25 185) in the sense of being 
merely sensuous animals without rationality, they were powerless to create beauty in 
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themselves. That is to say, they did not have the ability to convert matter by form. 
However, when man reaches the stage where he is able to represent the dangerous forces 
of nature as form, as "object[s] ofhis contemplation" (L25 185), he can be free offear and 
assert his independence. ·schiller writes, "To the extent that [man] imparts form to matter, 
and for precisely as long as he imparts it, he is immune to its effects; for spirit cannot be 
injured by anything except that which robs it of its freedom, and man gives evidence of 
his freedom precisely by giving form to that which is formless" (L25 185). 
To illustrate his concept of freedom and beauty, Schiller uses the example of a 
horse pulling a wagon piled with heavy things (Kallias 505). The horse is not free to act; 
its activity is the result of external influences. Schiller holds that the nature of an animal is 
expressed through its movement or form, and the beauty of the animal is in inverse 
proportion to its mass and the effects of gravity. A free horse runs with a light, springy 
step, and this reflects his unhindered nature. He can move easily and quickly along the 
same path where a carriage horse struggles "with lead-weight feet .... the ponderousness of 
the movement makes the carriage horse momentarily in our representation into mass, and 
the characteristic nature of the horse is suppressed in the same by the universal bodily 
nature" (Kal/ias 505). Schiller sees beauty in the free horse because it has movement 
based on its nature, not controlled by mass. He also points out that birds symbolize 
freedom and "most excite sentiments of beauty" (Aesthetical Lectures 475) because we 
see beauty where mass is overcome by the forces of life. He writes, " ... we observe beauty 
everywhere, where the mass is fully dominated by the form and (in the animal and plant 
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kingdom) by the living powers (in which I place the autonomy of the organic)" (Kallias 
505). 
For Schiller, freedom is the will to determine oneself (mind) through material 
(body). He writes that" ... because a will, which can determine itself according to mere 
form, is calledfree, so is that form in the world of sense, which appears determined only 
through itself, a presentation of freedom; for presented is an ide~ which is so combined 
with an intuition, that both share with one another one rule of cognition" (Kallias 492). 
When we judge aesthetically, we want to know if the object has "independence of 
purposes and rules to the highest advantage," or, on the other hand, if the object "must 
rather be subjected to rules" (Kallias 493). This is not a contradiction for Schiller, because 
''the observed influence of a purpose and a rule is proclaimed as force and carries with it 
heteronomy for the object. The beautiful product is permitted and must even be regular, 
but it must appear free of regulation" (ibid.). 
For Schiller, freedom (second) is not merely a concept, but is visible in this world. 
Therefore, he writes, when it comes to aesthetic judgments, ''we are interested, not in 
morality of itself, but simply in freedom, and morality can please our imagination only 
insofar as it makes that freedom visible" (Pathetic 68). Although we are not completely 
free because of mass and gravity, we can be free in appearance, in the real experience of 
beauty, when we achieve victory in the war with matter. Schiller writes, "Free were the 
presentation, where the presented seemed itself to take action and to have fully exchanged 
the matter with that to be presented'' (A esthetical Lectures 4 77). Thus, the appearance of 
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beauty means the presentation of freedom. "Freedom in the appearance is therefore 
nothing other than self-determination with regard to a thing, in so far at it reveals itself in 
the intuition" (Kallias 492). Schiller holds that 
... because this freedom is merely lent to the object by reason, since nothing can be 
free except the super sensible, and freedom itself can never fall as such into the 
senses - briefly - since it is here merely a matter, that an object appear free, not 
actually is: so is the analogy of an object with the form of practical reason not 
freedom in action, rather merely freedom in the appearance, autonomy in the 
appearance. (Kallias 489) 
The medium or matter, as in the marble of a statue or the actor's "natural 
character" (A esthetical Lectures 4 77), must not be the thing which the viewer notices as a 
characteristic of beauty. Schiller applies the same thought to poetry, maintaining "The 
poet must seek to overcome the striving for universality, which lies in the nature of his 
language, antagonistic to individuality, therewith the presented appears in its true 
characteristic. Presented free self-action in nature through language is beauty in poetry" 
(ibid.). In Schiller, appearance is the most trustworthy way to realize freedom and beauty. 
Regarding Schiller's comment "Beauty ... is nothing other than freedom in the 
appearance" (Kallias 490), Norton states that this is Schiller's "most memorable yet 
enigmatic line," and goes on to say that many questions remain unanswered. 
If, as he seems to imply, beauty is indeed the sensuous manifestation of freedom, 
which otherwise has no corresponding physical expression, then one would first of 
all wish to know what the sensible attributes of beauty itself are. Schiller remained 
stubbornly silent on this vital topic, and at most he addressed it only negatively .... 
he never revealed what perceptible qualities do have something to do with beauty, 
and without some indication of what they are, the rest of his argument necessarily 
rests on extremely unsteady ground. (Norton 230) 
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Indeed, Schiller is clearly not addressing the sensuous attributes of beautiful objects. The 
experience of beauty, as in a horse running freely in a meadow, occurs in the mind of the 
subject, the individual viewing the scene. It is a sensuous experience of the subject. In 
Schiller's view, inner autonomy has to control the body, and when we observe that this 
condition exists in the object, we feel this is beauty. Schiller clearly holds that beauty does 
not have any particular physical condition, such as a figure, line, or symmetry, except 
freedom. "Regularity can thus not have value as the universal grounding concept of 
beauty, but rather .freedom, that is, the characteristic self-determined through the nature of 
a thing" (Aesthetical Lectures 474-75). Thus, for Schiller, freedom is the synonym of 
beauty, and "Freedom alone is the ground ofthe beautiful" (Kallias 510). Here, he is 
indicating freedom as an attribute of that which is unregulated; if it is necessary to exhibit 
a particular sensuous attribute to be free, as Norton claims, this is a lack of freedom and, 
therefore, beauty. Consequently, I do not hold that Schiller's comment "Beauty .. .is 
nothing other than freedom in appearance" (Kallias 490) is contradictory or confused as 
Norton alleges. 
Individuals are in and part of the whole, but must not be sacrificed to the aims of 
the whole. The aim of the state must be subordinate to the aims of the individual. "Beauty 
or rather taste regards all things as self-aim and by no means tolerates, that one serves the 
other as means or bears the yoke" (Kallias 513). Schiller writes that every citizen in the 
aesthetical world is a free citizen, possessing equal rights with all others, and "may not 
once be compelled for the sake of the whole, but rather must absolutely consent to 
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everything'' (Kallias 513). For Schiller, freedom is ''the harmony ofthe whole" (Kallias 
515) - each part following its own nature in the whole. 
A landscape is beautifully composed, when all individual parts, of which it 
consists, so play into one another, that each sets its own limits, and the whole is 
therefore the result of the freedom of the individual. Everything in a landscape 
should be referred to the whole, and everything individual should seem 
nevertheless to stand only under its own rule ... Men, animals, clouds want to 
move, for the freedom of the living expresses itself only in action. The river will 
accept in its course no law from the bank, but rather follows its own; in short: each 
individual desires to have its will. Where, however, remains now the harmony of 
the whole, when each concerns itself only for itself? Just therefrom does it follow, 
that each out of inner freedom directly prescribes itself the limitation, which the 
other needs, in order to express its freedom. (Kallias 514-515) 
Without restriction, there is no concept of freedom. Being alone in a wilderness is 
not freedom. Schiller claims that humans can realize themselves "as whole" only in 
society, not in a solitary life. He writes that man's "exalted freedom is absolutely nothing, 
if he is even bound in a single, solitary instance. Culture is supposed to put humans in a 
state of freedom and to assist in realizing the concept of a human person as whole" 
(Concerning the Sublime 71). Schiller illustrates the relation between wholeness, 
individuals, and freedom by using the example of an English dance on the stage. "I know 
no more suitable image for the ideal of beautiful behavior, than a well performed English 
dance, composed from many complicated figures" (Kallias 518). He points out that the 
thing which audiences see is unlimited movement; the dancers are mingling very rapidly, 
but they never crash although they seem to be acting as freely as they want. There is 
liveliness and brilliant order, and when groups of people are dancing, in the next moment 
someone different is dancing in the same place. Schiller writes, "It is striking, how good 
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fashion (beauty of behavior) is developed from my concept of beauty. The first law of 
good fashion is: Spare others' freedom. The second: Show freedom yourself," and the 
fulfillment ofthese laws "alone makes the complete man ofthe world'' (Kallias 518). For 
Schiller, if we can realize freedom, which brings morality, pleasure, and love, this will be 
the equal of realizing beauty, as he writes: "Freedom in the presentation of the physical 
and moral purpose of man could supply a true ideal of beauty, if, of course, all regularity 
in the presentation vanishes" (Aesthetical Lectures 473). 
In Schiller, freedom is a synonym of nature; it means being natural, and nature 
means something being itself, free from restriction although always subject to gravity and 
material. To graphically represent the relation between freedom and nature, Schiller drew 
a straight line with sudden change in direction and a wavy line which changes direction in 
smooth oscillations. 
Now is the entire difference between this second and the former merely this, that 
the former changes its direction abruptly, however, the latter unnoticeably; the 
difference of their effects upon the aesthetical feeling must therefore be grounded 
in this single observable difference of their properties. What, however, is a 
suddenly altered direction other, than one violently altered? Nature loves no jump. 
If we see it make one, then it shows, that violence has occurred to it. On the 
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contrary, only that movement appears voluntary, to which one can assign no 
determined point, in which it changed its direction. And this is the case with a 
wavy line, which is distinguished from the above - portrayed merely through its 
.freedom. (Kallias 51 7) 
For Schiller, beauty, rule, nature, and freedom coexist as necessary elements for each 
other. He writes, "As far as the ideal of beauty is concerned, all necessary movements 
must be beautiful, because, as necessary, they belong to its nature ... ~~ (Grace 340). He 
states that "mathematical regularity'~ is not beautiful~ and the "There are confused 
representations of perfection, which yet awaken directly no feeling of beauty; also, every 
judgement of beauty is not combined with the judgement of perfection" (Aesthetical 
Lectures 469). Even a perfectly drawn triangle, according to this view, could be less 
beautiful than an imperfectly drawn triangle which expresses its own freedom following 
its nature. 
4.15 Nature and Duty I Principle and Practice 
As in the relation of freedom and regulation, there is a corresponding relation 
between nature in the sense of our desire in the sensuous drive to preserve ourselves, and 
our duty in the formal drive to realize happiness for society. In the following table, the 
formal drive is represented as moral principle, freedom, and the ideal, while the other 
side, the side of the sensuous drive, is represented as nature, practice, regulation, and the 
actual. 
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C (Wholeness= Ideal Beauty) 
Play drive 
(True) Moral 
(True) Beautiful Action 
(True) Freedom (second) 
(True) Ideal 




As in the above table, for example, duty/moral and nature in line 1 will be expressed as 
not only true moral, but also as elements of other lines of wholeness, such as true free 
action, true beauty, and true reason. Here, as in the definition ofbeauty, 'moral' means the 
result of a combination of body and mind or the sensuous and rational. When beauty, the 
equivalent of nature and freedom, is realized because of the integration of the opposite 
sides, the act becomes a moral act. The circulated or interchangeable relations, such as C 
(Free Action -line 5) is the synthesis of A (Principle -line 2) and B (Actual- line 4) in 
the above table, show that being truly moral means being beautiful, natural, free, ideal, 
and rational. If the action lacks beauty, it also lacks the other characteristics. But if 
someone assists another selflessly, he "has forgotten himself ... fully" and "fulfilled [his 
duty] with an easiness, as if merely the instinct had acted from him" (Kallias 498). 
Schiller writes, "Therefore were a moral action then first a beautiful action, if it appears as 
an effect of nature arising from itself," and a free action is beautiful ''when the autonomy 
of the disposition and autonomy in the appearance coincide. From this ground is the 
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maximum of the character perfection of a man moral beauty, for it arises only then, when 
duty has become nature to him" (Kallias 498). Reason wants to influence our senses, to 
force us to act morally- to realize freedom for ourselves and others. Schiller holds that" ... 
[reason] declares, if [any] action is that which it wants and should be. Every moral action 
is of this kind. It is a product of the pure, i.e., of the will determined through mere form 
and therefore autonomously ... " (Kallias 488). 
In Table 4.15, elements under column A want to be free from elements under 
column B, and the converse is also true. For example~ duty/moral (column A, line 1) has 
to be free from practice (column B, line 2). Being completely free is not possible, but the 
elements can be free in appearance. Schiller writes, 
... we consider "every being in the aesthetical judgement as a self-aim" and it 
disgusts us (makes us indignant), to whom freedom is the highest, that something 
should be sacrificed to the other and serve as means. For that reason a moral 
action can never be beautiful, if we look on the operation, whereby it is frightened 
away from sensuousness. Our sensuous nature must therefore appear free in the 
moral, although it is really not, and it must have the appearance, as if nature 
merely carried out the instructions of our instincts, in which they bow down, 
directly opposed to the instincts, beneath the dominion of the pure will. 
(Kallias 499) 
Schiller gives an example of a moral act in Kallias, in a parable concerning the reactions 
of five individuals who encounter a man who had been beaten, robbed, and left to die. 
Four of the five passers-by react with a strong sense of either duty or self interest. The 
fifth, a Good Samaritan figure, acts "from the purest moral purpose," forgets himself, and 
"fulfilled [his duty] with an easiness," without self-interest (Kallias 498). 
If the object manifests beauty with morality- if it shows the object's nature and 
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freedom, then it is called ideal beauty in day-to-day experience. Schiller writes, "Although 
beauty only adheres to the appearance, so is moral beauty nonetheless a concept, to which 
something in experience corresponds" (Kallias 495 - 496). Schiller's moral beauty is the 
combination of reason, which means a principle to realize freedom, and sense, which 
means acting to satisfy our physical desire. For him, moral beauty represents freedom in 
appearance - overcoming restriction, and showing freedom through matter - which he 
calls beauty. For Schiller, the moral is a synonym of the natural, free, and rational; it is the 
united condition of the opposite relations. The moral does not mean merely rational or 
intellectual, but both the rational and sensuous combined. Schiller holds that moral beauty 
will be seen in freedom in appearance - the overcoming of matter by form or of nature by 
reason. He writes, "I can advance to thee no better empirical proof for the truth of my 
theory ofbeauty, than if I show thee, that even the different use of this word [applying the 
concept ofbeauty to moral beauty] only takes place in such cases, where freedom is 
shown in the appearance" (Kallias 496). 
4.16 Love as Beauty 
Schiller tries to answer the question which has been asked since ancient Greece -
what is love? He answers that love is beauty; that is to say, recovering our nature, 
overcoming alienation, and reaching wholeness. Schiller's efforts in the Letters can be 
seen as an attempt at defining the interdependent relations of nature, freedom, moral, and 
love under the concept of beauty; if we know what beauty is, then we know what moral, 
freedom, nature, and love are. Beauty comes from realizing our ultimate personality -
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which is represented as form through our actions. If we realize ourselves as works of fine 
art, then we can be called beautiful and we express morality and love; thus love is a 
synonym of beauty in Schiller. 
Schiller also classifies love as false and true. False love is based on love of either 
the material or form, and ignores the other side. True love is based on love of both, and 
the realization of freedom in mind and body for ourselves and others. Thus, love is aware 
of the beauty in each object. For example, someone who has an obsessive, controlling 
personality, and tries to restrict his lover's freedom does not have true love. Restricted 
freedom in a cage does not make a bird beautiful. Both a horse carrying a heavy burden 
and a person in prison lack freedom and beauty. Under such circumstances those animals 
and humans are not loved, and not able to love themselves; they are alienated from 
themselves and others. Slaves of the physical world, they are subject to gravity without 
the wings to regain freedom in mind and body. 
For Schiller, the ultimate goal of the aesthetic state is love for ourselves and others. 
Freedom in appearance (beauty) unites the inclination of reason and sense - and this 
condition is called love: 
Freedom in the appearance awakens not merely pleasure about the object, but 
rather also inclination to the same; this inclination of reason, to unite with the 
sensuous, is called love. We contemplate the beautiful properly not with respect, 
but rather with love; excepting human beauty, which however, includes expression 
of morality as object of respect in itself. - Should we at the same time love that 
which is worthy of respect, so must it be by us achieved or for us achievable. Love 
is an enjoyment, respect, however, is not; here is tension, there relaxation.- The 
pleasure of beauty arises, therefore, from the observed analogy with reason and is 
united with love. (Aesthetical Lectures 480) 
155 
If we are able to appreciate the moral element in each object, then we are able to love the 
object because we respect its natural status. If we see a lack of moral status in the object, 
we feel we should help it to realize the moral element. Therefore morality, represented as 
nature and freedom - the unity of reason and sense, is called beauty, and produces love. 
Schiller comments, ''The beautiful ennobles sensuousness, and makes reason sensuous. It 
teaches, to place a value upon form. With the beautiful one learns to love things without 
self-interest, merely on account of their form" (A esthetical Lectures 481 ). 
Love is the compound of reason and sense; for example, the bond between the 
sexes, Schiller writes, is based not merely on passion but on a "compulsion ... of a lovelier 
kind" and a "communion of hearts" (L27 213). 
Released from its dark bondage, the eye, less troubled now by passion, can 
apprehend the form of the beloved; soul looks deep into soul, and out of a selfish 
exchange of lust there grows a generous interchange of affection. Desire widens, 
and is exalted into love, once humanity has dawned in its object; and a base 
advantage over sense is now disdained for the sake of a nobler victory over will. 
The need to please subjects the all-conquering male to the gentle tribunal of taste; 
lust he can steal, but love must come as a gift. For this loftier prize he can only 
contend by virtue of form, never by virtue of matter. (L27 213) 
For Schiller, good means realizing love, and there is no goodness without beauty, 
freedom, and nature. For him, the desire that objects be beautiful and good "can exist 
together with the greatest freedom of mind" though "we can only wish for the beautiful 
and the good to be present" (Concerning the Sublime 73). 
The possibility of the realization of the aesthetic state comes from a refinement of 
our morality and love - by overcoming our dual characters. Schiller goes on to describe 
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how we will reach such a state with love!t which is the realization of our humanity!t 
through a playful mind - a synthesis of matter and form, or body and mind, or sense and 
reason - which is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 Play as the Perfection of Humanity 
5.1 True Play 
For Schiller, the task of reason is realizing beauty, and reason demands "a bond of 
union between the form-drive and the material drive; that is to say, let there be a play-
drive, since only the union of reality with form, contingency with necessity, passivity with 
freedom, makes the concept ofhuman nature complete" (L15 101-103). Neither the 
formal and sensuous drives, nor reason and sense, but only the play drive can reveal the 
beauty in humanity, or ''the consummation of [man's] humanity" (Ll5 1 03). 
There are three kinds of play in Schiller. One is ideal play, which can be seen only 
in a divine world; like the concept of ideal beauty which cannot be seen in real life, this 
ideal play will not be experienced in our earthy world. He claims that Greek mythology is 
symbolically indicative of the concept of ideal play, as the figure of gods and goddess, 
who do not have any restriction of matter, are able to do what we are supposed to do -
play freely . 
... [the Greeks] banished from the brow of the blessed gods all the earnestness and 
effort which furrow the cheeks of mortals, no less than the empty pleasures which 
preserve the smoothness of a vacuous face; freed those ever-contented beings from 
the bonds inseparable from every purpose, every duty, every care, and made 
idleness and indifferency the enviable portion of divinity - merely a more human 
name for the freest, most sublime state of being. Both the material constraint of 
natural laws and the spiritual constraint of moral laws were resolved in their 
higher concept of necessity, which embraced both worlds at once: and it was only 
out of the perfect union of those two necessities that for them true freedom could 
proceed. (LJ5 1 09) 
The second kind of play is actual play, such as in games and children's activities. 
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In the Letters, Schiller notes that he is not talking about this kind of lower play: "True, we 
must not think here of the various forms of play which are in vogue in actual life, and are 
usually directed to very material objects" (L15 1 07). 
While there is no beauty in the ordinary sense of play, we can find beauty in the 
third kind of play - truly ideal play which operates between matter and form, or reason 
and sense, in real life. "The beauty we find in actual existence is precisely what the play 
drive we fmd in actual existence deserves; but with the ideal of beauty that is set up by 
reason, an ideal of the play drive, too, is enjoined upon man, which he must keep before 
his eyes in all his forms of play'' (LJ5 107). This third play includes fine art, but Schiller's 
assertion that "man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, 
and he is only fully a human being when he plays" (L15 1 07), applies not only to the fine 
arts, but to the "art of living" (Ll5 1 09) as well, which is a more difficult task than the 
former. Here, the human psyche can be a lighthearted medium between the material drive 
and formal drive, which place demands on each other to preserve life from the condition 
and to preserve dignity from the ultimate ego person. "In a word: by entering into 
association with ideas all reality loses its earnestness because it then becomes of small 
account; and by coinciding with feeling necessity divests itself of its earnestness because 
it then becomes of light weight" (Ll5 1 05). This lighter feeling is called play. Under such 
a condition, life has dignity, duty allows for physical tendencies, and "our psyche accepts 
the reality of things, or material truth, with greater freedom and serenity once this latter 
encounters formal truth, or the law of necessity, and no longer feels constrained by 
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abstraction once this can be accompanied by the immediacy of intuition" (Ll5 1 05). 
Schiller, s theory of play might be regarded as impractical for real life if we focus 
on the psychological aspects of play. However, I claim- and illustrate in Table 5.1 which 
follows- that his concept of play is part ofhis dynamic view of wholeness and ofthe 
dialectic progress of humanity. When Schiller says only play makes humans complete, he 
is not referring merely to a playful mind in real life, but to playful mind and action, a 
synthesis of matter and form, body and mind. Until we act, we do not start playing, and 
we are not yet able to show beauty in ourselves. The play drive in the ideal, and beauty in 
the ideal, will make humans complete and realize social reform. 
Interpreting Schiller's play merely from the psychological viewpoint ignores his 
earnest motive for writing the Letters and his theme - how to put principle into practice in 
real life. Schiller is not limiting the experience of joy to appreciating beautiful objects in 
works of art, although he uses fine art as an analogy to describe constructing humanity. 
He is also not talking about leading a solitary life of mediation, leaning to the side of 
form: 
Man, as we know, is neither exclusively matter nor exclusively mind. Beauty, as 
the consummation of his humanity, can therefore be neither exclusively life nor 
exclusively form. Not mere life, as acute observers, adhering too closely to the 
testimony of experience, have maintained, and to which the taste of our age would 
fain degrade it; not mere form, as it has been adjudged by philosophers whose 
speculations led them too far away from experience, or by artists who, 
philosophizing on beauty, let themselves be too exclusively guided by the needs of 
their craft. It is the object common to both drives, that is to say, the object of the 
play drive. (Ll5 1 03) 
As the following table shows, as in the case where true ideal beauty will be realized by the 
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sublation of ideal beauty and actual beauty, true play will be realized by the sublation of 
ideal play and actual play. If we focus on Schiller's concept of play as mere mental 
activity, it might well lead us to defme his play as the ideal play in column A of Table 5.1, 
which does not have the possibility of realizing anything in actual life. Ideal play in 
column A means the activity of the formal drive without the material, which is impossible 
to realize in real life. 
Table 5.1 Three Kinds ofPlay 
Fragmented Humanity 















C: Fulfillment ofboth 
(True) Ideal Play 
Beautiful Action 
(True) Ideal 
(True) Ideal Beauty 
Play drive 
Living Form 
Interpreting Schiller's play as actual play in column B of the table is also a 
mistake. Actual play means play which involves only the material, as seen in the 
enjoyment of games. Schiller anticipates an objection which would come from such a 
misinterpretation; he asks whether or not beauty is "degraded by being made to consist of 
mere play" and diminished by being associated with play (Ll5 105). He asks, "Does it not 
belie the rational concept as well as the dignity of beauty - which is after all, here being 
considered as an instrument of culture- if we limit it to mere play?" (ibid.). However, 
Schiller is not dealing with such "mere play." 
We find Schiller's definition of play in C in Table 5.1 - true or ideal play which 
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must be realized in real life. "It [beauty] is the object common to both drives, that is to 
say, the object of the play drive. This term is fully justified by linguistic usage, which is 
wont to designate as 'play' everything that is neither subjectively nor objectively 
contingent, and yet imposes no kind of constraint either from within or from without" 
(Ll5 103-1 05). True play is the combination or synthesis of principle and practice, mind 
and action, or form and matter as living form. Play which operates either in the 
speculative or material world is not true play. 
The second category of play, actual play, will not be the solution to lead humans to 
morality and goodness, as it is based on the material. True play comes from the world of 
reason. Thus, in an aesthetic state, man will be subject ''to form even in his purely 
physical life," and "it is only out of the aesthetic, not out of the physical, state that the 
moral can develop" (L23 165). The play drive has the power to liberate humans from the 
material world of appetites. 
In Schiller, the war between matter and form is an allegory of playful activity - a 
peaceful mental condition achieved by the unity of opposed elements, intellect and 
feeling. "The law of [man's] will he must apply even to his inclinations; he must, if you 
permit me the expression, play the war against matter into the very territory of matter 
itself, so that he may be spared having to fight this dread foe on the sacred soil of 
freedom" (L23 167 -169). Through play, we easily overcome the binary elements, and in 
this moment realize our true nature. Schiller admits that his claim "man only plays when 
he is ... a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays" may appear 
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paradoxical, but it will "take on both weight and depth of meaning once we have got as 
far as applying it to the two-fold earnestness of duty and of destiny'' (Ll5 1 07). Schiller 
claims that we should push the natural character (sensuous drive) further from matter, and 
make the moral character (formal drive) closer to matter (L3 15). He writes, "The most 
frivolous theme must be so treated that it leaves us ready to proceed directly from it to 
some matter of the utmost import; the most serious material must be so treated that we 
remain capable of exchanging it forthwith for the lightest play" (L22 157). Devoting 
ourselves either to form or matter has not produced desirable results for humanity. To 
regain true unity with ourselves, to heal our fragmented condition, to start political 
reform, we must play. Schiller holds that "Once man is inwardly at one with himself, he 
will be able to preserve his individuality ... and the state will be merely the interpreter of 
his own finest instinct, a clearer formation of his own sense of what is right" (L4 21 ). 
When the third character, the play drive, predominates in a people, they are ready 
to reform their state with moral principles (L4 1 7). Only the play drive can start and 
continue the transformation, and create an aesthetic state, which is neither a natural nor 
moral state. Schiller claims that "the aesthetically tempered man will achieve universally 
valid judgements and universally valid actions, as soon as he has the will to do so" (L23 
163). An aesthetic state is also called a state of aesthetic semblance because this state will 
be made in the same way artists create their works of art, by their "art of semblance'' (L26 
197) - playing with beauty to unite both drives. Beauty is integral to this process of 
change; Schiller writes, "With beauty man shall only play, and it is with beauty only that 
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he shall play" (L15 I 07). It is aesthetic people who finally establish an aesthetic political 
state. Schiller adds, " ... we have to look aronnd for ... people who combine in themselves 
all the realities of life with the fewest possible limitations, and are carried along by the 
stream of events without becoming its victims," and he asserts that only such people "can 
preserve the beauty of human nature as a whole" (Naive 248). 
5.2 Contemplation 
Man in the first physical state is at one with the world, Schiller claims, and thus 
"there exists for him as yet no world" (L25 183). An escape from ''the material world and 
a transition to the world of spirit" (L25 185) happens when a man starts observing the 
world with awareness of himself. In this stage, man "contemplates" the world; "his 
personality differentiate itself from it, and a world becomes manifest to him because he 
has ceased to be one with it" (L25 183). Reason in this context expands by moving into 
the area of feeling. "Through the aesthetic modulation of the psyche, then, the autonomy 
of reason is already opened up within the domain of sense itself, the dominion of 
sensation already broken within its own frontiers ... '' (L23 163). At this point the spiritual 
man, Schiller states, can begin to develop from the physical man "according to the laws of 
freedom'' (ibid.). Schiller calls this awareness of self and the world contemplation. 
Contemplation (or reflection) is the first liberal relation which man establishes 
with the universe aronnd him. If desire seizes directly upon its object, 
contemplation removes its object to a distance, and makes it into a true and 
inalienable possession by putting it beyond the reach of passion. The necessity of 
nature, which in the stage of mere sensation ruled him with nndivided authority, 
begins at the stage of reflection to relax its hold upon him. In his senses there 
results a momentary peace; time itself, the eternally moving, stands still; and, as 
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the divergent rays of consciousness converge, there is reflected against a 
background oftranscience an image of the infinite, namely form. (L25 183) 
Schiller holds that contemplation brings a great change in man's inner world which may 
be compared to "a revolution in the outer [world]" (L25 185). 
We have three ways of relating to "nature (as appearance)'~ (Kallias 485), 
according to Schiller. They are"Passively: ifwe merely perceive its effects; actively, if we 
determine its effects; both simultaneously if we represent it" (ibid.) Humans~ in a 
prehistoric condition before they started using their rational ability, received objects 
passively; then they started observing actively with rationality, and finally both passively 
and actively simultaneously in contemplation. Schiller writes, "With contemplation of 
appearance we conduct ourselves passively, in that we receive its impressions: actively, in 
that we subordinate these impressions to our forms ofreason"(ibid.). By contemplation he 
means "we are invited by the things themselves to their representation" (ibid.). The 
important element of contemplation is enjoying both sides~ form and matter, and this 
experience Schiller calls beauty. 
Beauty, then, is indeed an object for us, because reflection is the condition of our 
having any sensation of it; but it is at the same time a state of the perceiving 
subject, because feeling is a condition of our having any perception of it. Thus 
beauty is indeed form, because we contemplate it; but it is at the same time life, 
because we feel it. In a word: it is at once a stage of our being and an activity we 
perform. (L25 187) 
He admits that beauty is "the work of free contemplation" which leads us to "the world of 
ideas," without "leaving behind the world of sense, as is the case when we proceed to 
knowledge of truth" (L2 5 185-187). Schiller holds that to get to the true ideal of human 
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ennoblement, man "must take leave of the actual world, for he can fashion it, like any 
ideal, only from inner and moral sources" (Naive 247). Man does not find it in his 
environment or busy life, "but only in his heart, and he finds his heart solely in the 
stillness of solitary reflection" (Naive 248). This holds the promise of change, for 
knowing such a state means acting to change the world. 
However, when Schiller advocates "solitary reflection,'' he does not mean living a 
solitary life. Both overly-isolated and overly-social people will be in danger of not 
realizing "the aesthetic mode of the psyche" (L2 6 191 ). 
Not where man hides himself, a troglodyte, in a cave, eternally an isolated unit, 
never finding humanity outside himself; nor yet there where, a nomad, he roams 
in vast hordes over the face of the earth, eternally but one of a number, never 
fmding humanity within himself- but only there, where, in his own hut, he 
discourses silently with himself and, from the moment he steps out of it, with all 
the rest ofhis kind, only there will the tender blossom ofbeauty unfold. (L26 191) 
Truth in Schiller comes from a dynamic synthesis of the passive and active conditions. A 
sensuous person lacks activeness in his intellect, while an intellectual person lacks the 
passiveness to feel. To be both, "he will have to become aesthetic" (L23 163). 
For Schiller, beauty transforms matter into form, and thus we feel joy in beauty 
which expands our material limitation. This pleasure is disinterested pleasure without 
purpose. When we see an object and experience its beauty, we do not distinguish the 
object from its appearance of beauty. This experience itself is called semblance6, which 
6 As a state reflects the character of its individual citizens, Schiller also calls the 
ideal political state a state of aesthetic semblance, created in the same way artists 
create works of art, by the "art of semblance" (L26 197). Aesthetic semblance is 
the experience of beauty by the play drive in every human activity. 
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can please us by the object's beauty without purpose- that is to say, it is a disinterested 
pleasure. According to Schiller, we are not able to establish an ideal political state yet 
since "we have not yet attained to the level of pure semblance at all, that we have not 
sufficiently distinguished existence from appearance, and thereby made the frontiers of 
each secure for ever" (L26 201-203). By play, false semblance will be converted by true 
semblance. False semblance does not change our morality. True semblance means a kind 
of illusion which changes our morality by the conversion of the psyche. 
Schiller writes, "We shall deserve ... reproach as long as we cannot enjoy the 
beauty of living nature without coveting it, or admire the beauty of imitative art without 
inquiring after its purpose .... " (L26 203). Play, as an activity in the experience of beauty, 
is meaningful because it is free from purpose. Regarding this disinterested pleasure, 
Schiller claims it does not contribute to man's character or knowledge: 
In the aesthetic state, then, man is nought, if we are thinking of any particular 
result rather than of the totality of his powers, and considering that absence in him 
of any specific determination. Hence we must allow that those people are entirely 
right who declare beauty, and the mood it induces in us, to be completely 
indifferent and unfruitful as regards either knowledge or character. They are 
entirely right; for beauty produces no particular result whatsoever, neither for the 
understanding not for the will. It accomplishes no particular purpose, neither 
intellectual nor moral; it discovers no individual truth, helps us to perform no 
individual duty and is, in short, as unfitted to provide a firm basis for character as 
to enlighten the understanding. (L21 145-14 7) 
This "meaninglessness" indicates meaning for humanity - transcending the ordinary 
definitions of real and ideal. "But how can we speak of mere play, when we know that it 
is precisely play and play alone, which of all man's states and conditions is the one which 
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makes him whole and unfolds both sides of his nature at once? ... the agreeable, the good, 
the perfect, with these man is merely earnest; but with beauty he plays" (L15 105-1 07). 
Leaving the material or formal states, either of which forces us to live seriously, for the 
aesthetic world, a middle-ground between the material and formal states, allows us to 
realize ideality in real life. 
5.3 Shaftesbury 
Schiller's ideas of play, in the sense of disinterested pleasure with harmony, 
probably was influenced by at least three forerunners- Shaftesbury, Moritz, and Kant. The 
Third Earl of Shaftesbury ( 1671-1 713 ), who first introduced the concept of disinterested 
pleasure in the experience of beauty, was commonly known in Germany at that time. Ives 
writes, "Shaftesbury's own writings were translated into German in 1745 by the 
theologian and popular philosopher Spalding, and those of his disciples Hutcheson and 
Ferguson by Lessing (1756) and Grave (1772) respectively. Grave's translation of 
Ferguson's Principles of Moral Philosophy is one of the few works known for certain to 
have been read by Schiller in his youth'' (Ives 16-17). After moving to Weimar in 1787, 
Schiller was directly influenced by his friend C. M. Wieland, an eager supporter of 
Shaftesbury's views, as Norton comments, "In 1788 ... [Schiller] mentioned in a letter 
from the end of November to Caroline von Beulwitz that he planned to read Shaftesbury 
during the following summer ... " (Norton 228). 
Shaftesbury, in his Characteristics, discusses disinterestedness and ethics. As 
Odin notes, "Shaftesbury's principle of disinterestedness originally emerged as a polemic 
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against egoism in ethics and instrumentalism in religions "(Odin 29). Odin holds that 
Shaftesbury contrasted the attitude of disinterest with the attitude "of 'enlightened self-
interest' defended by Thomas Hobbes" (ibid.). According to Shaftesbury, when we look at 
beautiful objects, our pleasure comes from a disinterested mind - in the sense of 
contemplation without self-interest or self-love, as follows: 
If you are already ... such a proficient [sic] in this new love [of beauty] that you are 
sure never to admire the representative beauty except for the sake of the original ... 
you may then be confident .... Imagine then ... if being taken with the beauty of the 
ocean, which you see yonder at a distance, it should come into your head to seek 
how to command it and, like some mighty admiral, ride master of the sea. Would 
not the fancy be a little absurd? ... Let who will call it theirs ... you will own the 
enjoyment of this kind to be very different from that which should naturally follow 
from the contemplation ofthe ocean's beauty. (Shaftesbury 318-319) 
Thus, ifwe act as "disinterestedly or generously as [we] please" (56), we are not 
concerned with possessing the object or gaining self-interest at all in the enjoyment of 
beauty. "What is new in the passage is that Shaftesbury opposes disinterestedness to the 
desire to possess or use the object" (Stolnitz 134). 
According to Shaftesbury, as in Schiller's concept of sensuous and formal drives, 
there are two kinds of impulses - one is the impulse to self-preservation and the other is 
an impulse to participate in society. The general good for society is the "good of the 
whole" (Shaftesbury 21 ), and this social impulse does not contradict the impulse to do 
private good. Since all things are connected and interdependent, loving oneself, being 
"rightly selfish" (56) or having ideal "self-love" (56), is the same as loving mankind. 
According to Shaftesbury, contemplation ofbeauty leads us to be moral- it creates 
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a harmonious relation between those two impulses. Ives claims that Shaftesbury attempts 
to show that the impulses overlap, and that his intent is to demonstrate ''that one's true 
self-good lies in the preservation and development of an ordered society ..... Grudzinski7 
considers that here the source of all later eighteenth century attempts to formulate 
schemes for the aesthetic education of Man may be seen, and he also believes that 
Shaftesbury was the first to use the word 'harmony' with reference to the inner life of the 
personality" (lves 16). 
According to lves, "Shaftesbury' s ideas can undoubtedly be traced back to Greek 
sources" (lves 13), especially Pythagoras, who viewed the universe as a whole with 
harmonious relations between each part, and Plato, who saw a harmonious personality in 
the unity of reason, desire, and passion (lves 14-15). In turn, Shaftesbury seems to have 
influenced Schiller concerning his concept of wholeness in relation to morality. In 
Characteristics, Shaftesbury has one of his characters, Theocles, address the omniscient 
"guardian deity": "Thy influence is universal, and in all things thou art inmost. From thee 
depend their secret springs of action. Thou movest them with an irresistible unwearied 
force, by sacred and inviolable laws, framed for the good of each particular being, as best 
may suit with perfection, life and vigour of the whole" (Shaftesbury 307). Shaftesbury 
claims that there is a universal order - a wholeness. He writes "All things [including 
humans] in this world are united" (ibid. 274), and when each part exists following its 
7 Polish literary critic and scholar Gustaw Herling-Grudzinski (1919-2000). 
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nature in a cooperative relation, there is harmony. For example, each animal and object 
has "mutual dependency,'' and has its functions and purposes in cooperation with others. 
"Thus, in contemplating all on earth, we must of necessity view all in one, as holding to 
one common stock" as "the works of nature" (ibid. 275). However, we often cannot see 
those relations as a whole, for "a mind which sees not infinitely, can see nothing fully 
and, since each particular has relation to all in general, it can know no perfect or true 
relation of anything in a world not perfectly and fully known" (ibid. 275). If we can 
integrate our private desire to get the necessities and the public desire to improve society, 
then individuals will gain harmony in themselves as virtuous persons, and be able to 
realize virtue in society. 
5.4 Moritz 
Shaftesbury does not make clear the connection between aesthetics and his 
concept of disinterested pleasure. However, Schiller's friend Karl Philipp Moritz (1756-
1793), a pioneer of German aesthetics, transformed Shaftesbury's ethical notion of 
disinterestedness into an aesthetical notion, which deeply influenced Schiller and 
probably influenced Kant. Schiller carefully read Moritz, and frequently mentions this 
writer, as inAesthetical Lectures (470). Moritz, in Toward a Unification of All the Fine 
Arts and Letters under the Concept of Self-Sufficiency ( 1 785) - published five years before 
Kant's Critique of Judgement- comments, "In contemplating a beautiful object ... I roll 
the purpose back into the object itself: I regard it as something that finds completion not 
in me but in itself and thus constitutes a whole in itself and gives me pleasure for its own 
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sake .... Thus the beautiful object yields a higher and more disinterested pleasure than the 
merely useful object" (qtd. by Woodmansee 12). Woodmansee writes that Moritz 
... gave the first unequivocal and systematic expression to what I have called our 
modem conception of the arts. Works of art, he argued in this [Toward a 
Unification ... ] and in his subsequent writings, are 'self-sufficient totalities' 
produced simply to be contemplated 'for their own sake'- that is, 
'disinterestedly,'- purely for the enjoyment of their internal attributes and 
relationships, independently of any external relationships or effects they might 
have. (Woodmansee 11) 
Moritz contrasts the utilitarian and the beautiful by referring to common, everyday objects 
in his home: 
I only look at the clock and the knife with pleasure insofar as I can employ them, 
and do not employ them for the sake of looking at them. In the case of the 
beautiful, the opposite holds. The beautiful does not have its purpose outside 
itself, and does not exist for the perfection of itself, but rather for its own intrinsic 
perfection. One does not look at it because one wants to employ it, but only 
employs it because one wants to look at it. (Moritz 24 7) 
As in Shaftesbury, Moritz uses disinterestedness as an antonym of selfishness. "Like the 
moral philosophers in Germany during this period, Moritz uses the terms ''unselfish" 
(uneigennutzig) and "disinterested" (unineressiert) interchangeably to denote the absence 
of any selfish ulterior motives or interests, denoted by the English term "disinterested" 
(Odin 32). 
Moritz claims that contemplation without ulterior motives or interests leads us to 
realize total humanity as wholeness. He claims, 
We do not need the beautiful object in order to be entertained as much as the 
beautiful object needs us to be recognized. We can easily exist without 
contemplating beautiful works of art, but they cannot exist as such without our 
contemplation. The more, we can do without them, therefore the more we 
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contemplate them for their own sake so as to impart to them through our very 
contemplation, as it were, their true, complete existence. 
(qtd. by Woodmansee 32) 
Woodmansee comments, "The artist's sole end or purpose in Moritz's model of art 
consists in the creation of a perfectly 'coherent harmonious whole' [ubereinstimmendes 
harmonisches Ganze ]'' (18). In Moritz, as in Schiller, we see the concept of wholeness as 
the total realization of humanity. Indeed, Schiller mentions Moritz when discussing the 
concept of wholeness: "The beautiful is recognized in the useful as superfluous. The 
useful receives its worth through its contribution to perfection of a whole. A whole is, 
what is completed in itself. Only the whole, which strikes the senses or can be embraced 
with imaginative power, is beautiful. - Up to here one can regard Moritz as right" 
(Aesthetical Lectures 4 70). 
5.5 Kant 
After Shaftesbury and Moritz, Kant systematized the concept of beauty and 
disinterestedness under the name of play. He defines beauty as the experience of pleasure 
which comes from disinterestedness. In Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment, he 
writes, "Taste is the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest" (Kant 96), and goes on to describe the 
object of satisfaction as beautiful. The beautiful, he holds, is ''that which, without 
concepts, is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction" (ibid.). Disinterestedness 
means we are interested in the object, but we do not have self-interest, concerning desire 
or utility, toward the object. Kant holds that only "the taste for the beautiful is a 
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disinterested and free satisfaction; for no interest, neither that of the senses nor that of 
reason, extorts approval" (ibid. 95), and the object of such a satisfaction is called beautiful 
(96). According to Kant, when understanding and imagination play without restricting 
each other so that "the facilitated play of both powers of the mind (imagination and 
understanding), [is] enlivened through mutual agreement" ( 104 ), we have the "feeling of 
free play" (102). He claims "In the judging of a free beauty (according to mere form) the 
judgement of taste is pure. No concept of any end for which the manifold should serve the 
given object and thus which the latter should represent is presupposed, by which the 
imagination, which is as it were at play in the observation of the shape, would merely be 
restricted" (114). 
Kant's intention is to establish the universal validity of claims to beauty. "Life is 
not merely an empirical awareness [in Kant's philosophy], even of the pleasure of moral 
acts, rather it is a universal forming power that seeks self-awareness. It is this deeper 
notion of life that Kant integrates into his aesthetic theory as its transcendental grounding" 
(Wessell132). Beauty is a subjective experience, yet, many individuals have common 
judgements regarding taste. Kant comments, "This state of a free play of the faculties of 
cognition with a representation through which an object is given must be able to be 
universally communicated, because cognition, as a determination of the object with whi~h 
given representations (in whatever subject it may be) should agree, is the only kind of 
representation that is valid for everyone" (Kant 102-103). Wessell notes that "aesthetic 
theory cannot generate any universality or necessity, as Kant clearly saw .... Kant also 
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located the aesthetic in subjectivity. However, Kant showed that subjectivity itself evinces 
a rational structure. This structure generates universality in judgments of taste" (Wessell 
13 6). Thus, "The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds" (Kant 1 06) and a universal 
condition to determine what is beautiful. 
The play drive for Kant is a key to explain the subjectivity of beauty with its 
universal validity. Wessell observes that for Kant, as for Schiller, unity in multiplicity is 
rational and objective: 
Any universe for Kant must be a function of necessary, a priori and universal 
principles. And feeling in its empirical content is always contingent and particular. 
Only form can constitute a manifold as a universe. The form (or objectivity 
constant) of an aesthetic universe cannot lie in Gefiihl as the content (manifold) of 
aesthetic awareness, rather only in the reflective act whereby the percipient subject 
determines itself to its affective contents. (Wessell 13 1-13 2) 
Wessell also points out that Kant and Schiller have similar attitudes toward wholeness as 
a synthetic unity of parts: "Schiller's concept ofhuman nature has much in common with 
Kant's. For Kant (and for Schiller) experience involves a manifold held together in a 
synthetic unity. In all experience there is a plurality of determinations that are woven 
together to form a synthetic whole" (Wessell 138). 
To the concept of the play drive which he inherited from Kant, Schiller added his 
own teleological view of wholeness: the fragmented condition which will be healed in the 
dialectical process ofbecoming whole in the progress of the individual and of history. 
5.6 Conclusion- Is Play Realistic? 
Throughout the Letters,- we see connections between each concept and word, and 
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when we look at them all as one, it is evident that Schiller's intention is to construct 
systematic wholeness as a universally valid principle by a dialectical transformation in 
every aspect of life. In the order of the universe, everything has its own nature and 
purpose. For Schiller, the quest for wholeness is indeed the quest for humanity. 
Because of his intention to construct a systematic wholeness, Schiller attempts, 
like Kant, to reconcile rationalism and empiricism. For Schiller, objectivity and 
subjectivity, ideal and real, truth and fact, reason and sense, form and matter, mind and 
body must be a oneness, a unity, as they are "two sides of the same coin." In Schiller, 
aesthetic means the manifestation of perfection - in the sense of a unity of the manifold. 
Thus, there are two kinds of worlds in Schiller; one is fragmented or one-sided and the 
other is united or synthesized, as follows: 
Table 5.2 Two Kinds ofReality 
Fragmented reality (Clear border) 
Ideal- Real 
Mind- Body 
Reason - Sense 




Because he deals with two kinds of reality, Schiller uses each term in one or the other of 
the two contexts. This complexity has understandably confused many of his readers. 
In Schiller, individual reform is necessary prior to social reform, as he claims: 
" ... we must continue to regard every attempt at political reform as untimely, and every · 
hope based upon it as chimerical, as long as the split within man is not healed, and his 
nature so restored to wholeness that it can itself become the artificer of the state, and 
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guarantee the reality of this political creation of reason" (L 7 45). 
Here, we should note what Schiller means by social reform. Social reform for 
Schiller is not a rebuilding of a natural state where the sensuous drive governs, and 
controls its citizens by power, nor an attempt to build a moral state where the formal drive 
governs, and controls its citizens by laws regulating morality. Social reform for Schiller 
means building the aesthetic state, which frees man "from the shackles of circumstances," 
and releases him from "all that might be called constraint, alike in the physical and moral 
sphere" (L27 215). In this ideal state, all individuals are respected as free citizens; "In the 
aesthetical world, which is entirely different than the most perfect Platonic republic, even 
the coat, which I carry on my body, demands respect from me for its freedom, and desires 
from me, like an ashamed servant, that I let no one notice, that it serves me" (Kallias 
513). 
At the end of the Letters, he addresses the question of whether the aesthetic state 
exists at all and, if so, where it might be found: 
As a need, [a state of aesthetic semblance] exists in every finely attuned soul; as a 
realized fact, we are likely to find it, like the pure church and the pure republic, 
only in some few chosen circles, where conduct is governed, not by some soulless 
imitation of the manner and morals of others, but by the aesthetic nature we have 
made our own; where men make their way, with undismayed simplicity and 
tranquil innocence, through even the most involved and complex situations, free 
alike of the compulsion to infringe the freedom of others in order to assert their 
own, as of the necessity to shed their dignity in order to manifest grace. (L2 7 219) 
When Schiller states that the need for the aesthetic state "exists in every finely attuned 
soul," he means we need individual reform first of all, as he stresses throughout the 
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Letters. On this basis, the possibility of a political aesthetic state exists. The citizens of 
such a state do not act to deprive each other of freedom; indeed, "none may appear to the 
other except as form, or confront him except as an object of free play" (L27 215). Here we 
clearly see Schiller's revolution is ideal revolution (reform to achieve morality in ~ 
individuals and society), but not realistic revolution (reform only society with brute 
force), as I discuss in Section 4.5, Two Kinds ofRevolution. 
However, Schiller is not saying that we have to wait to reform society, and suffer 
under oppressive power, with the vague hope of realizing the majority of people's mental 
reform to attain an ideal personality. On the contrary, in his view, we must engage with 
the outer world. We must resist any lack of freedom, equality, and fraternity, that is to 
say, lack of morality in each era. Schiller has high regard for the human dignity displayed 
in the battle to regain freedom. Hence, for Schiller, play with joy is a most strategic way 
to gain victory, instead of a bloody struggle with fearful seriousness; he writes that man 
"must ... play the war against matter into the very territory of matter itself, so that he may 
be spared having to fight this dread foe on the sacred soil of freedom" (L23 167-169). 
Only the play drive can simultaneously realize intention and action, or reason and 
sense, as in children who cannot stop playing with toys as they are attracted to the objects. 
Once we start to use the play drive as our guide, the battle between matter and form will 
be changed instantaneously into play. Schiller claims that beauty influences us "not by 
providing an aid to thought ... but merely by furnishing the thinking faculty with the 
freedom to express itself according to its own laws ... " (L19 131). Thus, we go back to 
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nature by using the play drive in ordinary life to be beautiful and free, to awaken from the 
nightmare of alienation into the real world. 
In Schiller's view, an individual who cannot control his emotions cannot control 
the outer world. Anger, for example, is not an effective motivation for reform; angry 
reformers will give up or lose sight of their true goals. More strategic ways to reform the 
outer world arise from reforming the inner world. By putting the world outside ourselves 
(L25 183), and contemplating our actions, we will begin to heal ourselves first, and then 
the world. When play sublates the opposing elements, social reform begins side by side 
with individual reform. The aesthetic state is a practical mode of society, as Schiller 
contends " ... beauty alone can confer upon [man] a social character," and "The aesthetic 
state alone can make [society] real, because it consummates the will of the whole through 
the nature of the individual" (L27 215). 
In Schiller, language reflects the alienated human condition and thought; ideality 
is opposed to reality, nature is opposed to civilization, and freedom is opposed to duty as 
language tends to present one-sided definitions as fragments. He offers a transformation 
of mankind's sense of values. Thus, an "easy" way to reform society which is "practical" 
and "realistic" might be difficult, impractical, and overly idealistic in Schiller's view. If 
we follow those terms and sense of values based on the common, fragmented definitions, 
since our actions accompany our language, according to Schiller, it will slow the 
development of human progress, and postpone reaching the end of the natural state and 
establishing the aesthetic state. 
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The Letters is, I hold, Schiller's "aesthetic mode of communication" with his 
readers. He claims: 
Taste alone brings harmony into society, because it fosters harmony in the 
individual. All other forms of communication divide society, because they relate 
exclusively either to the private receptivity or to the private proficiency of its 
individual members, hence to that which distinguishes man from man; only the 
aesthetic mode of communication unites society, because it relates to that which is 
common to all. (L27 215) 
When we dissolve the border in the definitions of terms, that is to say, synthesizing the 
opposing elements as in Schiller's definitions of ideality, reason, nature, beauty, and play, 
we finally start being free from the inconsistency of our dualism - our alienation. Critics 
who claim that Schiller lacks the ability to define his terms should recognize that he 
defines his terms in a deliberate, aesthetic manner - through a dialectical process 
involving form and matter. 
Regarding the practicality of applying Schiller's concept of the aesthetic state 
through using the play drive, the reaction of many readers of the Letters is that this is not 
practical or realistic since Schiller does not show any clear method of how to perform play 
in real life. However, we should note that one cannot be forced to play. One cannot be 
forced to do that which does not come from one's inner life. There is no rule, method, or 
short cut to play since freedom is essential for play. As I discuss in Chapter 4.15 -Nature 
and Duty, the Good Samaritan figure, without a mental conflict between practice and 
principle, between freedom and regulation, was playing between the duality within 
himself when he helped the injured man A beautiful soul or playful mind which makes 
180 
action and mind instantaneously one will be found only in such a harmonious individual. 
Is Schiller's play realistic? From a one-sided or fragmented definition (A or B) of 
play, it is unrealistic, since realistic means focussing on material needs. However, from a 
united or true definition (C), play is realistic, and encompasses mental in addition to 
physical needs. From Schiller's point of view, the answer to the question reflects one's 
degree of alienation- as either a fragmented or a united personality. Until we start to play, 
we cannot convert the true meaning of real and ideal or false and truth. The Letters may 
be regarded as a mirror for each individual to search for wholeness by overcoming 
alienation. By reading the Letters, and deciding whether or not play is realistic, we are 
already starting our aesthetic education- the quest for wholeness. 
To realize beauty in humanity, Schiller asks what realistic and true means, and 
shows that the poet's duty is to "overcome the tendency of language to the universal 
through the greatness of his art and triumph over the matter (words and their laws of 
inflection and construction) through the form (namely the application of the same)" 
(Kallias 526). Schiller's approach is to gain victory through language, and through this 
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